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Abstract 
Radio frequency identification (RFID) enabled devices are becoming increasingly 
common in today’s world, facilitating many things from supply chain efficiencies to 
medical equipment tracking. The majority of studies into such systems centre on 
technical and engineering issues associated with their implementation and operation. 
Research outside of this scope generally focuses on RFID systems in isolated private 
sector supply chains. Less common is research on RFID systems within the public 
sector, and this research generally occurs within the health, defence, or agriculture 
areas.  
Using a combination of Actor-Network Theory (ANT) and Institutional Theory, this 
qualitative study examines how RFID is used within the public sector/private sector 
RFID network. Interactions across public and private sector RFID networks are 
examined in order to identify common themes within the network, and to determine 
where the needs of the two sectors diverge. Twelve themes were identified that acted 
as ANT mediators within the network, across three dimensions. These mediators 
differed in activity depending on where within the ANT translation they were 
strongest. A number of the mediators were also found to exert institutional pressures 
on organisations within the network, contributing to their strength during translation.  
The relationship between the two sectors was also examined. Findings indicated that 
some mediators were stronger within the public sector, particularly with respect to 
privacy and legislation. It was further found that the relationship between the two 
sectors was confused by the multiple different roles taken by the public sector within 
the translation. This multiplicity at times confused both public and private sector 
partners, leading to uncertainty within the network. 
This study contributes to research by addressing a gap in understanding of RFID 
systems in the public-private sector context. It also provides practitioners with a 
guideline as to which mediators should be addressed when contemplating an RFID 
system within this context, as well as indicating possible reasons the relationship 
between organisations in the two sectors may be challenging. In addition, the unusual 
combination of ANT and Institutional Theory contributes to theory by pointing 
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towards a possible new way to investigate complex technology systems at the 
organisational level.  
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1 Introduction 
This research was motivated by the desire to investigate how Radio Frequency 
Identification (RFID) enabled devices are used in applications which are shared 
between the public and private sector, or where both public and private sector 
(public-private) entities are involved in one RFID system. Public-private RFID enabled 
systems might occur in supply chain applications, where both public and private sector 
organisations use RFID enabled devices to track and trace items along a single supply 
chain. Applications can also be more complex, such as animal health and traceability 
systems involving farmers, farming entities, governance bodies, animal health, and 
public sector agricultural organisations, enabling regulations and RFID sensors. 
RFID systems within the public-private context are currently under-researched even 
though they are becoming broadly implemented. Thus, the implications of such 
systems need careful consideration and understanding. 
This thesis will relate the story of this investigation, and report findings in relation to 
the operation of RFID enabled technology systems that are shared between the public 
and private sectors. It will discuss how these systems are established and maintained, 
primarily using Actor Network Theory (ANT) as a framework for this understanding. 
This first chapter will present an introduction to the research, and a brief overview of 
the nature and use of RFID systems in the public-private sector context. 
1.1 Overview 
The story of human interaction with computing devices goes as far back as 2300 BCE, 
with Ifrah (2001) noting the appearance of what is considered to be the first 
computing device - the abacus. Today the abacus would hardly be considered, or 
recognised to be a computer as it lacks electronic components. Rosenberg (2004) 
believes that modern electronic computing has its origins in the ENIAC computer of 
the early 1940’s, the first computer considered to be digital and fully capable of 
reprogramming. Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) also arose during the early 
1940s, as a result of World War II when the British Royal Air Force developed a radar 
based system to identify incoming aircraft known as the “Identification Friend or Foe 
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(IFF)” system (Banks, Pachano, Thompson, & Hanny, 2007). According to Miles, (2008) 
this system was based on a radio frequency transponder (or tag) on the aircraft 
responding correctly to an enquiry from the ground 
based interrogator (or reader) in order to identify 
friendly aircraft, this process is demonstrated by 
Figure 1. Although RFID technology became 
commonplace in the 1970’s, this basic conformation of 
tag and reader is still in use in current RFID 
applications (C. M. Roberts, 2006). Today, we exist in a 
world awash with devices that have computing 
capabilities. Apart from the easily recognised personal computer, mobile phones and 
calculators, there are nanotechnology and sensor devices of all sorts, not to mention 
RFID enabled devices. The nature of human interaction with these less obvious 
digitalised devices is also changing, as is the way technology is viewed by people and 
organisations. 
Today’s RFID technology facilitates a wide range of different processes and actions, 
from its most common application in smoothing the supply chain, to innovative uses 
such as tagging bees in order to study their foraging behaviour, related by Swedberg 
(2011). According to Wyld (2005) the utility of these RFID enabled applications is 
significantly enhanced by the ability of such systems to identify individual items rather 
than simply identifying item type, through the use of an Electronic Product Code (EPC). 
This coding allows for the identification and location of individual items, and is an 
advance on the familiar barcode type systems, which can identify items only to the 
item (or product) type (Wyld, 2005).  
As well as supply chain uses, RFID facilitates new possibilities for human/computer 
interaction arising both from different ways a computer can be used, and the 
increasing commonness of computing devices with the capability to interact with the 
Internet, and with each other. These new interactions and uses have attracted a range 
of theories and models to describe them. Terms such as ubiquitous computing, first 
coined by Weiser (1991), disappearing computing, pervasive, calm, invisible, and 
Figure 1: Early IFF System Tag and 
Reader Operation 
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experiential computing have all been used to describe similar, if not the same, 
relationships between people and computing devices.  
One of the most widely discussed models of the future of human interaction with 
computers and computing devices is the Internet of Things, a concept of the future 
where RFID enabled products (things) with unique EPCs communicate with each other, 
their owners, and the Internet (Slettemeas, 2009; Welbourne et al., 2009). Konomi 
and Roussos (2007) believe that the ability of objects to connect to each other, and 
the Internet, is a key to the Internet of Things future, and RFID is the technology 
through which much of this communication is happening. 
Researchers are now looking to extend even further this concept of the RFID enabled 
Internet of Things. Yoo (2010) suggests that computing will become experiential – 
going beyond human interactions with computers for the purpose of performing tasks, 
instead focusing on digitally mediated everyday life experiences. Similar to its role in 
the Internet of Things, RFID plays a central role in this model facilitating the 
communication of RFID equipped items, known as digitalised artefacts, with each 
other, people, and organisations, via the Internet.  
1.2 Problem Context 
The spread of RFID technology has attracted the interest of a number of researchers. 
Irani, Gunasekaran and Dwivedi (2010), analysed 666 peer reviewed academic papers 
covering 283 journals, finding that the majority were technical in nature with 60% 
looking at technology development issues, 9.5% supply chain management and 8% 
adoption issues. The economic, legal, political or social environment was discussed in 
only 7.5% of papers. They also found that there was a relative lack of publications in 
respect of government, ethics or legal issues relating to RFID, and noted that 
publications in this category were mainly dominated by research into privacy. Ngai et 
al. (2008) analysed 85 academic papers and came to similar conclusions, finding that 
papers on RFID technology and hardware made up 36% of the published literature. 
They also noted the relative paucity of papers in respect to RFID policy - those 
published dealt with security and privacy with only two dealing with standardisation, 
despite recognising the need to standardise networks in order to facilitate data 
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sharing and the Internet of Things (Ngai et al., 2008). Wyld (2005) called for further 
research on the impact of RFID on society, business, law and ethics, and also noted 
that much of the RFID research available at the time looked at reinventing current 
processes rather than focusing on new ideas and new ways of doing things. This focus 
on the technical nature of RFID systems, and calls for research on the social 
implications of such systems, identifies a gap in the academic literature which this 
study will address. 
1.2.1 Isolation of RFID Systems 
Despite different computing models describing how the future might look with 
completely connected technology systems (including RFID) offered by researchers 
such as Weiser (1991) and Yoo (2010), Santucci (2010) notes that many of the RFID 
systems in operation today function in isolation either within one organisation alone, 
or along a single supply chain of manufacturers and consumers. Further adding to this 
isolation is that these RFID systems seldom cross the boundary between private and 
public sectors and where they do, they seldom affect core government services, being 
almost completely limited to supply chain applications. Chatfield, Wamba and Totano 
(2010) for example, found that the e-government literature contained few references 
to the use of RFID technology in public safety applications. They also noted the on-
going lack of research regarding RFID policy that had previously been identified by 
Ngai et al. (2008). 
1.2.2 Issues Identified by RFID Research 
Banks et al. (2007) found that where studies discuss RFID in the public sector, they 
mainly concentrate on the defence, border control and health sectors where the 
technology is most widely used. Neuby and Rudin (2008) suggested that identification 
of individuals and things, individual access control, monitoring, and tracking were 
general areas in which RFID has uses both in the public and private sectors. They also 
identified barriers to RFID implementation including cost and privacy. In the 
agricultural sector, Gogan, Williams and Fedorowicz (2007) examined an RFID system 
focused on tracking animals from the farm to the table (including the involvement of 
various public sector agricultural agencies), and noted difficulties in implementation 
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that included a lack of uniform data standards and differing levels of collaboration 
between organisations.  
Dawes (2008) noted the importance of information sharing between public and 
private organisations in achieving success where projects crossed the boundary 
between the two, also finding that issues of data ownership presented a barrier to 
successful information sharing. The European Commission (2009) identified policy 
development and coordination, data protection, and infrastructure management 
amongst others, as areas in which government has a role in overseeing the spread of 
the Internet of Things. However, aside from a few specific case studies, some of which 
are mentioned above, there is little research discussing the use of RFID in the public 
sector and its use between public and private sectors, or on how RFID systems might 
change core government systems and processes. In the private sector, similar issues 
with RFID systems have been identified, including both data and infrastructure 
standards, privacy and security. 
1.2.3 How are RFID Systems Established? 
Some research has been directed at determining how RFID systems are adopted 
within various contexts, using a range of technology implementation and adoption 
models. For example, Wamba and Chatfield (2009) developed a contingency model of 
RFID adoption based on the Diffusion of Innovation theory proposed by Rogers (2003), 
and the Venkatraman framework (Venkatraman, 1994). They found that the level of 
organisational transformation was related to the benefit organisations derived from 
implementing RFID systems. Kros et al. (2011) studied RFID acceptance using 
Structural Equation Modelling (SEM), and determined that technology readiness had a 
positive impact on RFID adoption, while satisfaction with existing organisational 
technology inhibited RFID adoption. Carr et al. (2010) undertook one of the few 
studies reported in the public sector, applying the Technology Acceptance Model to 
RFID systems in the healthcare sector. They determined that risk, change resistance, 
ease of use, and support from suppliers were indirectly related to each other, while 
there was no direct relationship between intention to use and perceived ease of use 
of RFID technology. However, despite these studies no research could be located that 
addressed how RFID technology was adopted and maintained within systems that 
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crossed the boundary between public and private sector. Instead, what research there 
was focused on either adoption decisions, or those taken during technology 
implementation. 
1.2.4 The Need for Broader Research 
The limited scope of most research into RFID is inhibiting understanding of the range 
of issues that need to be addressed before more widespread RFID systems can be 
considered. In their study of RFID adoption Wamba and Chatfield (2010) found that 
studies considering the adoption of RFID technology mainly focused on the retail 
sector. They went on to point out that further research was needed in this area if 
organisations were to achieve the level of change needed before they could fully 
utilise their RFID systems. Recognising the need for more broadly based research Yoo 
(2010) recommended that researchers expand the scope of their enquiries to look at 
“various issues and opportunities that arise as organisations try to embed various 
forms of digital technology into their products and services “(Yoo, 2010, p. 244). 
However, even Yoo does not mention how the public sector might fit into this new, 
experiential computing model he described, nor how the public and private sectors 
might combine to deliver innovative products and services using RFID systems. 
1.3 Problem Summary 
Although there is some research available addressing RFID use in the supply chain, and 
a more limited amount of research focused on the use of RFID in specific public sector 
applications, there is little general research addressing RFID systems shared between 
the public and private sectors. Nor could much research be found addressing how 
such systems are maintained within the public-private sector context. As a result, no 
satisfactory explanation was found addressing the factors that should be considered 
when managing such systems. Nor were the wider implications of the various 
computing models discussed in any detail. This leaves a gap in research in respect of 
how RFID systems become established and are maintained on an on-going basis where 
such systems are shared between the public and private sectors. 
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1.4 Research Objectives and Question 
The objective of this research is to examine how RFID based technology systems come 
to be established in applications which cross the boundary between the public and 
private sectors. The factors that assist in establishing and maintaining such systems 
will be identified, and any differences apparent between public and private sectors 
will be discussed. Thus the overarching research question can be derived as follows: 
Research Question: How are public-private RFID systems established and maintained? 
In this study the term established will be taken to encompass the decisions and 
actions taken in deciding to use, and bringing into operation, RFID systems within an 
organisation. Where maintenance is discussed it will be in relation to the on-going 
support and management required in order to ensure RFID systems continue to 
operate within the organisation.  
Recognising that the term implementation can mean both the establishment of an IT 
system and the completed system itself, thus leading to confusion, this study will use 
the term implementation in respect of the installation and establishment of the RFID 
technology. Otherwise the term system will be used to describe the technology 
system itself, separate from the act of its implementation. 
1.5 Definitions  
The following definitions of key terms and concepts are used in this thesis, all are 
discussed in more detail in the Literature Review following, and a glossary is available 
in Appendix E – Glossary. 
 Digitalised Artefacts/Devices are objects or things augmented with digital 
sensors, RFID tags or similar devices, allowing them to respond to and/or 
communicate with the Internet or other digital artefacts (Yoo, 2010). 
 Electronic Product Code (EPC) is the most widely spread coding scheme used by 
RFID devices to identify themselves when queried by an RFID reader (EPCglobal, 
2010). 
 Government, is defined following Shaw and Eichbaum (2011) as the group of 
individuals and institutions, including the public service, Parliament, and 
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government departments, that work together in order to produce government 
policy.  
 The Internet of Things is created by the network of digitalised devices (things) 
communicating with each other and with computers (and humans) through the 
Internet (Atzori, Iera, & Morabito, 2010). 
 Private Sector can be simply defined following the Oxford Dictionary (2013) as 
“the part of the national economy that is not under direct state control”. 
However, Parsons (1995) refines this by taking an economic perspective, 
considering the private sector to be that sector of the economy which 
produces goods which are purchased by choice, and not under control of the 
state. 
 Public Sectors following the Oxford Dictionary (2013) could be defined as “the 
part of an economy that is controlled by the government”. However, the public 
sector can be difficult to define according to Lindgren and Jansson (2013). They 
consider that the public sector consists of those organisations that co-ordinate 
public administration. Parsons (1995) defines the two sectors economically, in 
terms of the goods they produce, with the public sector producing goods 
which are available to all and not necessarily produced in response to the 
demands of the market. 
 Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is the process by which a device tagged 
with a transponder, in response to a signal from a reader, identifies itself with 
a unique response (Lahiri, 2006). 
 Supply Chain, is defined by Hatch (2012) as the flow of raw materials, or 
products, from their origin to their final consumer. 
1.6 Research Design and Methodology 
For this research the qualitative paradigm is considered most appropriate to answer 
the research questions as the study seeks to find meaning in the reality observed (or 
constructed) by the organisations and individuals that use and interact with RFID 
systems. Creswell (2009) finds that qualitative research is best used when not much 
research has been done on a particular issue. Similarly, Yin (2009) outlines three 
criteria where qualitative research is indicated – where the research is focused on a 
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modern, real life issue; where the researcher does not influence proceedings and/or 
where the research question is a how or why question. As this study involves a 
complex, modern, social phenomenon about which little is known, it is considered 
that a qualitative study is the best approach to answering the research questions. 
1.6.1 Theoretical Approach to this Research 
A number of theories and frameworks are used to address questions in relation to the 
place of technology in organisations, and society. For example, the Technology 
Acceptance Model (TAM) developed by Davis (1986), focuses on the intention of users 
to adopt technology, with particular emphasis on the ease of use and perceived 
usefulness of the technology itself. Also widely used, Diffusion of Innovations (DoI) 
Theory, described by Rogers (2003), examines how innovations move through society 
based on flows of information and social processes. Eze, Duan and Chen (2012) 
consider these theories to be deterministic, hence failing to account for the range of 
interactions seen in technology systems. More generally, Structuration Theory 
formulated by Giddens (1979) emphasises that the relationships between human 
agents and social structures are based on dual analysis of both agency and structure, 
thus the social can also take part in the development of technological structures.  
However, this research is not bounded by a particular part of the lifecycle of RFID 
technology. As a result theories examining particular stages in a technology’s life cycle 
(such as TAM and DoI) are not useful in this context. These theories, and others, also 
force technology to adopt certain roles. For example, Structuration Theory denies 
technology the ability to act at, all forcing it into a passive role. Given the strong place 
of RFID technology within this study these theories were also considered to be 
unsuitable. Therefore an approach that recognises the agency of technology, while not 
being limited to the use of the technology or a particular phase of its lifecycle was 
selected. 
Actor-Network Theory (ANT), otherwise known as “the sociology of translations” was 
developed in France in the early 1980’s. Arising from the social study of science and 
technology, ANT focuses on tracing associations and relations between members of a 
network, be they human or material, in order to determine how the network becomes 
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stable over time, if indeed it does (Latour, 2005). Although controversial, the inclusion 
of material things and concepts within networks, acknowledging the place of 
technology in the construction of the social, allows the researcher to understand how 
complex networks of social and technological actors are formed and how they 
function (Hanseth, Aanestad, & Berg, 2004). Further, as RFID enabled systems are 
essentially networks of both human and technological actors, including RFID enabled 
digital devices, ANT is uniquely placed to offer an in depth understanding of how these 
networks might be formed, the place of RFID within the network, and what actors – be 
they human, technological or conceptual – would be involved in its formation. ANT 
has no detailed methodology in and of itself. However, the majority of ANT studies are 
presented as qualitative studies; therefore, qualitative methodology will be used to 
advise this research, as outlined in the following Methodology chapter.  
1.7 Delimitations 
This study examines a small segment of the possible range of worldly experiences. It 
would not be possible to take an all-encompassing network approach to 
government/public/organisation interactions as the scope of such a study would be 
too broad. Nor would it be possible to examine every detail of a network studied using 
an ANT approach thus it was necessary to place boundaries on the network studied. 
Understanding how to limit the range of the network will be discussed further in the 
methods section. 
Similarly, this study concentrates on RFID enabled digitalised artefacts using an item 
identifier. There are simple RFID systems that do not use individual item identifiers, 
and technology apart from RFID that can be used to digitalise devices, and these will 
not be discussed.  
1.8 Thesis Outline 
This thesis will be presented in chronological order as far as possible following the 
sequence in which the research evolved in order to respect both the grounded nature 
of ANT, and the narrative style of ANT accounts. Therefore, following this Introduction 
the Literature Review (Chapter 2) will review relevant literature,  introduce RFID, and 
discuss the various technology models that are relevant to the context of this study. 
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Chapter 3 will discuss the theoretical basis of this study and justify the use of ANT, as 
well as the inclusion of Institutional Theory as a further theoretical lens. Institutional 
Theory is included at this stage as it became apparent during the course of data 
gathering that some influences on the RFID network arising from organisational and 
institutional behaviour could not be accounted for within the ANT framework. 
Observations as to the way the network was formed, and the inclusion of an 
additional theoretical lens, led to additional research sub-questions which are also 
outlined in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 will review findings that address the research 
questions, discussing – how the RFID network is established and maintained; and how 
institutional forces act on the network. Chapter 5 will then present the mediators of 
the RFID network, discussing how they influence the ANT process of translation. 
Consistent with an ANT account, the two findings chapters (Chapters 4 and 5) will 
focus primarily on reporting the findings and drawing a picture of the network. 
Chapter 6 will discuss and interpret the findings, and Chapter 7 will conclude this 
study, discussing how understanding of RFID systems has been extended by this 
research, as well as describing how ANT and Institutional Theory can be combined to 
study complex socio-technical systems.
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2 Literature Review 
This chapter will review the academic literature in respect of RFID, identify the place 
of RFID within current computing models, and discuss how RFID fits into the new 
theories of human/computer interaction. It will also explore the interaction of the 
public and private sector regarding the on-going growth and development of a 
connected network of RFID devices.  
2.1 Radio Frequency Identification – From Identification to Smart 
Chips 
Today’s RFID systems are far more sophisticated (and much smaller in size) than the 
initial 1940s Identification Friend or Foe system, but they share the same hardware 
basis. The core of the RFID technology is still the interrogator, or reader, and 
transponder, or tag, and this combination has changed little from the origin of RFID. 
Each radio frequency (RF) tag is coded with a unique identifier, primarily an Electronic 
Product Code (EPC), although other proprietary coding systems do exist (Konomi & 
Roussos, 2007). When the tag comes within range of a reader, the RF energy 
transmitted by the reader activates the tag and it transmits its identity back to the 
reader.  
The majority of RFID tags are passive – that is they do not contain batteries and rely 
on the RF energy of the reader in order to transmit. Passive tags often carry and 
transmit no information other than their identifier. Active tags are more sophisticated 
and contain a battery, which can power sensors and microchips. These tags can both 
store and transmit information in response to a reader, depending on their inbuilt 
capabilities. RF tags can be produced in a huge variety of forms. They can be housed in 
identity cards, buttons or shoes, and can also be injected into people, or animals 
(Glover & Bhatt, 2006).  
Of itself, the identifying code transmitted by RF tags has little meaning. The code must 
be matched with the item it identifies, and processed by RFID middleware systems in 
order to match the code with the tagged item. Only then can sense be made of the 
transmitted information. It is possible for one reader to generate a huge amount of 
information as it may read thousands, or millions, of tags as they move through its 
14 
 
field. Further, one tag can be read multiple times if it remains stationary within the 
field of the reader. The RFID middleware is responsible for filtering the information 
received from readers, removing duplicate reads and otherwise “cleaning” the data. 
The captured data can then be used in a variety of ways, from tracking the movement 
of an individual item through the supply chain to determining the total number and 
location of particular stocked items (Glover & Bhatt, 2006).  
The item identifier is unique to each item and in the case of an EPC is allocated by the 
EPCglobal Network, a not for profit organisation driven by subscribers including such 
companies as Wal-Mart, Lockheed and LG Electronics (EPCglobal, 2010). The objective 
of EPCglobal is to develop standards for both hardware and RFID systems architecture 
to allow the supply chain to integrate from manufacturers to retailers, and to allow for 
easy exchange of data across systems (Glover & Bhatt, 2006). EPCglobal also provides 
an Object Naming Service (ONS), similar to the domain name system (DNS) used for 
addressing the internet, which helps connect the EPC code to the appropriate 
information service. This EPC Information Service (the EPCIS) enables users to share 
EPC data with each other, mapping an item’s EPC code to the relevant item 
information (for example user manuals, sales information, expiry dates etc.). The 
EPCIS also controls access to the information it holds, allowing information to be 
shared according to set permissions between business partners, and between 
business and the public. For example, business partners would share information 
regarding the movements of a particular item, while the public would only be able to 
see its point of origin and user manual (Glover & Bhatt, 2006; Sarma, 2004). 
The most common use of RFID technology today is in supply chain and retail 
applications where they are used to track either individual items, or pallets. The tags 
increase inventory visibility allowing for more accurate inventory, location finding and 
reduction in stock outs. Each item has an electronic product code and can be 
individually located and tracked (Dutta, Lee, & Whang, 2007). Osyk, Vijayaraman, 
Srinivasan and Dey (2012) found that RFID tags were replacing barcodes in supply 
chain and warehousing applications, with the main benefits being seen to be pallet 
and item tracking, asset management, loss prevention and security. Stanford (2003) 
found that advantages of RFID tags compared to barcodes included: 
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 the ability to scan an item that is not in the direct line of sight of the scanner; 
 the ability to “simultaneously” read many tags at the same time; and  
 the ability to uniquely identify individual items. 
Similarly, Ilie-Zudor, Kemény, van Blommestein, Monostori, and van der Meulen (2011) 
noted that RFID identification was more promising than bar coding as a method of 
automatic identification as it required less manual intervention on the retail side of 
the supply chain, due to its remote scanning capability. 
Roussos (2006) suggested the use of RFID in retail might allow retailers to introduce 
smart shopping carts where products are scanned once only at check-out. This would 
allow for the easy identification of products that have exceeded their use by dates or 
are subject to recalls, and reduce stock outs and item theft. Areas other than supply 
chain have begun opening up to RFID systems from the commonly used animal 
tracking applications described by Vlad et al. (2012) to preventing cheating in Mahjong 
(Tang, 2013). Other conventional uses include controlling building access through the 
use of RFID enabled cards, and collection of road tolls (Lahiri, 2006).  
The value of the RFID market continues to grow annually with Harrop and Das (2013), 
estimating the value of the RFID market in 2012 to be US $7.67 billion, compared to 
US $6.51 billion in 2011. For the period 2012 to 2017, ABI Research (2012) estimated 
that the RFID market would be worth US $70 billion over the five years from 2012 to 
2017. 
Wyld (2005) identifies a number of factors that have driven this broadening of interest 
in RFID including: 
 reductions in the cost of RF tags with passive tags costing around 5 cents US 
each;  
 greater standardisation of technology and product codes allowing 
interoperability of systems and exchange of data; 
 competitive pressures driving a need for better business decision making;  
 better data processing capabilities and IT infrastructure allowing for the 
capture and use of more complex information; and 
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 leading organisations (such as Wal-Mart and the US Department of Defense) 
having mandated the use of RF technology for their suppliers. 
As the use of RFID technology has increased, a number of issues have been identified 
with its use, from the perspective of both the business and the customer. From the 
point of view of business, Spekman (2006) categorises these barriers as either physical 
barriers resulting from the deployment of the RFID technology, or 
interpersonal/institutional barriers that result in a lack of trust and inability to 
collaborate. Physical barriers include: 
 cost (Hossain & Quaddus, 2011; Ilie-Zudor et al., 2011), a persistent problem 
although both Wyld (2005) and Hossain and Quaddus (2011) found that the 
decreasing cost of tags was driving RFID implementation; 
 businesses being too small to accrue benefit from implementing the 
technology (Hossain & Quaddus, 2011) 
 the lack of uniform standards for the radio wavelengths, hardware, and for the 
product coding leading to concerns regarding interoperability of systems, 
especially across international boundaries (Hossain & Quaddus, 2011; Ilie-
Zudor et al., 2011; Kopalchick III & Monk, 2005; Ting, Kwok, Tsang, & Lee, 
2011). The lack of uniform standards was identified (by 60% of respondents to 
an Information Week survey), as the biggest challenge to RFID 
implementations (Bacheldor, 2005); 
 complexity of the technology and associated technical issues (Hossain & 
Quaddus, 2011; Yao, Chu, & Li, 2011; Zhou & Piramuthu, 2010); 
 tag reliability (Ilie-Zudor et al., 2011); 
 different legislative regimes in different jurisdictions (Ilie-Zudor et al., 2011); 
 different standards requirements in different countries (2011); 
 unclear ownership of the technology itself, the EPC or coding systems and the 
data generated by the RF reads (Bose, Ngai, Teo, & Spiekermann, 2009; Curtin, 
Kauffman, & Riggins, 2007; Wyld, 2005); and 
 management of large volumes of data produced by RFID reads (Wyld, 2005). 
Interpersonal or institutional barriers include: 
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 a lack of institutional trust between organisations (Spekman & Sweeney II, 
2006); 
 privacy and security concerns (Ting et al., 2011; Van Lieshout & Kool, 2007; 
Yao et al., 2011); 
 the need for guaranteed accountability between transactions, with incorrect 
information being occasionally transmitted (Ilie-Zudor et al., 2011); 
 management attitude and the lack of readiness of organisations to adopt the 
technology (Hossain & Quaddus, 2011); 
 the impact of the RFID technology on workers in respect of health concerns as 
well as potential job downsizing (Curtin et al., 2007; Wyld, 2005); and 
 appropriate training for staff in the use of new systems, as well as ensuring the 
acceptance of these systems (Kopalchick III & Monk, 2005) 
The majority of studies of RFID technology have concentrated on the private sector. 
However, a number of studies have looked at government/public sector uses, 
generally focusing on case studies, primarily in the health and defence sectors, or 
alternatively have discussed how government can encourage the use of RFID 
technology. Neuby and Rudin (2008) note three interrelated uses in both the private 
and public sectors, determining: 
 what an item is using access control and identification; 
 where an item or person is, using location technology; and 
 how an item or environment is, in other words monitoring the environment 
against preset norms, or profiling the environment. 
Wyld (2005), suggests a number of ways government can facilitate the use of RFID 
including promoting best practices and standards, funding research and education and 
resolving privacy related RFID issues. He also suggests these efforts are best 
conducted as joint ventures between public and private sectors. Similarly, Hossain and 
Quaddus (2011) found that government support through funding, training and 
regulation facilitated the decision of organisations to adopt RFID technology. 
Even though the use of RFID systems is steadily increasing in both private and public 
sectors, the majority of today’s RFID systems exist in relative isolation, they do not 
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interact with each other. However, this isolation is decreasing as more and more items 
become tagged (or ‘digitalised’), and capable of being part of larger RFID and internet 
based systems. 
2.2 RFID Digitalised Artefacts 
Any item (or artefact) can be said to be “digitalised” when it has either an RFID chip, 
two dimensional barcode, and/or sensor installed (Yoo 2010). Differing from the 
traditional view of artefacts as items stored in museums and libraries, electronic files 
or digital copies of documents, digitalised artefacts can interact with the user, the 
environment, each other or the internet, depending on the capability of the chip or 
sensor. Yoo (2010) identifies seven qualities of digitalised artefacts being: 
1. programmability – the artefact can be programmed through embedded 
software, although in some the programming may not be modified after the 
initial upload; 
2. addressability – the artefact can be identified and responds individually; 
3. sensibility – the artefact can respond to the environment, sometimes in 
complex ways; 
4. communicability – the artefact can communicate with other artefacts, the user 
and the internet; 
5. memorisability – the artefact can record and store information, depending on 
the type of chip or sensor installed; 
6. traceability – the artefact can be followed through time and/or space; and 
7. associability – the artefact can be related to other artefacts, events and 
entities. 
Even though some passive RFID chips are very simple, having no memory capabilities 
or ability to be reprogrammed, they can still be considered to be digitalised artefacts 
as in essence they satisfy the criteria outlined above – they can be communicated with 
individually using an address, they can be traced and they can be associated with 
other artefacts. 
The low cost and increasing ubiquity of RFID enabled devices are also allowing the 
emergence of networks of digitalised artefacts especially in the private sector. This 
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network is known by a number of different terms with similar meanings, including 
ubiquitous, pervasive, disappearing or invisible computing as well as the more 
encompassing term, the Internet of Things (Curtin et al., 2007; Slettemeas, 2009).  
2.3 The Ubiquitous, Pervasive, Disappearing, Invisible, Experiential 
Internet of Things 
A range of different computing models have been proposed to explain the interaction 
of computers with society and organisations, each focusing on slightly different 
aspects of these interactions. Models such as ubiquitous, pervasive, and experiential 
computing focus more on the social nature of computing interactions. The Internet of 
Things model focuses more on the interaction of computing devices or things with 
each other, and organisations, reflecting the uses that the different types of devices 
have been put to. These relationships are discussed in this section, and are 
summarised below in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Summary of Computing Models 
Weiser (1991) was the first to use the term “ubiquitous computing”. In his landmark 
article, he described a future in which computers would vanish into the background of 
human existence with both computers and “invisible widgets” fitting into the human 
environment (Weiser, 1991). Streitz (2008) similarly describes the disappearing 
computer as a concept, in which the computer itself is invisible to users, but is 
ubiquitously available for interaction and collaboration. RFID enabled devices fit well 
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into such categories as the RFID technology itself is often invisible, or difficult to 
detect, however, there are other models to consider. 
The concept of ubiquitous computing is often confusingly aligned with other 
computing models, most commonly that of pervasive computing. Lyytinen and Yoo 
(2002) define pervasive computing as “the capability [of the computer] to obtain 
information from the environment in which it is embedded” (p. 64). This concept is 
extended by Kourouthanassis, Giaglis & Karaiskos (2010) to include an environment 
with multiple different IT devices. Michelfelder (2010) describes ubiquitous computing 
(as well as calm technology and the Internet of Things) as an older term, and defines 
pervasive computing as “the implementation of ubiquitous computing through a 
constellation of technology” (p. 61). Taylor (2009) directly equates ubiquitous 
computing with the Internet of Things, and the European Commission (2009) 
considers the disappearing computer, ubiquitous computing, pervasive, proactive and 
ambient computing to be the same thing, as do Streitz and Nixon (2005). 
The most common distinction between ubiquitous and pervasive computing is subtle 
and appears to hinge on the difference between the technology infrastructure and its 
application. This distinction is defined by Ye et al., (2008) who see the difference as 
ubiquitous computing providing the infrastructure and pervasive computing providing 
integrated computing services, although they also point out that distinguishing 
between the two is becoming unnecessary.  
Whether defined separately or as the same thing, ubiquitous and/or pervasive 
computing models share a number of common features: 
 they are context and location aware (Chalmers et al., 2006); (Saha & 
Mukherjee, 2003); 
 they rely on numerous different types of small or invisible devices scattered 
throughout the environment (Schindler, 2009); (Streitz & Nixon, 2005); (Agha, 
2008); and 
 they serve mobile users (Schindler, 2009). 
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This view of ubiquitous computing can be broadened to take in the complete network 
of digitalised things and people, coupled to the internet, and enabled by such devices 
as RFID. These devices have the capacity to interact not only with humans, but with 
each other through machine to machine (M2M) communications. This network, first 
described as the “Internet of Things” by Kevin Ashton in 1999 (Ashton, 2009), is 
defined by Slettemeas (2009) as a “wireless network of products with unique IDs that 
communicate with each other through RFID” (p. 226). Miorandi, Sicari, de Pellegrini 
and Clamtac (2012) suggest three pillars to the Internet of Things being: 
 the ability to identify anything; 
 the ability to communicate with anything; and 
 the ability to interact with anything.  
At the moment the vision of the Internet of Things has not reached fruition despite 
the increasing ubiquity of digitalised things. As Santucci (2010) points out, today’s 
objects that exchange information only within controlled environments he terms 
“intranets of things” (my emphasis) – he further states that in order to complete the 
vision of the open and complex Internet of Things, many challenges in design and 
ethics need to be addressed. Zorzi, Gluhak, Lange and Bassi (2010) describe the 
current Internet of Things as being “vast mostly unexplored territory, without clear 
borders, where all current technologies can play a role” (p. 44). They list some of the 
challenges to integrating devices into an Internet of Things as including governance, 
standards, connectivity, energy management, privacy, security, connectivity, and the 
huge number of different devices with different technical specifications (otherwise 
termed the heterogeneity of devices). A similar list of challenges was produced by 
Miorandi, Sicari, de Pellegrini and Clamtac (2012) who also included the need to adopt 
widespread wireless communications as a challenge. Friedewald and Raabe (2011) in 
discussing the Internet of Things note the importance of solving societal compatibility 
issues such as ensuring universal access for all, as well as making sure that users 
understand the nature of the technology they are using. They also note that it is 
important to ensure individuals are properly served by the technology, instead of the 
technology being used for the benefit of the technology provider making sure the 
“house elf… is acting in the interest of its owner” (p. 63). Santucci’s (2010) vision of 
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the future includes individuals being able to spontaneously document their lives using 
the highly detailed information that would be provided by digitalised devices. In fact 
this is already happening today with applications such as Foursquare and Gowalla 
being used to geo-locate individuals based on their smart phone usage (Wilson, 2012).  
The European Commission has produced a number of reports in relation to the 
Internet of Things. These include in 2009 an Internet of Things action plan, a 2011 
Internet of Things conference report, and in 2013 a report covering governance issues. 
These reports detail policy and concerns surrounding such issues as privacy, security, 
standards, and governance. However, as the European Commission (2013) report on 
governance shows, there still appears to be uncertainty around whether one common 
standard is required, what level of governance the Internet of Things needs, or even 
around the very definition of the Internet of Things. The report concludes by pointing 
out the different perspectives of individuals versus industry, with individuals being 
more concerned about ethical issues while industry was concerned to ensure a 
minimum of public intervention due to the possibility of stifling economic progress. 
Experiential computing takes the ubiquitous computing/Internet of Things model even 
further. In an experiential computing environment the focus is not on the computer at 
all, but on the non-computer, but still digitalised, everyday artefacts with which 
people interact. As such computing is not viewed as a separate activity with its own 
goals, but instead it is part of our everyday experience (Yoo, 2010). Yoo’s focus on 
integrating digitalised artefacts into everyday existence is similar to the perspective 
taken by the Internet of Things in that both require devices that communicate with 
each other, the internet and their users (in this case RFID enables this communication). 
Ultimately, this digitalisation would allow humans (or their devices) to interact with 
any and all physical artefacts. Organisationally an experiential computing viewpoint 
encourages an expansion of the boundaries of inquiry beyond organisational 
information systems to include not only the Internet of Things but also the 
organisations or individuals that might connect to it – even when these encompass 
different types of business or products. Instead of asking the question how do 
individuals interact experientially with the Internet of Things, this view asks how the 
organisation provides products and services that add value to the human experience 
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and what needs to be done to provide these. Bødker, Gimpel and Hedman (2012) take 
this concept into the dynamics of interaction between people and devices by 
suggesting two distinctions, those of time-in and time-out. Time-in devices merge with 
everyday living (as experiential computing suggests), time-out devices require 
individuals to interact in an active way with the technology.  
While the many and various computing models are interesting, this study is focused 
on the future Internet of Things, looking beyond a single RFID system and attempting 
to determine those factors that are required for the integrated Internet of Things to 
be realised.  
2.4 Technology in Government - e or u-Government 
As this research crosses the boundary between public and private sectors it is also 
appropriate to review the literature regarding computing models within the public 
sector. Many of the computing models discussed above have been modified to 
describe the behaviour of information technology (IT) in the public sector. The use of 
IT in government has created a broad body of literature covering topics ranging from 
disaster relief to Government 2.0. The terms Public Management Information Systems 
(PMIS), mobile government (m-government), ubiquitous government (u-government) 
and electronic government (e-government) amongst others have been used when 
describing various aspects of the management of information technology within 
government.  
The most commonly used term among these is e-government. Anttiroiko (2005), notes 
that the development of e-government has occurred along with the internet 
revolution since the early 1990s. He defines e-government as the provision of 
government services through electronic channels. The World Bank (2004) takes a 
broader definition of e-government considering it to be “about changing how 
governments work” although this definition alludes more to governance than 
government. Grönlund and Horan (2005), in a review of e-government find that the 
term is variously defined, but most commonly focuses on issues of governance rather 
than government. Sprague (2008) takes the view that e-government is a concept for 
yesterday and instead discussed “connected government”, describing it as 
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“a comprehensive approach to building an information infrastructure that facilitates 
the agency to agency, agency to business and agency to citizen workflows upon which 
effective, citizen-centric service delivery depends” (p. S6).  
The advent of mobile technology has led to theorising about another technological 
form of government - mobile or m-government. Sharma and Gupta (2004) argue that 
m-government is a superset of e-government allowing transactions to occur using 
mobile technology such as PDA’s, cell phones and other mobile devices, while defining 
e-government more restrictively as the “use of information and communication 
technologies to improve the activities of public sector organisations” (p. 465). Archer 
(2010) takes a different view arguing that m-government is a subset of e-government, 
one that supports the use of mobile and wireless devices. Anttiroiko (2005) defines 
mobile government (m-government) as a subset of u-government, one which allows 
interaction with government services through mobile devices (with u-government 
confusingly being a subset itself, of e-government). 
The concept of ubiquitous computing has also been extended to government by 
Bélanger, Carter and Schaupp (2005), as “ubiquitous government” (or u-government). 
They define u-government as being: 
“the use of ubiquitous networks to support personalised and uninterrupted 
information and services between a government and citizens, employees, 
organisations, businesses, and among government agencies to provide a level of value 
over, above and beyond traditional government” (p. 427)  
This definition is close to Sprague’s (2008) definition of connected government. The u-
government concept takes m-government one step further in that transactions with 
government can occur at any time and in any place and on any device, not just the 
standard computing devices or a mobile telephone (Anttiroiko, 2005). Anttiroiko 
(2005), also points out that u-government services can be considered as merely 
another attribute of the fully transformed government, along with “seamless” or 
“integrated” government. He further suggests that the general development of e-
government and u-government are parallel to each other. Sharma and Gupta (2004) 
track the evolution path of u-government from information and communication 
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services through to interactive and transaction services, the latter allowing for mobile 
polling, ordering and payments. Almost any device or sensor can transmit over the 
network, contributing to u-government with many of these devices being enabled by 
RFID (Anttiroiko, 2005). Yu and Hu (2007) extend the definition of u-government 
beyond the boundaries of information technology to include any citizen/government 
transaction regardless of the involvement of electronic means. 
Based on the u-commerce constructs of ubiquity, uniqueness, universality and unison, 
Bélanger, Carter and Schaupp (2005) have identified four parallel characteristics of u-
government: 
 ubiquity – allowing anytime, anywhere access to government information and 
services. 
 uniqueness – allowing for the unique identification of consumers by position, 
preferences, personal characteristics and actual identity. 
 universality – the technology is both multi-functional and universally usable 
 unison – u-government integrates data across applications so a consistent view 
is presented of government information and services across multiple agencies 
and devices. 
Bélanger, Carter and Schaupp (2005) also identify four antecedents of u-government 
being governmental benevolence, integrity, and competence; and the presence of 
mediators in the form of the demographics of the citizen and the voluntariness of the 
transaction. The first three mediators are based on the trust literature and have been 
shown in many studies to be antecedents of trust.  
There are differences between u-commerce and u-government focused on the 
different relationships people have with companies as opposed to government. Many 
transactions individuals have with government are mandatory (Warkentin, Gefen, 
Pavlou, & Rose, 2001), with both timing and nature of the transactions prescribed 
(McMillen, 2004). Bélanger, Carter and Schaupp (2005) note that this may lead to 
concerns with acceptance of u-government, balanced against the advantage of 
“enabling a citizen to interact directly with embedded technologies in society’s 
infrastructure” (p. 432) without the need for direct contact with a computer. They do 
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not describe m-government separately in their model on the basis that u-government 
includes wireless devices (as opposed to mobile devices alone), and that evolution to 
multi-platform u-government will likely occur directly from the current e-government 
model. They also recognise that u-government must occur within the legislative 
framework of the country in question. Anttiroiko (2005) suggests that to create u-
government an understanding of how the ubiquity of services is going to change their 
delivery will be necessary. He goes on to propose that this might be done through fine 
tuning the current e-government models.  
The above discussion shows that, like the discussion of ubiquitous computing, u-
government suffers from difficulties of definition. This study will take the position that 
u-government, like ubiquitous computing is a comprehensive term covering the range 
of electronic transactions with government including computer based internet 
transactions (e-government), transactions using mobile devices (m-government) and 
transactions involving other types of devices. The relationship between the various 
models is demonstrated in Figure 3 below. 
 
Figure 3: Government computing models - e, m or u? 
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It remains to be seen how transactions involving the new types of electronic devices, 
(including RFID) will change the e-government or u-government paradigms. Work has 
commenced on determining how the RFID enabled Internet of Things might affect 
governments, mainly based in the European Union. Based on the social changes 
predicted to result from the on-going spread of the Internet of Things, the European 
Union (2009) has identified a number of roles for government in managing these 
changes including: 
 co-ordination and development of policy on both the internet itself and the 
Internet of Things, and ensuring these are compatible and consistent; 
 the on-going consultation and regulation of data protection and privacy policy; 
 ensuring individuals have the right to opt out of involvement with the Internet 
of Things; 
 open and transparent development of standards; and 
 to provide on-going international dialogue in respect of the issues arising with 
the growth of the Internet of Things (European Union, 2009). 
2.5 RFID in Government/Public Sector 
The use of RFID in the public sector has been primarily focused in the Healthcare, 
Defence and Border Control areas where the technology is most mature (Banks et al., 
2007). For example, in a more usual supply chain type application, the US Department 
of Defense requires all pallets, cases and individual items of a value greater than 
US$5,000 to be RFID tagged (Li, Visich, Khumawala, & Zhang, 2006; Wyld, 2005). In 
healthcare a number of studies have suggested uses of RFID ranging from operating 
room sponges embedded with RFID chips to ensure they are not left inside the patient 
(“Sponge count,” 2006), to tracking all patients, staff and visitors in a hospital so if a 
person later develops SARS (or a similar infectious disease) everyone they contacted 
within the hospital can be identified (Xiao et al., 2007).  
Further, Ting et al. (2011) found that data management was an issue in RFID systems 
in the healthcare sector. They particularly highlighted the need to better secure, share 
and use data from these systems. Wamba (2012) in an analysis of 22 studies in the 
Journal of Medical Systems (from 1997 to 2011) on RFID in the healthcare sector 
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found that the number of articles covering RFID technology increased from two in 
2008 to 13 in 2011. He further found that although the majority of studies dealt with 
privacy, data management or security, only two discussed financing issues. 
Organisationally, Lee and Shim (2007) found that the amount of knowledge an 
organisation had about RFID, together with the presence of a champion, were 
determinants of RFID adoption in the healthcare sector. 
In the public sector in general authors have found a similar range of issues in RFID 
systems  to those found in the private sector including: 
 security (Bhon, Gartner, & Vogt, 2003; Ting et al., 2011); 
 lack of standardisation (C.-P. Lee & Shim, 2007; Ting et al., 2011); 
 cost (Mukerji & Palanisamy, 2011; Neuby & Rudin, 2008; Yao et al., 2011); 
 legal issues (Mukerji & Palanisamy, 2011; Yao et al., 2011) 
 privacy (Yao et al., 2011; Zhou & Piramuthu, 2010); and 
 technical reasons (Yao et al., 2011, 2011). 
Neuby and Rudin (2008) found that a lack of understanding of public understanding of 
RFID systems was a barrier to its implementation in the public sector. Although the 
majority of published studies have covered adoption of RFID technology Gogan, 
Williams and Fedorowicz (2007) found that long term management of an animal 
tracking system was necessary due to different levels of collaboration between public 
and private sectors. 
Although studies tend to focus on barriers to implementation, a few in the healthcare 
sector have looked at benefits. Zhou and Piramuthu (2010) in contrasting public and 
private healthcare, found that benefits to the public sector included the ability to 
offset efficiencies with public sector resource constraints. This finding was reflected by 
Yao, Chu and Li (2011) who found that RFID systems benefits included savings in time 
and cost as well as improvements in healthcare processes. In a Delphi study of the 
RFID (related to its use in the Internet of Things), Wamba and Ngai (2012) found that 
the main advantages in the use of RFID for the future were improved asset traceability 
and inventory management. 
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In the broader context RFID appears in a variety of governmental reports1 in the 
context of facilitating the Internet of Things, with which it is inextricably linked 
(European Commission, 2012). At the time of writing few academic papers could be 
found taking the approach of studying RFID adoption across the boundary between 
the government and private sectors, focusing instead on individual government 
sectors. Nor were any papers found discussing specifically the place of RFID enabled 
devices in the e (or u) government paradigms.  
The use of RFID in the public sector could be considered part of the e-government 
paradigm in that RFID enabled devices work through electronic means. However, their 
use probably fits best within the concept of u-government as it is a technology that is 
mobile, pervasive and ubiquitous, extending the boundaries of the relationship 
between public and private sector by including devices that can communicate 
between sectors without necessarily requiring human intervention. Following this line 
of thought, u-government would become experiential by moving beyond the provision 
of government services making interaction with government both seamless and 
invisible to the point where the citizen may not even know they were receiving 
government services and products.  
As can be seen from this overview, the themes regarding establishing and maintaining 
RFID systems in the public-private context are many and entangled. Even the 
technology model that fits RFID systems best is open to debate, primarily because 
RFID technology enables many of the current computing models. Nonetheless, there 
has been a considerable body of research in respect of various RFID systems. The 
following sections will discuss some of these themes. 
2.6 RFID Research – Themes from Literature 
A number of themes regarding RFID systems can be drawn from literature. Standards 
for hardware, RFID bandwidths and data management help ensure interoperability 
between RFID systems locally and internationally, where relevant. Information 
infrastructure needs to be available for the system to work consistently and 
seamlessly. Further, organisations need to trust both that the system will work and 
                                                     
1
 Especially those arising from the European Union, European Commission and International 
Telecommunications Union 
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that their information will be protected before they will feel comfortable using it. 
Privacy and security are often cited as key issues in the development of any internet-
based technology, as they are in the case of RFID systems (Langheinrich, 2001; The 
European Commission, 2006). The question of both the quality of data generated and 
its ownership have still to be addressed, and in order to gain full value out of any RFID 
system this data needs to be both compatible with and shared, broadly, across 
business partners and individuals. The following sections will discuss these issues in 
more detail. 
2.6.1 Infrastructure 
The definition of information infrastructure has been extensively debated, though it is 
also considered essential to the development of any internet-based technology. 
Borgman (2007) defines information infrastructure simply as “a global framework to 
facilitate information exchange” (p. 42). In her 2003 book, Borgman notes that the 
premise of any information infrastructure is the worldwide linking of 
telecommunication and computer networks brought about by cooperation between 
individuals and the public and private sectors (Borgman, 2003). Hanseth and Lyytinen 
(2010), take a more socio-technical approach defining information infrastructure 
generally as a “shared, open, heterogeneous and evolving socio-technical system of 
Information Technology capabilities” (p. 1). Although Hanseth, Monteiro and Hatling 
(1996) note the difficulty of defining the term. 
EPCglobal separates hardware and software infrastructures with the readers, tags and 
middleware components grouped together, and a second group consisting of the 
EPCIS platform designed to exchange data generated by RFID tags, its data, and 
interface standards (Bendavid & Cassivi, 2010). The European Union (2009) in 
discussing the Internet of Things, notes that its infrastructure should be seen as 
separate from, while relying on the infrastructure for the internet. The EU also 
emphasises the importance of providing appropriate infrastructure for the operation 
of the Internet of Things including power supply and internet connectivity. 
Van de Ven (2005) extends the definition of infrastructure to include “political 
arrangements” such as policies and practices, standards and property rights, all of 
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which combine with more traditional information infrastructure in order to facilitate 
innovation. Interestingly, Yoo (2010) puts the concept of infrastructure into an 
experiential context by suggesting that it will be necessary to integrate the 
information infrastructure into other infrastructures including cultural ones – this 
integration, Yoo notes, will most likely be difficult. He also concludes that a ubiquitous 
infrastructure will be required to facilitate experiential computing. 
The distinction between physical, political and social infrastructure can be a logical 
one, as it allows for discussion of issues specific to each type of infrastructure. 
However, it does cause confusion where different authors have different 
understandings of the term “infrastructure”. As a result this thesis will use the term 
infrastructure more narrowly, following the lead of GS1 and the European Union by 
defining infrastructure as the technical/hardware and software elements necessary 
for the functioning of the RFID network and the Internet of Things. 
Yoo (2010) discusses the necessity of integrating global IT infrastructure with 
digitalised devices and sensor networks, and highlights the importance of information 
infrastructure to the development of the Internet of Things. This integration would 
allow for seamless communication between, and with digitalised artefacts any time, in 
any location. Chalmers et al. (2006), point out that the sustainability and permanence 
of the information infrastructures supporting ubiquitous computing is an issue that 
needs to be considered when we seek to understand ubiquitous computing systems 
and their impact on society. 
Spekman (2006) finds that the reducing cost of RFID hardware infrastructure is 
allowing for more widespread adoption of the technology. However, he also notes 
that this spread is creating difficulties with IT infrastructure expected to be able to 
cope with the large volumes of data generated by frequent tag reads. The same point 
is made by Konomi and Roussos (2007), who also emphasise the importance of 
integrating infrastructure already in place with new infrastructure required by RFID 
networks so as “not to catastrophically disrupt the capability of the organisation to 
provide services“(p. 508). 
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A number of city sized projects including u-Japan and New Songdo City have 
emphasised the importance of infrastructure in the development of the “smart cities” 
of the future. These cities are being built today based on a future where everyone and 
everything is connected. The design of New Songdo City in Korea considers 
connectivity in all elements of infrastructure including the more obvious utilities and 
transport, and less obvious parks and open spaces (Santucci, 2010). U-Japan focuses 
more on rolling out ubiquitous computing services across Japan, and promoting the 
importance of broadband technology, network coverage and full utilisation of the 
current network (Murakami, 2003). 
2.6.2 Standards 
Closely tied to infrastructure development is the need for standardisation, both of 
hardware and software infrastructure elements. Standards allow a business to be sure 
that the tag they attach to their product will be readable by trading partners 
throughout the supply chain, facilitating supply chain interoperability (Rothfeder, 
2004). They allow for the automation of information exchange between trading 
partners, as well as direct data exchange, as data formats would be compatible with 
all of the business partners’ varying information systems (Harrison & Parlikad, 2006; 
Konomi & Roussos, 2007). Standard data formats also make it easier to add or remove 
partners to the supply chain when necessary without having to reformat any part of 
the operation (Harrison & Parlikad, 2006). Finally, standards allow for the 
interoperability of RFID equipment - tags and readers - from different vendors 
(Kopalchick III & Monk, 2005). The global standardisation of the radio frequencies 
used for communication is also a cause for concern due to different countries and 
regions allocating different parts of the radio spectrum for RF purposes. The European 
Commission (2006) note that radio frequency harmonisation is not possible due to 
these varying national standards. 
The need for RFID and EPC standards is one of the most frequently cited barriers to 
their successful implementation and use. A study by Whitaker, Mithas and Krishnan 
(2009) found that standards ambiguity was associated with an expectation of delayed 
return from a firm’s investment in RFID. Similarly, Curtin, Kauffman and Riggins (2007) 
found that industry standards were a key factor in adoption and benefits realisation 
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for RFID projects. Wyld (2005) identifies the air interface protocol (the 
communications of tags and readers), data organisation, standardisation of radio 
frequency product testing, and how RFID applications are used as four areas where 
standards are needed. Outside of the need for RFID standards, Dawes (2008) 
highlights the need for standards in government information, noting that the lack of 
compatibility between government databases limits the ability to integrate and share 
information between government departments, and between public and private 
sectors. Sprague (2008) also makes this point and identifies compatible information 
infrastructure as a key component in facilitating information sharing and exchange. 
EPCglobal/GS1 is the main standards body for RFID in the US and worldwide, aligning 
with both the ISO (Dutta et al., 2007) and Global Trade Item Number (GTIN) standards 
(Thiesse, Floerkemeier, Harrison, Michahelles, & Roduner, 2009). Dobkin (2013) notes 
that although the EPC standards are not the only standards available for RFID, they are 
the most widely implemented. He lists two other established organisations producing 
suites of RFID standards, being ANSI and ISO. Despite the current dominance of these 
standards Ilie-Zudor et al. (2011) note that given the speed of technological 
development the current standards could become quickly obsolescent. On top of 
these general standards, many proprietary standards, working within individual or 
small groups of RFID applications, also exist (Dobkin, 2013). 
Parallels can be drawn between the development of barcode and RFID standards. 
Barcode standards in the form of the Universal Product Code (UPC) were proposed for 
use on grocery items in 1969 by a committee of members of the Grocery 
Manufacturers of America, and the National Association of Food Chains (Brown, 1997). 
The barcode standards spread rapidly, and today the barcode is one of the world’s 
most recognisable symbols appearing on virtually every manufactured item (Markus, 
Steinfield, Wigand, & Minton, 2006). Wu et al. (2006) note that barcodes and RFID will 
continue to co-exist for the moment, mainly due to the cost of RFID systems and tags, 
and demands caused by the high volume of data generated by RFID systems on IT 
system capacity. Gershenfeld, Krikorian and Cohen (2004) also note an interesting 
similarity between the current state of RFID standards development and the early 
development of ARPANET where a wide range of differing standards existed, requiring 
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special hardware to bridge the differences, eventually becoming one open universal 
standard allowing worldwide harmonisation of the internet. 
2.6.3 Interoperability and Information Sharing 
As RFID systems become standardised, the opportunity arises to exchange data 
between different systems, either organisationally or between organisations. 
Interoperability is the engine that drives the sharing of information. Without 
interoperability of systems, data cannot be shared as systems cannot talk to each 
other. Kopalchick and Monk (2005) found that interoperability between readers and 
tags from different sources was necessary for a high rate of adoption of RFID systems. 
Thiesse, Al-Kassab and Fleisch (2009), advise that organisations should implement 
RFID systems based on international standards in order to ensure interoperability 
between components, even when it is intended that the systems will only function 
internally. 
Interoperability of RFID systems allows for information sharing between the members 
of the system. The power of an RFID system arises from the ability of organisations to 
track items, receive information from sensors, to share that information within and 
between organisations, and to process it into business knowledge. Without the 
sharing of data between organisations, or even departments in the same organisation, 
this power cannot be harnessed. This is one area where public and private sector 
organisations may well differ. Holmes (2001), finds that the primary goals of public 
sector organisations are to carry out policy and to provide a stable administration, 
goals which are not seen in the private sector. Bretschneider (1990), notes that there 
is more interdependence between public sector organisations than that which occurs 
between private organisations. Focusing on information sharing, Rocheleau and Wu 
(2002), discuss the differing views of IT in the public and private sectors with the 
private sector viewing IT as a way of achieving competitive advantage leading to a 
reluctance to share information with other entities. They find the opposite applies in 
public sector organisations enabling the public sector to draw from the experience 
and lessons learnt by other organisations when implementing their own IT systems. 
However, they also note that private sector organisations can use IT to identify 
unprofitable customers, and decide whether to continue doing business with them 
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whereas government does not have this option and must continue to transact with all 
citizens and businesses. As stated by Yu and Hu (2007), “governments cannot choose 
their customers - they are obliged to serving [sic] all citizens” (p. 4).  
Yang and Pardo (2011), also highlight the importance of sharing information across 
government boundaries in order to efficiently run government operations involving 
more than one department. They identify four factors necessary for effective 
information sharing between departments as being: 
 trusted social networks; 
 shared information; 
 integrated data; and 
 interoperable technical infrastructure (p. 1). 
This is a point echoed by Dawes (2008) who discusses the importance of sharing 
information not only between public sector organisations, but also between public 
and private sectors, as the processes of government are now being increasingly shared 
with the private sector. She also notes that the issues of data ownership can impede 
the sharing of information, making it difficult to determine who has the right to make 
decisions regarding the release of information. In an earlier paper, Dawes (1996) lists a 
range of technical, organisational and political advantages to information sharing 
between government departments including integration of planning and policy 
development, as well as more efficient use of resources. Gil-Garcia et al. (2010) report 
that governments globally are sharing information as part of the response to 
challenges in the health and justice sectors. A point also reported by the United 
Nations (2007) who found that increased sharing of information is occurring as 
managers realise the information they need for decision making is held outside their 
own organisations. Ilie-Zudor et al. (2011) list a number of issues that might inhibit 
data sharing in cross border RFID networks including different legislation in different 
jurisdictions, different languages, and time zones. 
Treglia and Park (2009) found that knowledge of, and trust in the other parties in an 
intelligence system led to greater sharing of information, as did clear policies and 
regulations – which were made clear to staff. Similarly Gil-Garcia et al. (2010) in their 
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study of cross boundary information sharing found that knowledge of partner 
organisations and alignment of objectives was important in facilitating information 
sharing as they built trust. 
2.6.4 Data 
Fundamental to information sharing is the generation of data, and its exchange 
between organisations. The issue of the quantity, quality and ownership of data 
generated by RFID tags and readers has been identified as a concern by a number of 
authors. Levinson (2003), predicted that businesses will be swamped by an “ocean of 
information” generated by RFID tag reads. However, there are alternative views to 
Levinsons’; Sarma (2004), found that the on-going development of, and research on, 
RFID systems has addressed the fear of data generated by RFID readers2 overloading 
middleware systems. Businesses are also getting better at understanding how to 
manage and store the large volumes of data generated by RFID technology, and how 
to manage reader and tag positioning to ensure that no more data than necessary is 
collected (McKnight, 2007).  
However, many businesses are not making optimal use of the data that is generated 
by RFID systems. Albright (2005) found that many retailers were not using the data 
they had available to them to generate any kind of business process improvement. 
Discussing RFID related data specifically, Albright (2005) emphasises the importance of 
sharing data between stores and their suppliers, stating that “RFID data is useless 
unless stores use it effectively and more importantly can share it with their suppliers” 
(p. 22). Alvarez (2004) also emphasises the importance of using the data generated by 
RFID, finding that businesses are currently focusing on implementation of the 
technology rather than using the data generated to improve business decision making. 
It is the processing and interpretation of the information generated by RFID systems 
that will create useful knowledge for managers and businesses, on which they can 
base their decisions (Curtin et al., 2007). Brady, Fellenz and Armstrong (2007), 
studying how marketing firms use data generated by RFID, found that there was an 
initial peak of high expectations which could be disappointed as firms struggled to find 
                                                     
2
 RFID readers capture many reads, often from the same tag. The result of a reader querying for 
responses every few seconds can be hundreds or thousands of lines of data (or more), depending on 
the query rate of the reader. Many of these data points could come from the same tag.  
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meaning from the information generated by the system. They emphasised the 
importance of aligning the capability and objectives of the business in order to make 
the best use of the RFID technology (Brady et al., 2007). 
Along with determining how to use the data generated by RFID systems, organisations 
must also determine who owns the data generated by increasingly distributed systems. 
For example, where an RFID supply chain system crosses several organisations, who 
own the data generated within each distinct organisation? The ownership of data 
generated by RFID systems is complex, and one on which there were few academic 
papers found. Smith (2006), identifies several areas of concern with tracking data 
generated by RFID systems including: 
 in some cases the data gathered may arise from the actions of others – e.g. 
tracking data which arises from a customer moving around a store, raises the 
question of who owns the data, the store that collected it or the customer who 
generated it; 
 copyright is difficult to claim on data sets because the data itself is 
automatically gathered rather than being the product of a specific intellectual 
process; and 
 the tag that generates the data is likely owned by the customer when the data 
is gathered, rather than being owned by the organisation that owns the RFID 
equipment that gathered the data. 
Smith comes to the conclusion in the case of tracking data that it would be difficult for 
a business to claim they owned the data because they did not generate it as such, they 
only gathered it. Garon (2010), concluded that in the US and some European countries 
the effort involved in the extraction of data from a large database, and it’s processing, 
would be enough to allow the claiming of copyright on that effort. However, the 
situation is unclear in respect of the ownership of the initial data set. Garon (2010) 
also comments on the importance of integrating data management with appropriate 
data privacy, data policy and standards, in order to provide a comprehensive approach 
to ensuring data is protected not just within a company but nationally and worldwide. 
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A further complication arises when considering where the data is held, as different 
countries have different laws that can be applied to data management and ownership, 
both at local and national level. International treaties also impact on ownership of any 
data (Garon, 2010). Chow et al. (2009), discussing the ownership of data stored in a 
cloud computing environment, states that “the legal implications of data and 
applications being held by a third party are complex and not well understood” (p. 86). 
They also find that the majority of fears in relation to data being held “on the cloud” 
relate to the potential to lose control of the stored data, some of which can be 
sensitive. 
In general, the issues described above refer exclusively to non-personally identifying 
information generated within a business supply chain. The problem of personal data 
(or data that identifies an individual), is an entirely separate issue, and raises privacy 
and security questions in respect of the data concerned. 
2.6.5 Security and Privacy 
Probably among most frequently cited barriers to the implementation of both RFID 
and ubiquitous/pervasive computing is the security and privacy of both data collected 
and individuals and businesses that use the technology. The concepts of privacy and 
security are inter-related and often confused. The concept of privacy is generally 
considered to be derived from the Warren and Brandeis (1890) definition of “the right 
to be let alone” (p. 193). However, this view is insufficient in the modern age where 
data can be exchanged freely between individuals, organisations and even countries. 
Thus, Brodie, Karat, Karat and Feng (2005) proposed amending the definition of 
privacy to become “The right of an individual to control information about themselves, 
rather than the right to individual isolation” (p. 35).  
In the international arena the OECD (1980) has produced a set of guidelines outlining 
requirements which have been widely implemented in the privacy legislation of 
various countries, including New Zealand3. These guidelines and their associated 
legislations recognise that without security, privacy can be difficult to achieve. As a 
result they mandate at least a minimum level of security in relation to systems 
                                                     
3
 The OECD guidelines are incorporated as Privacy Principles in the NZ Privacy Act (1993) 
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containing individuals’ information. The European Commission on Internet of Things 
Governance (2013) considered that the current data protection framework, (including 
the OECD guidelines) was sufficient, but noted the need for further transparency 
around what data was collected by organisations. They recommended ensuring that 
organisational privacy policies were “by default and design” (p. 4), and that adequate 
security was implemented on Internet of Things systems. The European Union (2009), 
as well as implementing privacy guidelines which mandate protections for personal 
data and privacy, also recognises the importance of security, finding that appropriate 
control over individual and business data plays a role in encouraging the use of 
technology. 
Privacy concerns within an Internet of Things environment can be separated into two 
streams, one related to the personal information collected by the tags, the second 
related to the movements of individuals who may be carrying tagged items. Passive 
RFID tags by their very nature carry little if any inbuilt security, and nor do they have 
the capability within technical constraints of memory and cost; they simply respond to 
any reader within range. As such, they are constantly “on”, representing a risk in 
themselves as anyone who can decipher the codes transmitted by the tag can identify 
the tag. Of greater concern is that anyone can purchase a reader, some of which can 
read tags over 10 metres away, making it possible to track tagged items, or to 
intercept tag/reader communications over some distance (United Nations, 2006). This 
allows for the possibly of covert surveillance of a person carrying a particular tag, or 
for someone to discover what items are in a particular location by simply reading the 
embedded RFID tags. Even when a person doesn’t carry the same item every day, they 
likely own many items bearing RFID tags that can be used to track them, from their car 
keys to their wallet (Cas, 2005). In the future it may be difficult to avoid carrying 
tagged items (United Nations, 2006). That said, as pointed out by Murphy and 
Blessinger (2003), the problem of clandestine surveillance is not limited to RFID tags as 
it can more effectively be carried out through other wireless devices such as those 
that are Bluetooth enabled, or even cell phones.  
The ubiquitous computing environment presents numerous privacy challenges, as 
many of the features that make an environment ubiquitous are the very features that 
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raise privacy concerns. The tags in a ubiquitous environment are not only everywhere 
but they are invisible, making it difficult to know what items carry tags, what 
information those tags carry, and if they are being read at any particular time (Krotov 
& Junglas, 2008). This increase in computing power of both tags and the ubiquitous 
environment also makes it possible to not only gather information, but to store it in 
real time for possibly indefinite periods (Langheinrich, 2001). Michelfelder (2010) 
argues that these features compromise the right of the individual to decide the criteria 
under which they relate to information technology, as information can be gathered 
and dispersed without their knowledge or consent. Responding to this concern, the 
European Commission (2013) found that  individuals should have the right to be 
invisible to Internet of Things systems, essentially opting out of having data collected 
from any RFID tags (or other Internet of Things enabled devices) they may be carrying. 
As well as the immediate threat of tag interception and individual tracking, there are 
further privacy concerns raised about the nature of the data collected by tags and 
readers. The European Commission (2006), draw a distinction between tags 
identifying goods (or services) and the identification of individuals, finding that the 
identification of an item per se does not result in a privacy problem. Privacy problems 
arise when the owner of a tag (or the data collected from it) can be individually 
identified, or when the aggregation and profiling of data is used in a way that 
disadvantages an individual. King and Jessen (2010) note a number of privacy harms 
arising from profiling including the individual being subject to tracking, increased 
exposure to the risks of identity theft and fraud, not to mention the data being used to 
generate advertising by marketers. The most well-known example of this type of 
targeted advertising is Google’s AdSense technology which, when applied to email in 
Google’s G-mail service, generates advertising based on keywords in a user’s email 
messages (Chopra & White, 2007). 
Bandyopadhyay and Sen (2011) note two dimensions of privacy in the Internet of 
Things environment, being individual privacy and business confidentiality. They find 
that despite a range of security technologies being available “the cloud of things is 
hard to control” (p. 59). They also consider that privacy and security challenges arise 
from the nature of the technology itself with tags generally being incapable of carrying 
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much security, as well as from the huge variety (heterogeneity) of devices able to 
interact with the Internet of Things. Miorandi et al. (2012) also discuss the importance 
of data confidentiality, pointing out not only the individual privacy implications of a 
data breach, but also that the data held in a business context is an asset to that 
business which needs to be protected. They define data confidentiality as “the 
guarantee that only authorised entities can access and modify data” (Miorandi et al., 
2012, p. 1505), and suggest a range of possible technology solutions. Like the 
European Commission (2013) and others they find that implementing privacy and 
security in the Internet of Things still presents many challenges, despite the range of 
technologies currently available supposedly addressing this issue. 
A number of solutions have been proposed to answer privacy issues. The most 
commonly cited is the “kill tag” solution where an RFID tag is deactivated at point of 
sale. This solution however presents its own problems. Deactivating the tag also 
disables a number of features that make the use of tags attractive in the first place, 
features like ease of item return, warranty tracking, advanced waste management and 
product support (Ohkubo, Suzuki, & Kinoshita, 2005). Other possible privacy solutions 
include physically shielding the tag itself, blocking the transmissions from the tags, and 
encrypting the tag information (United Nations, 2006). All of these solutions face 
difficulties, not least of which is in a ubiquitous computing environment there will be 
many more tags than just those individually purchased by, or even discoverable by, 
individuals.  
Another possible solution to the problem of individual privacy and security in an RFID 
system is identity management.  Identity management is generally considered to be 
the way the identity of the user of a particular system is verified so that the user can 
be logged on to a computing system, and when logged on, the identity management 
profile dictates what information that user can access (De Hert, 2008). De Hert (2008) 
also recognises a second element of identity management, discussing how an 
individual can manage their own identity through the use of pseudonyms and other 
techniques which allow for the actual identity of an individual to be obscured online. 
In respect of RFID systems, especially when considering their contribution to the 
Internet of Things, it is possible that in the future individuals will be able to dictate 
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what information they reveal about themselves (their identities) in specific contexts 
(Streitz et al., 2005). For example, Cas (2005) suggests that when a person walks 
through a shop they could choose to suppress any information about their 
movements that might be collected from any RFID enabled devices they happen to be 
carrying. This kind of “privacy enhancing technology” may help answer some of the 
concerns individuals have with future ubiquitous computing environments, and has 
also been recommended by the European Commission (2013). Debate remains about 
whether privacy rights need to be regulated, or whether industry can be counted 
upon to self-regulate. A number of authors argue that privacy solutions cannot be left 
to industry self-regulation, but that government intervention will be required to 
ensure the rights of consumers identified in various government and European Union 
mandates are protected (King & Jessen, 2010). 
2.6.6 Trust 
Although not always explicitly acknowledged in technology systems, trust is a strong 
theme within the information systems and supply chain management literature. 
Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt and Camerer (1998) describe the discipline specific range of 
trust definitions, from the calculative or institutional views generally taken by 
economists, to the personal attribute views taken by psychologists. They find two 
common features of trust across all disciplines being the need for a risk which gives 
rise to the opportunity to trust, and interdependence where the different parties must 
rely on each other. They also note, along with many others, that the broader literature 
on trust is vast. As such this review focuses on that part of the literature relevant to 
the research topic highlighting some key points.  
Trust is a concept that extends beyond the inter-personal and can include trust in 
technology or institutions. Mahinderjit-Singh and Li (2010) for example, found that the 
ability to build trust in the supply chain context could turn against infrastructure 
characteristics of the RFID system itself (such as tag qualities and data 
communications) as well as the more familiar business characteristics. In the purely 
technical sense Miorandi, et al. (2012) in discussing trust in the Internet of Things 
context describe trust as a function of trust negotiation – being “the process of 
credential exchanges that allows a party requiring a service or a resource from 
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another party to provide the necessary credentials in order to obtain the service...” (p. 
1508). This concept relates to the identification of individual digitalised artefacts 
within RFID networks, as tagged artefacts identify themselves to the RFID network, 
which then processes the information and either reads the tag or ignores it depending 
on the appropriated responses being provided. When considering the sharing of data, 
essential to the RFID supply chain, Eurich, Oertel and Boutellier (2010) found that trust 
between organisations was necessary before data would be shared in any way. 
Where the implementation of a technology-based system is successful, trust, both 
individual and organisational, frequently emerges as having been central to this 
success, as it does in studies of RFID systems. Lee, Park, Yoon and Yeon (2007) note 
that trust issues in a RFID based ubiquitous environment are complicated by the 
various perspectives held by many different stakeholders and the speed of 
technological change. Their study found that consumer trust became especially 
important in this environment as the newness of the technology exacerbated 
consumer concerns. They recommended the use of strong, consistent policies in 
relation to privacy in particular, in order to increase consumer acceptance of 
ubiquitous systems. Trust is generally considered to build slowly over time. However, 
Blomqvist (2005) found that trust could develop quickly between organisations in an 
environment where managers were involved in intense negotiation and collaboration. 
Trust in the relationship between supply chain partners has been examined in a 
number of studies. Laeequddin, Sahay, Sahay and Waheed (2012) considered that 
trust wasn’t strictly relevant between supply chain partners, as long as they had 
sufficient information about each others’ business practices to ensure there was no 
risk in their relationship. Similarly, Blomqvist, Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, Nummela and 
Saarenketo (2008) in studying trust relationships within and between born-global 
companies suggested that risks were high for such relationships and that the use of 
contracts assisted in the building of trust. Luhmann (1979) in discussing institutional 
trust suggested that the use of legislation or regulation was one of the most effective 
ways to reduce the risk of trusting in business relationships, possibly related to the 
legislated consequences of trust violation. 
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A number of authors have also modelled trust in various contexts. In their study 
Laeequddin et al. (2012) suggest a conceptual model of trust between supply chain 
partners that includes three dimensions:  
1. Characteristic trust: trust related to personal aspects including benevolence, 
honesty and reliability; 
2. Rational trust: trust related to logical aspects including economics, outcomes 
and cost/rewards calculations; 
3. Institutional trust: trust related to requirements including legislation, contracts 
and regulation. 
These dimensions are consistent with three of the four dimensions of trust suggested 
by Rousseau et al. (1998) who also noted the importance of deterrence based trust 
which was based on the presence of sanctions for possible non-performance. These 
three dimensions also mirror those suggested by Tejpal, Garg and Sachdeva (2013) 
who include a further four dimensions in their supply chain trust model being: 
1. Anticipatory trust: trust related to the expectation of a certain response or 
action; 
2. Responsive trust: trust related to the expectation of trust being both placed 
(by the trustor) and received (by the trustee); 
3. Identification based trust: trust related to the knowledge of what is mutually 
expected from the various parties involved, often based on shared goals and 
values; and  
4. Calculus based trust: trust related to the knowledge of the consequences of 
not completing a certain action.  
In the public sector, Dawes, Cresswell and Pardo (2009) note that lack of trust can be a 
barrier to the operation of knowledge networks in the public service. Hudson et al. 
(1999) while viewing collaboration between government sector organisations as being 
“self-evident” found that there needs to be a level of trust between organisations 
before collaboration can be successful. Gil-Garcia, Pardo and Burke (2010) noted the 
importance of trust in successful cross-boundary initiatives. They found three 
dimensions of trust in such initiatives being: 
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1. defined responsibilities and roles (reducing the complexity of cross boundary 
programs and facilitating understanding of the roles of each partner);  
2. familiarity with the partner organisations (creating realistic expectations); and  
3. the proper exercise of authority. 
Treglia and Park (2009) similarly found that understanding and knowledge of other 
partners within a network facilitated trusting relationships, and thus a greater 
tendency to share information. They also found that consistent policies aid in 
facilitating information sharing. Across national borders, Navarrete, Mellouli, Pardo 
and Gil-Garcia (2009) found that collaborative efforts faced challenges based on 
differing state and national agendas, the number of agencies involved in collaboration, 
and sociological differences based on language, culture, and resistance to technology. 
2.6.7 Legislation and Governance 
The presence of government regulation or legislation in respect of elements of any IT 
system, frames both the implementation and functioning of the system. Marche and 
McNiven (2003) draw a distinction between the business of government and the 
activity of governance. They define the difference around the relationship between 
the citizen and government, with government being the “way in which decisions are 
carried out” (p. 75) and governance as focusing on the way decisions are made.  
Any consideration of the role of the public sector in society will need to consider some 
aspect of governance as this is the basic function of government. Coleman (2008), 
notes that governance relies on information technology in the broad sense, and 
specifically on the information generated by IT applications, to provide information 
and support necessary for the various functions of government. Anttiroiko (2012) 
considers that the increasing use of technology in society is leading to increasing need 
for (and consideration of) technology governance. Busch (2010) considers government 
administered standards to be a form of governance, while Shah and Kesan (2010) 
conclude that the design of software defaults and configurations can also be 
considered a form of governance.  
In respect of governance in the Internet of Things context the European Commission 
(2013) report on Internet of Things governance showed a difference of opinion 
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between industry/academia and individuals. Industry and academic respondents 
believed there were already sufficient regulatory protections in place, and did not 
want to see additional regulation, as they were concerned about stifling innovation 
and investment. In contrast, individuals along with consumer associations were of the 
belief that rights to privacy (and other ethical issues) were more important. They were 
also concerned that users would be locked into technologies due to the market not 
developing competitively. Zorzi, Gluhak, Lange and Bassi (2010) also discussed the 
importance of governance in the Internet of Things, noting that at the time of writing 
there was little governance, which was contradictory at times.  
When considering any widespread IT system, especially one that includes the 
government sector, central to its implementation will be considerations of how 
legislation could affect the implementation, infrastructure and use of the system. 
Many countries have some form of privacy legislation mostly based on the OECD 
(1980) privacy principles, which include expectations of privacy, and the associated 
security. The European Union also requires member states to comply with its various 
directives in respect of data protection and privacy (Directives 95/46 and 2002/58). 
Despite the regulatory protections already in place, Friedewald and Raabe (2011), 
note that ubiquitous applications still present challenges in the protection of 
individual data, especially when balanced with the needs of organisations which want 
to use the data they collect. They further point out that the uncertainty surrounding 
technological development leads to difficulties in developing appropriate regulatory 
and legislative protections, and that it is likely that current protections are not 
adequate. These concerns are especially critical to RFID systems because of their 
scope, as RFID enabled devices can be easily carried across borders and around the 
world. A good example of this is RFID enabled passports commonly carried by citizens 
of many countries including the US and New Zealand (The RFID Reader, 2006). 
In the government context, Hovy (2008), claims that any research on e-government 
should consider a range of perspectives including amongst others, political agendas, 
legislation and technological perspectives. Jansen (2011), also discusses the 
importance of linking political priorities and legislation to the objectives of any 
technology based project in the government, noting that this linkage is necessary for 
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any successful IT implementation, along with building the appropriate infrastructure 
to support any reform necessary. Dawes, Cresswell and Pardo (2009) when discussing 
the importance of policy in achieving success in government collaborative projects, 
state that “policy barriers are the greatest obstacles to substantive success in building 
Public Service Knowledge Networks” (p. 398). 
2.6.8 Cost 
The final challenge to the implementation of any IT system is often consideration of its 
cost. Where RFID systems are studied, cost is one of the most frequently discussed 
elements on which the adoption decision is made. Rothfeder (2004) in a study of 
suppliers’ compliance with Wal-Mart’s requirement to RFID tag cases and pallets, 
found that cost was a major inhibitor to suppliers utilising RFID systems beyond the 
minimum requirement to put a tag on an item (this minimal compliance has come to 
be known as “slap and ship”). Other cost issues identified by Rothfeder include the 
cost of the tag relative to the value of the item – with tags costing 20 cents 
representing a large portion of the value of items worth only a dollar. Chui, Löffler and 
Roberts (2010) find that both cost and size of tags are falling, although they have not 
yet fallen far enough to encourage adoption on low margin goods.  
When discussing the implementation of Smart Card fare collection systems, Pelletier, 
Trépanier and Morency (2011) found that while ongoing cost reductions were an 
incentive for implementation, the actual cost of implementation was a major barrier. 
Taking a slightly different viewpoint, Riggins and Slaughter (2006), discussing inter-
organisation supply chains, found that issues around the sharing of both costs and 
benefits between participating organisations inhibited the adoption of RFID based 
information systems. Ramanathan, Ramanathan and Ko (2013) in a study of logistics 
found that cheaper costs would probably increase systems uptake, and interestingly 
that government support in terms of finance, training or regulation increased the 
probability of adoption of RFID systems. From a public management perspective, 
Dawes (2008) recommends a broad approach which includes intangible costs such as 
managing cultural change and organisational relationships. 
48 
 
Bunduchi, Weissharr and Smart (2011), examined both benefits and costs of 
technology systems from a process innovation perspective. Using the spread of RFID 
technology through industry as an example they found that during the early evolution 
of RFID systems the costs of systems development, infrastructure and ethical costs 
(including the cost of complying with privacy requirements) outweighed other costs. 
As RFID technology became more widespread they argued that initiation costs, cost 
associated with owning RFID equipment and the cost of business change come to 
dominate. In respect of benefits, they found that early adopters benefited from being 
able to accurately track inventory, thus reducing labour and handling costs. As RFID 
systems became more widespread they saw different benefits in different industries 
as these industries adopted RFID systems, as would be expected since RFID systems 
were first used in the supply chain arena, and moved from there into other industries. 
2.7 Literature Summary 
Examination of the RFID literature presents the picture of a simple technology 
wrapped in a complex network. From the uncomplicated tag and reader infrastructure 
arises a detailed middleware and data sharing network. Basic issues surrounding 
standards for both hardware and software remain undecided, and this is inhibiting 
systems interoperability and information sharing. Further barriers to information 
sharing include concerns about individual privacy and security of data, and the related 
issue of whether organisations can be trusted with the data they receive. From an 
organisational perspective, business practices and governance need to be balanced 
with knowledge of any legislation that might affect RFID systems.  
The context in which systems are based is also important. Various technology models 
hint at what might become possible, with RFID enabled devices contributing to a 
ubiquitous Internet of Things style network where all things (devices) could be 
digitalised with RFID tags and able to interact with each other, organisations and even 
individuals. The relationship such technology has with organisations, especially where 
they cross the boundary between public and private is still unclear, with only a few 
studies in limited application areas looking at this issue. The challenge remains how to 
study this network in the public-private context in a way that allows a clear picture of 
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how it is established and sustained to emerge. This is the question that will be 
addressed in the next section of this thesis.
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3 Theoretical and Methodological Basis of this Study 
As the basis of this research is the study of RFID, it is necessary to take a theoretical 
and methodological approach that will allow the technology itself to take a place 
within the analysis. This chapter will first discuss the theoretical approach taken in this 
study then describe the methodology used to gather and analyse data. It will conclude 
with a discussion of the role of the researcher and the ethics of funded research.  
3.1 Actor-Network Theory (ANT) 
As discussed in the introduction, a number of theoretical frameworks and 
epistemologies were considered for this study, but ANT’s inclusion of technology and 
devices in its model of society was considered most appropriate for answering the 
research questions. ANT’s use of a symmetrical view of the social, where all things 
human or non-human are considered to be able to act or have agency, allows the 
technology of RFID networks to act along with human counterparts. This view allows 
the network to be traced from place to place, focusing on the technology within the 
public-private context, rather than having to focus on individuals within single RFID 
systems. Given the dispersed, pervasive nature of RFID networks this seems 
particularly appropriate as a way to trace associations between humans and things 
that would otherwise not be visible within a constricting ‘humans only’ view of the 
social. For example, in discussing ANT, Vidgen and McMaster (1996) describe a 
“parliament of things”(p. 253) in which technology is present within society and 
represented by its spokespersons, a reasonable parallel to today’s Internet of Things. 
This highlights the value of ANT particularly in its focus on the place of technology in 
society, as RFID systems are networks themselves – of humans and non-human 
devices - the very core of ANT based study. 
There is little argument that ANT is a qualitative approach used by researchers who 
are attempting to make the world visible through the collection of the perspectives of 
many different people and objects – much like the bricolage of Denzin and Lincoln 
(2005). However, ANT does not fit comfortably into the more usual sociological 
frameworks. Instead Lewis (2007) and Myers (2009) consider ANT to be a “grand 
theory”, a way of looking at and understanding large and complex social and 
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technological structures. More commonly, as noted by Gad and Jensen (2010), ANT is 
considered to be neither a theory nor a method but more of a lens through which to 
view the social. Gherardi and Nicolini (2005) also take this point of view, believing that 
ANT is not a theory in and of itself but better considered to be an ‘interpretive 
sensitivity’, following the ideology of ontological performativity, where reality is 
constructed through the various actions or performances of its members. 
Although a research study generally takes the point of view of one of the accepted 
research paradigms (Bailey, 2007; Myers, 2009), ANT can be difficult to categorise as it 
has its own ontology, or set of assumptions about the nature of world, largely based 
on the work of Bruno Latour, John Law and Michael Callon. As pointed out by Law 
(1992) p 383: 
“Actor network theory is analytically radical in part because it treads on a set of ethical, 
epistemological, and ontological toes. In particular it does not celebrate the idea that 
there is a difference in kind between people on the one hand, and objects on the 
other”. 
He argues that ‘the social’ is heterogeneous; it is an effect of networks of society, 
people, organisations and things (technological artefacts). According to Law (1999) 
none of these elements can exist apart from each other and they are formed by the 
inter-relationships between them, in other words they have “relational materiality”.  
Despite, or perhaps because of the difficulty of assigning ANT to a particular social 
category, it has been associated with a number of paradigms, particularly 
interpretivism, social constructivism and critical theory. Cordella and Shaikh (2003) 
find that ANT is most commonly associated with interpretivism, a tradition whereby 
reality is constructed by humans, according to their values and beliefs, and is 
therefore subjective (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). However, Cordella and Shaikh 
(2003) go on to criticise the way researchers use ANT within an interpretivist paradigm, 
on the basis that they fail to focus on the ontology of ANT, instead using it as a lens to 
study information systems rather than allowing the actants to “speak for themselves” 
(p. 9). They contrast the ontology of the interpretivist tradition, which places emphasis 
on the construction of reality by the observer; with the ontology of ANT where reality 
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emerges through the association of the actors. This view, where reality should not be 
imposed by the researcher is also taken by Elbanna (2011, p. 138) who states “The 
role played by the social and the technical, and their effect on each other, is left as a 
local empirical matter that needs to be explored rather than being a theoretical 
starting point for research”. Elbanna (2011) considers that ANT provides the flexibility 
to allow the actors in the network to assemble their own form of existence (and 
politics for that matter), rather than having it imposed on them by the researcher. 
Although a number of studies have linked ANT with the social constructivist viewpoint, 
it is difficult to consider ANT a constructivist approach as in its purest sense social 
constructivism does not allow for the presence of non-human actors (Cordella & 
Shaikh, 2003). Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009), consider ANT to be part of the “second 
wave” of social construction which does allow non-human actors. Bijker (1993, p. 125), 
agrees with this view stating that “the technical is socially constructed, and the social 
is technically constructed - all stable ensembles are bound together as much by the 
technical as by the social”; although this is considered to be a less common viewpoint. 
This is the approach taken by Hanseth, Aanestad & Berg (2004, p. 119) who argue that 
ANT looks at the “construction of things normally taken for granted”. Similarly 
Aanestad (2003), employs ANT as a way of looking at the relationship between new 
technology and work practices in a different and more flexible way. 
The third paradigm sometimes associated with ANT is the critical paradigm as in the 
work of Doolin and Lowe (2001). However, as this study does not seek to critique 
society, nor take a moral stance (both requirements of a critical study according to 
Myers (2009)), such a critical approach is not considered appropriate.  
As this study is more interested in describing the RFID network rather than 
commenting on society, it is considered more appropriate to follow Elbanna (2011) in 
neither taking up a particular paradigm approach nor making any a priori assumptions 
about the nature of reality. Instead, this study focuses on the ontology and principles 
of ANT in order to advise the research, since “ANT can account for both the social and 
the technical without losing any thread in favour of the other providing a more 
balanced view of both” (Elbanna, 2011, p. 138). Thus, following Klein and Myers 
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(1999), ANT will also be used as a way of viewing the social that will allow for new 
associations and perspectives to be recognised. 
3.1.1 Principles of ANT 
ANT focuses on the examination of “the interaction between social and technical 
systems” (Shin & Lee, 2011, p. 89). Its basis lies in the relationships between elements 
(or actors) in a socio-technical network. Anything might be included as an actor in a 
network, a technological artefact, institution, document, policy, concept or person. 
The resulting network is termed “heterogeneous”, as it is made up of a mixture of 
elements. According to Doolin and Lowe (Doolin & Lowe, 2001) this mixture of human 
and non-human actors stabilises the network and results in its being socio-technical in 
nature rather than purely social. The technical actants are more than mere 
placeholders. Law (1992) argues that if we were to exclude any of the non-human 
materials from our networks, the networks themselves would disappear as the 
interactions between the humans and non-humans are an essential part of the 
network. Thus, the actor-network emerges both from the actors that make up the 
network, and their interactions with each other. As Law (1999) points out, the 
relationship between the actors is dynamic and changing. It is the dynamic interplay 
between the actors, how they act together and apart in order to form the network (in 
a process called “translation”) that the actor network researcher finds interesting (M 
Callon & Latour, 1981).  
Callon and Latour (1981) believe that in order to understand a network, it cannot be 
assumed that one actor is superior to another, otherwise elements of the network 
may be lost in attributing importance to one actor over another. Therefore, ANT 
demands that all actors are treated in the same way – it is agnostic to the position or 
quality of the actor, human or non-human, famous or mundane, social or technical 
(Law, 1992). It is also symmetric describing the viewpoints of both human and non-
human actors in the same neutral language. Callon (1986) considers that this requires 
a certain sometimes heroic approach to ANT description. For example in Aramis, or, 
the love of technology, Latour (2002) describes the Aramis project through different 
perspectives, including that of the technology itself. Aramis is an actor, commentating 
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on its own problems and ultimately its demise. Latour’s approach does not privilege 
human actors, he investigates all through the same approach. 
Along with the inclusion of non-human actors in the ANT networks, these actors are 
also treated on an equal symmetrical basis with human. Law (1992) argues that this 
approach demystifies the powerful by recognising no distinction between the actors in 
the network, instead it theorises that the difference between actors lies in how they 
use methods and materials to create themselves. Similarly, Hanseth and Monteiro 
(1998), state that “a more satisfactory account of the interwoven relationship 
between IT and organisational transformations is lacking” (p. 92). They believe that 
ANT provides a way to describe the detailed actions which contribute to the make-up 
of information technology systems. 
3.1.2 Macro or Micro? 
The symmetrical approach gives rise to the flat ontology of ANT, as outlined by Callon 
and Latour (1981, p. 280): 
“There are of course macro-actors and micro-actors, but the difference between them 
is brought about by power relations and the constructions of networks that will elude 
analysis if we presume a priori that macro-actors are bigger than or superior to micro-
actors.” 
Callon and Latour (1981) assume that all actants are isomorphic – being made up of 
similar material or in similar ways. Therefore, they argue, each actant and network 
should be examined using the same methods, as all are made of the same stuff. It is 
the process of examining how the actants form associations, and black boxes, which 
leads us to being able to tell the difference between them – not the size of the actant. 
The ability of a macro actant to assemble and keep together an association of micro 
actants is what dictates its ability to stay macro. Latour (1988) demonstrates how this 
process works, describing how Pasteur’s process grew in scope through the enrolment 
of many micro actants from microbes to governments. As Callon and Latour (1986) 
describe “macro-actors and micro-actors seated on top of many (leaky) black boxes”. 
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3.1.3 Actors or Actants 
One of the controversies of ANT, already alluded to above and discussed in detail later 
in this section, is the inclusion of non-human “actors” in ANT networks. This inclusion 
leads to difficulties with the use of the term “actor” to describe all members of a 
particular network as the term actor is normally reserved for humans who are capable 
of agency, and action. The term ‘actant’ on the other hand, can be applied to both 
human and non-human, and is defined by Czarniawska-Joerges and Hernes (2005, p. 9) 
as “those that act and are acted upon”. Because both human and non-human actants 
are included in this study, it is considered appropriate that the term actant will be 
applied to both, for the remainder of the study as well as allowing the non-human 
actants to have something of a “speaking role” in the networks developed, as Latour 
(2002) did with Aramis. 
The use of the term network in ANT is also not the standard usage. In ANT terms the 
network is heterogeneous - made up of both human and non-human actants, with the 
presence of the non-human actants helping the network to achieve stability (Elbanna, 
2009). ANT is concerned with how this stable network forms, how the actants organise 
themselves and how they keep the network together (Law, 1992). It is also interested 
in tracing the relationships between actants in the network, sometimes to “surprising 
places” (Law, 2007, p. 8). It is the tracing of these associations through the process of 
translation that is described in ANT accounts. 
3.1.4 The Process of Translation 
The process of translation forms and stabilises the network, and each part of the 
network – human, non-human or organisation, jostles for position within it. At any 
time part of the network can become unstable, actants can leave the network and 
new ones can join, forcing the network to go through further translations. According 
to Law (2007) actants attract other actants by persuading them that they share a 
common problem (a process known as problematisation) thus attracting them to join 
the network. This process of persuasion requires continuing negotiations during which 
the interests of the actants become aligned. According to Callon and Latour (1981) this 
process of translating another actant into the network is complete when that actant 
becomes able to act or speak on behalf of the other members of the network. 
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Translation is recognised to have four stages, originally summarised by Callon (1986) 
as: 
1. problematisation, during which an actant or actants begin by defining the 
problem, possible solutions, and the roles they will play in finding this solution. 
Some actants may also represent themselves as being essential to solving the 
problem thus becoming “obligatory passage points” for the solution; 
2. interessement, during which the initial focal actants attempt to interest other 
actants in the problem, aligning them with their own interests – and validating 
the problem; 
3. enrolment occurs when interessement succeeds and the different actants are 
all working towards a common goal. At this stage the role of each actant in the 
network is generally defined. Some actants may be delegated to stand in, and 
speak on behalf of others; and 
4. mobilisation involves the initial actants ensuring that the other actants 
continue supporting the network.  
Law (1992) describes four features of translation: 
1. it is most stable or durable when it incorporates a range of stable actants – for 
example books are more stable and durable than thoughts; 
2. it includes actants at a distance and therefore also includes the means of 
communicating with these actants through immutable mobiles; 
3. anticipation of future events and reactions to the network lends stability to it; 
and 
4. the scope of the network can be extended beyond the local to include 
strategies, which are largely implicit. Law (1992) suggests a range of strategies 
including “enterprise” and “vision” which act to form the typical structure of 
an organisation. 
Latour (1999b) provides simple diagrams in order to assist in understanding the 
various concepts he discusses. Following his lead Figure 4 below summarises the ANT 
process of translation. This thesis will use diagrams in the following sections to further 
demonstrate the ANT concepts discussed. 
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Figure 4: Actor Network Theory 
According to Latour (2005) the purpose of translation is to allow for the formation of a 
stabilised network, where controversies surrounding the network, and between the 
actants, are settled, or at least at rest. The process theoretically leads to the alignment 
of the interests of all the actants as they work towards solving the identified problem. 
However, while the process of translation itself seems relatively straightforward, it is 
possible for dissidents to de-rail the process of translation forcing actants to return to 
earlier stages of translation, or to give up on their attempts to align with others. 
Latour (1987) describes how a network can be challenged by ‘unreliable allies’ that 
want to alter the shape of the translation to suit themselves. In order to stabilise 
translation the actants can use other tools including inscription, punctualisation, 
immutable mobiles, displacement and black boxing, which will be discussed in the 
following sections. 
3.1.5 Obligatory Passage Points 
At the end of the problematisation phase of translation, there is an obligatory passage 
point that must be passed to move through the remaining phases of translation, as 
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demonstrated in Figure 5 below. Callon (1986) describes how the obligatory passage 
point occurs at the moment of problematisation where 
other actants accept the program set out by the original 
(focal) actants. Gherardi and Nicolini (2005) used the 
example of how legislation made a management 
accounting system an obligatory passage point in Italian 
local government agencies by requiring its use in the 
local body financial systems. However, they also recorded 
considerable resistance to this legislation with a number of dissidents sabotaging the 
translations required to integrate the accounting system into their organisations on 
the basis it would reduce their discretionary powers or increase workloads. There was 
also resistance from non-humans in the form of difficulties encountered with 
integrating pre-existing accounting information, changing accounting practices, and 
even in obtaining data to input into the new systems.  
Similarly Backhouse, Hsu and Silva (2006) found that an information security standard 
became an obligatory passage point “insofar as its prescribed practices and policies 
are considered valuable and interpreted to be technically sound”. This security 
standard could also be considered to be an inscription as it is an item or artefact with 
a course of action written into it.  
3.1.6 Inscription, Irreversibility and Durability 
Any translation is advised by, and produces, various inscriptions. When an artefact or 
a technology has a program or a course of action written into it – it is said to be 
inscribed. Akrich (1992) believes that the production of inscriptions is the primary 
occupation of innovators. The innovator’s vision of how the world works and the place 
of their invention in it is inscribed into the construction of the artefact they produce. 
The artefact then takes its place in the network, its programming dictating how it is 
used by other actants. When a network contains an inscribed actant, the network 
usually becomes irreversible as it is impossible, or at least extremely difficult, for the 
network to return to the same condition it was in before inscription occurred. Callon 
(1991) describes two features of irreversibility – the difficulty of completely undoing 
the effects of the translation, and the degree that the translation determines 
Figure 5: Obligatory Passage Point 
60 
 
subsequent events. An example commonly used is that of a computer program. 
Without the computer programming (or inscription) a computer is merely a collection 
of components. Thus the programming inscription is not only necessary it is 
irreversible, it cannot be undone or the technology will not operate. Latour (1992) 
argues that inscription also takes place in the formation of the technology itself within 
the actor-network. He implies that the inscriptions operating within the network bring 
it into existence, thus the network can act even if it is not fully implemented, through 
its inscriptions.  
According to Hanseth and Monteiro (1997) the strength of an inscription can be 
related to the complexity of its surrounding networks and how well they are aligned 
with the inscription. Monteiro and Ciborra (2000) give the example of learning a 
specific work practice. If the initial attempt to inscribe the process through training is 
too weak, then the practice could be inscribed into a manual, or if that is unsuccessful 
then an information system based inscription could be considered. Each inscription 
increases in strength until it is successful (or translated) into practice. They consider 
that an information infrastructure is an aligned actor-network as “the constitutive 
elements of an information infrastructure - the collection of standards and protocols, 
user expectations and experience, bureaucratic procedures for passing standards - 
inscribe patterns of use” (Monteiro & Ciborra, 2000, p. 78). Once established these 
networks are difficult to reverse – or to put it in ANT terms they are more irreversible; 
this lends the network a degree of strength and according to Monteiro and Ciborra 
(2000) contributes to the institutionalisation of networks. 
Law (1992) argues that translation is strengthened when more durable materials are 
used, assisting the translation in maintaining relationships. This applies particularly to 
inscriptions, as he notes “when we start to perform relations – and in particular when 
we embody them in inanimate materials such as texts and buildings – they may last 
longer” (p. 387). However, Law (1992) also cautions against being too keen to use the 
term durable due to its context dependence. He uses the example of a prison where 
the walls are secure and durable but still dependent on the presence of guards to 
ensure prisoners stay behind them. Callon (1991) believes that the durability of a 
network increases as the number of elements/actants, (especially irreversible ones) 
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increases. This he says is because it becomes more and more difficult to reverse a 
network that contains many actants as a redefinition of any part of that network 
causes it to re-translate – or to fail. Thus, these tightly wound networks also resist 
attempts to change or alter them. Such a network can then be said to be predictable 
in its output – or black boxed.  
3.1.7 Black Boxes and Immutable Mobiles 
Where parts of the network are considered no longer interesting, 
or where they are simply accepted as they stand, are thought to be 
reliable and unchanging, they are considered to be black boxes, as 
depicted in Figure 6. According to Latour (1987) the term black box 
arises from cybernetics where commands that are too complicated 
are viewed entirely as their input and their output, surrounded by a black box. A black 
box is part of a network that “no longer needs to be reconsidered, those things whose 
contents have become a matter of indifference” (M Callon & Latour, 1981, p. 285); 
such things as habits, or policies could be considered to be black boxes. This differs 
from the concept of punctualisation (which will be discussed in full later). While a 
punctualisation can be considered to be where part of the network acts as if it is a 
single block, a black box can be set aside as its contents can be considered fixed – for 
the particular moment it is being observed.  
Latour (1987), suggests a number of ways in which other actants can be enrolled into 
a black box: 
 appealing to the interests of others or persuading others to take up the 
interests of the actant; 
 suggesting other actants take a detour through the black box; 
 rearranging the interests and goals of others in order to divert them through 
the black box; and, 
 making themselves invaluable to others. 
Once an actant has been enrolled, it becomes part of the black box with predictable 
outcomes.  
Figure 6: Black Boxing 
62 
 
Black boxes also vary in stability. For example, Latour (1991) considers that the more 
difficult it is to open a black box, the more stable it is. He also believes that the more 
black boxes occurring in a “chain of associations” (p. 123), the more predictable the 
network is, and also more powerful as the black boxes limit the performance of 
actants to the one they dictate. However, Latour (1987) also believes that black boxes 
are not fixed, they can be re-opened and re-negotiated. The many different parts of a 
black box can also come apart as readily as they can be assembled, and a network 
gains durability when the various actants no longer feel the need to open up the black 
boxes to examine their contents. 
Durability itself is something that is open to question. Latour (2005) discusses how the 
different things that make up a network, or black box, differ in durability. He considers 
that “social stuff” (p. 66) cannot make up a durable network, instead networks are 
constructed of social skills and things. From this the instruction to “follow the actors” 
becomes instead “follow the actors in their weaving through things they have added 
to social skills so as to render more durable the constantly shifting interactions” (p. 68). 
Where an element of the network is mobile and durable – for example a manual or a 
map - it can become an immutable mobile, able to travel through both space and time. 
Law and Singleton (2005) relate that the concept of immutable mobiles arose as a way 
to understand control exerted over a distance. They give the example of ships used 
during the era of European Imperialism. The ships were mobile and held their shape, 
allowing sailors to travel around the world exerting European control, thus stabilising 
the European Colonial network. Other commonly given ANT examples of immutable 
mobiles include “letters of credit, military orders or cannon balls” (Law, 1992, p. 387), 
as all of these elements can have effect over a distance – although the effects are 
clearly different. 
3.1.8 Punctualisation 
Differing slightly from black boxing, punctualisation 
occurs when part of the network can be simplified 
and assumed to act in the same way consistently. 
It can then be incorporated into another network, 
Figure 7: Punctualisation 
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as depicted in Figure7. Returning to the example of a computer, Callon (1991) 
describes how a computer, the product of a translation, is used in another network as 
a punctualised device. It can be assumed to work in a consistent way in the network in 
which it is placed, but is actually the product of another separate network. Further 
examples of this might be a strategy, a habit, or a device. Law (1992) describes how 
patterns within the network that are often repeated can be considered punctualised, 
primarily as a way of dealing with the complexity of networks.  In the case of this study 
an RFID transmitter is a punctualised device, it is expected to work in the same way 
the majority of the time, and is the black boxed product of another translation 
punctualised into the network we are observing.  
The ‘punctualised’ actant is what we perceive in our network –a group of actants held 
together for the time being, by the process of translation, which Callon (1987) allows 
us to treat as a single point or actant. However, as Law (1992) notes it is not taken for 
granted that the punctualisation will work all the time (nor can we guarantee our 
transmitters will work all the time) as it can be challenged. When this happens, 
irreversibility decreases, and actants start to drift apart, as Callon (1991) states 
“markets collapse, industrial sectors are dislocated, and scientific specialities tear 
themselves apart. The macro-social is no different in kind from the micro social…” (p. 
153). So, to summarise, a fully translated network can become a black box, which can 
then be used in another network as a punctualised device (or actant). 
3.1.9 Mediators and Intermediaries 
Apart from describing those elements that lend 
stability to the network such as inscriptions or 
immutable mobiles, or arise from it such as black 
boxes, there are other influences on ANT networks. 
Mediators and intermediaries act within the network 
to either change or stabilise the translation. The most 
widely cited definition of a mediator in the ANT sense 
comes from Latour (2005, p. 39) who states “their input is 
never a good predictor of their output. Mediators 
transform, translate, distort and modify the meaning of 
Figure 8: Mediators and Intermediaries 
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the elements they are supposed to carry”, as demonstrated at the top of Figure 8. 
Because technology can mediate change in relationships (between actants) it becomes 
part of the translation, a “quasi-object” according to Latour (1993, p. 136), able to 
participate in events within a given network. One frequently cited example of a 
mediator is given by Latour (1999b), who describes the action of a speed bump as 
mediating the behaviour of drivers – forcing them to slow down when their plan was 
to continue driving at the same speed. Even processes can be considered mediators. 
Bryson, Crosby and Bryson (2009) argued that strategic planning was a mediator of the 
planning of a geospatial information system, as strategic planning was a set of 
processes the outcome of which was not predictable. 
Intermediaries on the other hand have a predictable output whereby they may “count 
for just one, or even for nothing at all because [they] can be easily forgotten” (Latour, 
2005, p. 39).This throughput is demonstrated above in Figure 8. In fact Latour (2005) 
views intermediaries as being black boxes. Callon (1991) considers that intermediaries 
can be categorised into four groups, texts (or literary inscriptions), technical artefacts, 
humans (with their associated skills and knowledge), and money. Aside from this 
grouping he acknowledges that many intermediaries are actually hybrids, constructed 
of both things and humans, giving the simple example of a man mashing potatoes 
with his fork – the predictable outcome of this action being mashed potatoes. 
Similarly, in Aramis Latour (2002) describes the transportation system “VAL” as an 
intermediary. When travelling on VAL users hardly notices the technology, it is simply 
a way of travelling from one station to another without thought (Latour, 2002).  
However, mediators are not fixed, they can become intermediaries, and vice versa, 
and where an intermediary becomes a mediator according to Latour (2005), a network 
can become destabilised as its output is suddenly unpredictable. Pollack, Costello and 
Sankaran (2013) describe mediating relationships in the implementation of a project 
management information system (PMIS). They found that the PMIS initially acted as a 
mediator in project development as its introduction did not lead to predicted 
outcomes. However, as the users of the PMIS became more familiar with it, its nature 
changed from being a mediator to that of an intermediary. As an intermediary the 
PMIS stabilised the process of project management while not changing its outcome. 
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Interestingly, they also found that the nature of a mediator/intermediary changed 
depending on the perspective of the actant. From the perspective of the PMIS the 
provision of training was an intermediary – it was “stabilised with repeatable 
outcomes from the inputs to the outputs of the translation” (p. 8). However, from the 
perspective of the new user the process was mediating in that they did not 
understand how they would be changing their work processes when they first 
encountered the PMIS, thus the output of the process was uncertain. Similarly 
Doganova (2013) describes how academic spin-offs4 can be seen as both 
intermediaries – simply transferring knowledge to the general public, and mediators, 
engaging with others outside the academic community to develop new knowledge 
and innovations. 
3.1.10 Multiplicities 
Because ANT acknowledges many different actants, and because the interpretation of 
the state of those actants (micro/macro, black boxed etc.) is variable depending on 
circumstances, it is possible for ANT to accommodate multiple different views of 
reality or multiplicities. Cresswell, Worth and Sheikh (2010) suggest that this 
multiplicity can help in interpreting the ANT network as it can accommodate the 
different characteristics of each actant, assisting in understanding their different roles 
and forms.  
Mol (1999) discusses how reality is performed in different ways and how these 
different performances lead to multiple views of reality, suggesting that reality, rather 
than being observed is instead “done and enacted” (p. 77). She gives the example of 
anaemia having three different performances. The first is the clinical performance 
where a doctor diagnoses a patient based on their symptoms. The second is the 
laboratory performance, where lab tests determine the presence (or absence) of 
anaemia. The third is the patho-physiological performance, or the differentiation 
between normal and abnormal haemoglobin levels. Understanding these 
performances allows Mol to understand why things happen in certain ways depending 
on the perspective taken, and how the different versions of reality might conflict. 
                                                     
4
 Products or businesses that arise from the result of research done in academic institutions. 
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Latour (2002) lists 21 different versions of the state of the Aramis transportation 
system, from “Aramis has been perfected...” to “No piece of Aramis has been 
perfected...” (p. 277), displaying a complete range of realities from the implemented 
to the impossible. Ironically, Gad and Jensen (2010) view ANT itself as being multiple 
with different versions addressing the different ways it is applied in practice, 
something they regard as unsurprising given the flexibility of the ANT approach. 
3.1.11 Criticisms of ANT 
Although the logic of the ANT approach can be seen through the above discussion and 
examples, ANT has been criticised in a number of ways. There are four main points of 
contention: 
 lack of a political dimension (Alcadipani & Hassard, 2009); 
 focusing on the local rather than society (Walsham, 1997); 
 inclusion of non-humans as agents (Alcadipani & Hassard, 2009; Walsham, 
1997); and 
 agnosticism (Walsham, 1997). 
The lack of a politics of ANT is addressed in more recent publications considered to be 
part of the ANT and After literature. Law (2007) discusses this issue, noting that the 
“politics” of ANT focus on describing how different realities could be constructed, how 
those realities might otherwise appear, and emphasising that each reality is not the 
only one possible. Latour (1993) addresses politics in ANT by pointing out that both 
the local and societal structures are made up of the same actants, and operate in 
similar ways. The same tools can be used to analyse both types of structure and it is 
possible to move between examining them both, depending on the nature of the 
study being undertaken.  
Hanseth and Monteiro (1997), do not consider politics to be a problem, with 
movement between macro and micro structures being a matter of choosing which 
black box to open, with the choice of box being a matter of convenience. Thus, the 
different layers of society can be navigated without regard for whether the actant is 
macro or micro, local or social. 
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Those that criticise ANT for including non-human actants generally do so on the basis 
that it abrogates human responsibility. This criticism is answered by Law (1992, p. 383) 
“We need, I think, to distinguish between ethics and sociology. The one may – indeed 
should – inform the other, but they are not identical. To say that there is no 
fundamental difference between people and objects is an analytical stance, not an 
ethical position. And to say this does not mean that we have to treat the people in our 
lives as machines”.  
As well as in his 1992 article quoted above, Law (2007) addresses the criticism that 
ANT is agnostic by noting that both good and bad arise from, and are identified in 
networks. This does not mean that ANT is agnostic; merely that it identifies both the 
good and the bad done within the network. In any case, it is the network examined 
and its implications that determine whether or not a particular study is either agnostic 
or overly privileging of technology compared to humans. As pointed out by Walsham 
(1997, p. 475) “moral and political issues should be debated from a solid empirical 
base, and actor-network theory offers a contribution to the latter if not directly to the 
former”. 
Taking the above issues under advisement, ANT is considered a suitable framework for 
this research, both because of its inclusion of technology actants, and because moral 
issues are not the primary focus of this research. However, the presence of large 
organisations within the network leads to the question, is ANT the most appropriate 
framework for the study of organisational behaviour especially at the more macro 
level? ANT has been coupled with a number of other theoretical approaches in the 
study of organisations, most commonly Structuration theory (Greenhalgh & Stones, 
2010), and Institutional Theory (Lounsbury, 2008). The following section will consider 
whether the addition of a second theoretical approach is appropriate in this study of 
the RFID network. 
3.2 Institutions, Institutional Theory and ANT 
While the discussion has so far focused on ANT as the most appropriate theoretical 
lens for this study, there are other perspectives that could add richness to the data 
analysis and assist in understanding some of the interactions between organisations 
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and actants that emerge in the findings. Okhuysen and Bonardi (2011) challenge the 
assumption that only one theoretical lens should be used to examine data. They argue 
that the management field is complex, lending itself to multi-theory explanations in 
preference to the narrow account that a single theory can provide. Similarly, 
Vosselman (2012) argues for multi-paradigm research. Utilising a combination of ANT 
and Transaction Cost Economics, he argues that “contrasting the two perspectives 
sharpens the assumptions of each of them, while connecting them brings interaction 
effects into focus” (p. 7). Orlikowski and Barley (2001) also favour combining 
approaches from organisational studies and information technology fields. Pointing 
towards the advantages to be gained from combining the strengths of both they argue 
that:  
“Technologies are simultaneously social and physical artefacts. Consequently, neither 
a strictly constructionist nor a strictly materialist stance is adequate for studying 
technologies...” (p. 149). 
They find that most organisational theories take a deterministic view of technology 
and its interaction with people, and believe that combining epistemologies would 
assist in enhancing understanding of socio/technical systems. They go on to also 
suggest that information technology researchers could gain insight from the inclusion 
of institutional perspectives. Fredriksson, Pallas and Wehmeier (2013) also accuse 
Institutional Theory of over-determinism in respect of institutions, while it ignores 
social actants. They suggest the ANT concept of translation may be of assistance in 
combating this tendency as it is non-deterministic and focuses on the role of actants in 
translating meaning into organisational contexts. In his study combining ANT and 
Institutional Theory, Waldorff (2013) examines how health innovations were adopted 
in a Danish healthcare setting. He used Institutional Theory to describe the 
institutional logics that actants used to legitimise their actions, while ANT described 
how these logics were translated into practice.  
In respect of ANT specifically, Cresswell, Worth and Sheikh (2010) suggest combining 
ANT with other theoretical approaches, as they believe a combination approach can 
“help to focus data collection and inform strategic decisions throughout the conduct 
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of the research” (p. 6). Although ANT has been combined with Structuration Theory, 
Clegg (2010) does not favour this approach as he believes Structuration Theory is one 
directional, describing only structuration without taking account of the possibility of 
de-structuration, a criticism he also levels at Institutional Theory. Instead, he prefers a 
combination of Institutional Theory with ANT on the basis that ANT helps explain 
power relationships, as well as including technology within its scope of analysis. 
Greenhalgh and Stones (2010) combine ANT with Strong Structuration Theory, which 
they argue allows for the inclusion of technology within the study framework, 
something that Structuration Theory would normally deny. However, the presence of 
large organisations (and institutions such as governments) within the scope of this 
research would tend to favour the addition of Institutional Theory along with ANT to 
explain the RFID network.  
Although it is not common to combine theoretical approaches, ANT has been 
combined with Institutional Theory by a number of authors such as Czarniawska-
Joerges & Hernes (2005) or Justesen & Mouritsen (2011), primarily from the 
Scandinavian countries. This approach has come to be known as the Scandinavian 
School of Institutional Theory according to Boxenbaum and Strandgaard-Pedersen 
(2009). They point out that Scandinavian Institutionalism emphasises the variation 
between organisations, rather than institutional isomorphism (the tendency for 
organisations to be driven towards standardisation by institutional pressures), with 
the ANT concept of translation being incorporated in order to explain how 
organisations change. They also note a newer trend to using the concept of translation 
within Institutional Theory to explain how actants attempt to align ideas or practices 
with their own interests.  
A major difference between ANT and Institutional Theory is that ANT describes the 
micro detail of the formation of networks that could (or did) become institutions. An 
example of this is Latour’s (1988) work describing how the expanding networks 
surrounding the pasteurisation process led to its global adoption, acknowledging along 
the way the place of technology within this formation. Institutional Theory on the 
other hand emphasises isomorphism or similarity, while not approaching how 
technology or other more micro actors may influence this process. Institutional Theory 
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assumes that institutions are driven to become more similar by isomorphic pressures, 
and moves away from the variation or heterogeneity seen in ANT descriptions. It is 
this drive towards isomorphism that the Scandinavian institutionalists and authors 
such as Lounsbury (2008) see as a weakness in the pure version of Institutional Theory. 
Although Lounsbury (2008) does note that even Meyer and Rowan (1977) (two of the 
originators of modern Institutional Theory) acknowledged that Institutional Theory 
was “decoupled from the buzzing conformity of everyday life” (Lounsbury, 2008, p. 
356).  
Lounsbury (2008) also focuses on how ANT can help explain variations in institutional 
practice, noting that an ANT perspective can assist in explaining lower level 
organisational relationships. This research takes the opposite orientation to Lounsbury 
(2008), utilising Institutional Theory to assist in explaining gaps in the ANT account, 
describing how institutional organisations and institutions (as actants) are influenced 
to act in certain ways by institutional pressures, an explanation that is not possible 
within the ANT framework. 
3.3 Institutional Theory 
As this study examines the interactions of organisations, and institutions, it is 
important to have an understanding of what the terms mean, especially as they tend 
to be used interchangeably but are not necessarily synonymous. According to Currie 
and Swanson (2009) the definition of institution is open to some debate with a 
number of recognised interpretations. Likewise, DiMaggio and Powell (1991) note that 
researchers have been lax in defining the term. However, among a number of 
definitions is that of Jepperson (1991) who defines an institution as “a social order or 
pattern that has attained a certain state or property” (p. 145), and institutionalisation 
as “the process of such attainment” (p. 152). Ostrom (2005) defines an institution as 
“the prescriptions that humans use to organise all forms of repetitive and structured 
interactions including those within families, neighbourhoods, markets, firms, sports, 
leagues, churches, private associations, and governments at all scales” (pg. 3). Scott 
(2001) is more precise in his definitions outlining five dimensions of the concept of 
institution, resilience, jurisdictional spread, a degree of stability, the elements that 
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make up institutions, and the carrier of the institution’s meaning. By these definitions, 
both government and motherhood could be considered to be institutions.  
The definition of organisation on the other hand is equally debated but somewhat 
narrower. Hatch (2012) views organisations as being “instruments for producing 
products and/or services in demand within the environment” (p. 57). Robbins takes a 
broader view defining an organisation as “a consciously coordinated social unit 
composed of two or more people, that functions on a relatively continuous basis to 
achieve a common goal or set of goals” Whereas authors such as Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld (2009) take an economic perspective, defining organisations through the 
negotiation of purchasers for products. These definitions highlight the main difference 
between the definition of institution and organisation. An institution can include a 
social construct (such as motherhood) whereas the definition of organisation is based 
around economic/market concepts excluding such a social concept. However, 
government, for example, can be considered both an institution and an organisation, 
as can the organisations within this study (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2009). Feldman and 
Pentland (2005) take a slightly different view noting that organisations are a collection 
of routines such as HR, or finance, with each routine being its own black box.  
Institutional Theory itself is seen to arise primarily from the work of Meyer and Rowan 
(1977), and DiMaggio and Powell (1983). Meyer and Rowan (1977) laid down the basis 
of the theory, suggesting that organisations develop as a result of institutionalised 
rules. These rules work as myths or stories within organisations, outlining how 
institutions (and individuals) should act, and reinforcing and legitimising behaviour. 
For example, Hatch (2012) suggests the concept some banks were ‘too big to fail’ that 
arose during the 2008 financial crisis was an excellent example of an institutional myth, 
which was untested simply because it was taken to be true at the time.  
According to Choi and Bhakoo (2013), the work of Meyer and Rowan (1977) 
concentrates on the internal structures of organisations. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) 
on the other hand, discuss how institutions react to the various pressures that 
surround them, and drive them to become more homogeneous, an effect they call 
isomorphism. They recognise three pressures acting on institutions: 
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 Coercive pressure arising from formal or informal requirements or regulation; 
 Normative pressure arising from professional organisations and the similarity 
of backgrounds of many organisational members; and 
 Mimetic pressure where organisations seek to model what others are doing. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) believe that coercive pressures arise within organisations, 
from organisations on which they rely, and can be manifest as persuasion or force, 
and sometimes as regulation. The legislative environment and the requirements 
imposed on organisations for reporting to various government and non-government 
entities also tends to drive organisations towards becoming more similar. A point that 
is also made by Meyer and Rowan (1977) who found that as government and large 
organisations increasingly move into areas of social life, their requirements are 
increasingly reflected in the social arena. Barratt and Choi (2007) describe how the US 
Department of Defense mandate to include RFID tags on items over a prescribed value 
forces other organisations to act in certain uniform ways. 
Normative pressures on the other hand, arise from professionalisation, which 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) define as “the collective struggle of members of an 
occupation to define the conditions and methods of their work” (p. 70). The origin of 
this pressure is twofold. Firstly, the formal education required by most professions 
tends to be somewhat similar, and secondly membership of professional bodies or 
trade associations generally requires a level of conformity with association norms. An 
example of this within the RFID network is the pressure facing organisations to 
conform with RFID technology standards. While organisations could choose not to 
conform, it would be difficult for them to interact with other supply chain members. 
Mimetic pressures occur when organisations look to other organisations as 
benchmarks for success, or for solutions to problems. This behaviour can yield 
solutions with little expense according to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), as copying 
already established, and apparently successful behaviour can be reasonably 
inexpensive. They see mimetic pressures as having a ritual characteristic, attempting 
to prove the legitimacy of the organisation by copying the already legitimised actions 
of others (whether or not they want to be copied). They also point out that the 
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amount of variation within organisational structures is low; that larger organisations 
tend to consult with a limited number of other companies, and that most 
organisations are built on older organisational models already in place.  
A broad example of the effect of these pressures is provided by Choi and Bhakoo 
(2013) in their study of hospital supply chains. They found that the three institutional 
pressures do not act uniformly across the supply chain. Instead, normative pressures 
were seen throughout the supply chain. This was due to the strong networks apparent 
in the health sector, and the work of professional bodies to drive high IT standards 
across healthcare institutions. Coercive pressures were more apparent upstream of 
healthcare institutions, as government saw this part of the supply chain as limiting 
potential integration. Mimetic pressures meanwhile were more apparent downstream 
of the healthcare institutions. This was seen as being due to the hospitals sharing 
information and best practices, thus they tended to become more similar through 
mimetic behaviour.  
When institutional pressure comes to bear on organisations, they can respond in a 
number of ways. Oliver (1991b) combining Institutional Theory with Resource 
Dependence Theory suggested there were five ways organisations could respond to 
institutional pressure: 
 Acquiescence – where organisations comply with the pressure for their own 
perceived good, following regulation and norms;  
 Compromise – where organisations engage in negotiation and bargaining; 
 Avoidance – where organisations steer clear of the pressure; 
 Defiance – where organisations ignore, dismiss or repel the pressure; and 
 Manipulation – where organisations attempt to control or influence the 
pressure into a more acceptable form. 
Mignerat and Rivard (2009) see organisational structures as being fully 
institutionalised “when they are considered taken for granted” (pg. 372), or as Latour 
might say, black boxed. Similarly, Latour (1987) suggests three possible responses of 
actants that have been offered enrolment. Actants could: 
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 Accept – thereby submitting themselves to the problematisation; 
 Dispute – and seek another problematisation/translation (or anti-program); 
 Disregard – simply walk away without engaging with the translation. 
These three ANT responses can 
be mapped with the responses 
suggested by institutional theory 
as shown by the Figure 9. From 
this figure it can be seen that the 
acquiescence and compromise 
of institutional theory can be 
considered forms of acceptance 
of a given institutional pressure, 
where organisations agree to 
the solution offered by the 
problematisation, and work with the translation as a member of the network (perhaps 
attempting to change the form of the problematisation through negotiation). Similarly, 
the defiance and manipulation of institutional theory can be mapped to the 
disputation of ANT, where organisations go out of their way to disrupt the translation, 
or to aggressively defy the solutions offered by problematisation. Finally avoidance 
maps easily to disregarding, where in Institutional terms an organisation avoids the 
pressure. In ANT terms an organisation disregards an offer of enrolment. This 
similarity between the two theories provides a useful overlap, helping to explain the 
responses of organisations to problematisation and offers of enrolment.  
3.4 Summary and Research Questions 
Doolin and Lowe (2001) believe that the principal aim of ANT is to reveal associations 
between human and non-human actants in a network, uncovering the influences that 
drive the structure of this network. When looking at an ANT network, Latour (1993) 
argues that a device can represent a network – allowing it to move through time while 
repeating the actions inscribed into it. This insight allows us to focus on RFID as the 
particular device in question, how it operates within a network and how that network 
is influenced by the associations between its actants. However, ANT accounts tend to 
Figure 9: ANT and Institutional Theory Responses 
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concentrate on the micro level of everyday existence rather than at the higher level of 
the public-private sector context, leading us to wonder how to best describe 
organisations and institutional actants, and the affect they have on the network 
Powell and Colyvas (2008) point out that institutional arrangements have their origins 
in the actions of individuals, and the technologies and tools they use in their actions. 
Yet, they say, these are not truly represented within Institutional Theory. They also 
resist the tendency to view organisations as actors – the very flat ontology suggested 
by ANT. Their concern that the roles assigned to macro factors causing institutional 
change are too prescriptive, leads them to call for more research on the micro-
foundations of Institutional Theory or “the genesis of organisational practices and the 
resulting meanings that are attached to these routines” (p. 295). ANT assists in 
answering this call by describing the very factors (or actants) not included within the 
Institutional Theory context, while Institutional Theory can assist in explaining the 
actions of Institutional actants. Thus, the two theories can be conceptualised together 
as in Figure 10 below: 
 
Figure 10: Stabilisers or De-Stabilisers of Translation 
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The two theories together provide a sound theoretical basis for this research. ANT and 
the additional tool of Institutional Theory can assist in explaining institutional 
behaviour, as well as illuminating the behaviour of the other human and non-human 
actants. However, the inclusion of Institutional Theory is not reflected in the research 
questions. Nor for that matter is the recognition of the importance of mediators in 
driving the network. Therefore, in order to focus the research question and to 
recognise the extra level of understanding brought by ANT and Institutional Theory, a 
supplementary research questions can be added as follows: 
RQ:  How are public-private RFID systems established and maintained? 
 RQa: How does the relationship between actants contribute to this? 
RQb: What mediators affect this process and how are they manifested? 
 RQc. What role does institutional behaviour play in the process? 
The next section will describe the methodology used to address these questions, 
discuss how the data collected was analysed and consider the role of the researcher in 
the process of data analysis. 
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3.5 Methodology 
The primary aim of this research is to describe how the RFID network is established 
and maintained within the public-private sector context. Thus, it is necessary to follow 
a methodology directed at this aim, which is compatible with the theoretical basis of 
the research. As ANT is a descriptive approach, qualitative research was considered 
most appropriate to answer the research questions. 
3.5.1 The Qualitative Research Approach 
From the point of view of the researcher, one of the main difficulties of ANT is 
translating the theory into practice. Gad and Jensen (2010) note that ANT does not 
have any explicit methodology even though it might “ally with specific methods” (p. 
73), consistent with Lewis’ (2007) view of ANT as a grand theory. Thus, ANT resists the 
tendency to say how a study must be done, just as it resists the tendency to say how, 
or of what, society must be formed. Instead as noted by Gad and Jensen (2010), ANT 
encourages the researcher to leave behind any preconceived notion of methodology 
and to use their training and study to understand, and translate, the construction of 
networks. Therefore, ANT studies must be advised by the qualitative approach.  
Thomas (2006), finds that a number of authors reporting qualitative studies take a 
“general inductive approach” (p. 238) to data gathering and analysis in ANT studies. 
Similarly Barbour (2008, p. 31), discussing qualitative research methods states “the 
main thing is to be able to justify your rationale”.  
Despite the lack of an explicit methodology for the conduct of ANT studies, there is 
still some guidance offered by the literature. Law (1992) proposes a number of 
questions that can advise any ANT analysis (discussed later in Section 3.5.5 Data 
Analysis), and Bonner and Chiasson (2009), identified three ways ANT could guide a 
study: 
1. by tracing the makeup of networks by following the actants involved in them; 
2. by focusing on black boxes employed by actants, and their effects on the 
network being studied; 
3. by recognising that actants at a distance can also influence networks. 
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ANT also provides its own vocabulary and ontology to use in ANT based studies. Each 
network is described in the language of translation allowing the researcher, and 
reader, to gain a greater understanding of how the different actants work together. 
Latour (2005) recommends using the simplest and most “banal” of language to 
describe the network, with the objective of allowing the voices of the actants to be 
strongest, rather than the voice of the researcher, although interestingly the 
recommendation for the use of simple language is one Latour himself seldom adheres 
to. Latour (2005) cautions against following only those terms currently used by 
researchers. Instead, he recommends the researcher follow up on the “queerest, 
baroque and most idiosyncratic terms offered by the actants” (p. 47). 
This context based language focusing as it does on the words of the actants, allows the 
voices of the actants to be dominant within any ANT discussion. Further, as the 
discourse focuses on the way the actants speak, neither humans nor non-humans are 
privileged in the ANT accounts as ANT makes no distinction between them (Elbanna, 
2009). The language of ANT and the guidelines above is used, along with qualitative 
methodology, when conducting this research.  
3.5.2 Locating and Following the Actant 
Although, there is relatively little advice offered by ANT researchers as to the specifics 
of an ANT method, there is, one point of agreement amongst ANT researchers which 
is to adhere to the advice of Latour (2002) and Callon (1991), to “follow the actants 
(sic)”. The actants and their associations are everything in the ANT study. Latour 
(1999a) considers that ANT is not a theory but a way to give voice to the actants in a 
network; “one learns not to take the characteristics of any actant (sic) for granted” (p. 
62). Creswell, Worth and Sheikh (2010) consider ANT to be a roadmap to 
understanding a particular network, a way to trace and make sense of the connections 
between the actors, and to locate the different parts of the network.  
This research commenced with two human actants located outside of New Zealand, 
who were known to the researcher, and very experienced within the context of RFID 
systems that crossed the boundary between the public and private sectors. These 
actants were interviewed and pointed towards other actants, both human and 
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documentary. Thus, the following of the actants began. Throughout the course of the 
research, actants were asked to refer the researcher to others who may be of 
assistance, in a process referred to by Yin (2009), and others, as snowballing. However, 
actants also tacitly referred to other actants (human and non-human) during the 
course of the interview, and these actants were located (or representatives were 
found), separate from the process of snowballing. In total 40 human actants were 
interviewed, representing both their own RFID systems and various non-human 
actants, and 24 documentary actants were consulted (aside from the literature 
review). Non-human actants are discussed in more detail in Section 3.5.3.1 below. 
Following the advice of Latour (2005) on ensuring that actants could speak on behalf 
of the network, there was a requirement maintained that human actants must have 
knowledge of RFID systems within the public-private context, and that they must have 
participated in such systems. A number of human actants were identified through the 
need to find representatives for technology actants, especially such actants as RFID 
hardware. Therefore, where a representative was needed for RFID tags, an expert in 
RFID hardware was sought. Human representatives were also sought when mediators 
arose and were not represented within those actants already recruited. For example, 
where privacy and security issues experts were recruited within these areas, they 
were also knowledgeable about RFID in the public-private context. In this manner a 
complex network was found, linking together several RFID systems across a number of 
countries, industries and organisations as demonstrated in Figure 11 above. No 
attempt was made to remain within certain areas, sub-sectors, or cases; instead the 
network was allowed to develop entirely through the directions of the actants 
themselves. Thus, the network developed much in the same way the Internet of 
Things develops with members joining throughout the process in order to contribute 
to the whole, but without limitation on the possible scope of the network. 
3.5.3 Gathering Data 
In gathering data throughout the course of this study, the researcher kept in mind the 
necessity to follow the actants wherever they led, no matter whether they were 
human or non-human. Generally, in qualitative research, Richards and Morse (2007) 
recognise a number of sources of qualitative data aside from the literature review. 
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These include interviews, photographs, maps, documents and diaries. This research 
used in-depth interviews to collect information from human actants, as well as 
allowing the literature review (above), documents, policies and other relevant non-
human actants to participate.  
As the aim of this research is to provide a rich account of the networks, the interviews 
were in-depth rather than focus group based (Yin, 2009). As noted by Iyamu and 
Tatnall (2011), this allowed the flexibility to follow actants as they were identified by 
the actants, and to gather a rich picture of the network. Where necessary, the 
interviews were followed up by email or by phone. As well as following actants that 
were identified during the interview process, the actants were asked to recommend 
others within and outside their organisations who have knowledge of their RFID 
system – this process, common in ANT and qualitative research, is generally termed 
“snowballing” (Bryman, 2012).  
Interviews were focused on the use of RFID in organisations, where the RFID system 
was shared between public and private sectors, in order to develop a picture of the 
actor-network in the public-private context. Interviews addressed the actants’ 
relationships with others, how relationships were built and maintained, and how they 
change, as advised by Tilson (2008). Each interview was digitally recorded and 
transcribed as soon as possible. Actants received a copy of the transcript and were 
able to make corrections and clarifications as necessary.  
Some interviews were conducted over Skype. Although this is not ideal, Rubin and 
Rubin (2012) discussed the use of phone interviews, and concluded that they are a 
good method for gathering data from participants who might otherwise not be 
interviewed due to distance constraints. Although they do point out that it is helpful 
to have previously met the interviewee. Similarly, Bryman (2012) notes a number of 
benefits of telephone interviewing including cost savings, and he suggests that phone 
interviews might be of advantage in removing bias arising from the presence of the 
interviewer. In respect of telephone surveys used in social research, Denscombe (2007) 
finds that “people are as honest in telephone interviews as they are with face-to-face 
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type interviews” (p. 11), and that researchers still retain the ability to interact with the 
respondent one-on-one.  
Of the 40 human actants interviewed, 17 were interviewed by Skype; 14 were in the 
US, two in Hong Kong, and one in Australia. Respondents were broadly involved in 
health, defence, primary industries, and general supply chain type activities. Seven of 
the participants interviewed by Skype had previously met the researcher, 
predominantly at RFID industry events. All interviews were digitally recorded; Skype 
interviews were recorded using EasyVOIP Recorder software, and transcribed by the 
researcher. The last 6 interviews were transcribed by a professional transcribe. All 
transcripts were double-checked by the researcher against the original recording. 
As the interviews were in-depth there was no formal questionnaire. Interviews 
commenced with the general question “Please tell me about your RFID system....”; 
and finished with the question “Is there anything else you would like to tell me about 
RFID systems in the public-private sector context”? However, no other questions were 
pre-supposed. The actants led the discussion as recommended by Latour and others, 
with direction provided by the researcher only when required to keep the interview 
focused. The final question in particular was valuable as it allowed actants to 
summarise any thoughts they may have had regarding their experiences, and in some 
cases led to further lines of enquiry. Interviews lasted between 60 and 120 minutes 
with most being between 60 and 80 minutes in length. The researcher took notes 
during interviews, as well as the recording, and these notes were included with the 
transcript. In accordance with the advice of Miles, Huberman and Saldana (2013) a 
contact summary sheet such as that in Appendix C was used to record information in 
respect of each interview, or document examined, in order to assist with identification 
of concepts raised during data gathering. This also assisted with reflecting on each 
interview and document examined.  
3.5.3.1 Non-Human Actants 
An ANT study typically has a number of non-human actants. In the case of documents, 
although they are non-human they can speak for themselves to a certain extent in 
that they can be read and analysed in a similar way to interview transcripts. The study 
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took this approach, analysing documentary actants as if they were interview 
transcripts. Documentary input was coded into HyperResearch, and included in the 
analysis that followed as if the documents were human.  
To assist with gathering data from non-human and non-documentary actants the 
approach of Vidgen and McMaster (1996) was followed whereby potential 
representatives of non-human actants were identified. Also identified were the 
various components of the actant, along with their potential interests. A 
demonstration of how this worked is presented in Table 2 below, using RFID tags as an 
example.  
Actant Components Interests Potential 
Representatives 
RFID tag Antennae/Transmitter 
Battery 
Memory (in active tags) 
Sensor  
EPC (or similar) 
To be used and maintained 
To transmit EPC 
To collect and transmit 
sensor information 
 
Suppliers  
Users 
Developers 
Manufacturers 
Technicians 
Table 1: Analysis of non-human actant interests and representatives 
Vidgen and McMaster (1996) found that the advantage of this approach was that it 
allowed for the identification of human and non-human actants that might not 
otherwise have been identified, as well as allowing a view of the interests of the non-
human actants. The various documentary and human representatives identified and 
by this study are detailed in Table 2 following: 
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Documentary Actant Type No. 
Books 1 
Business Cases 4 
Legislation 5 
Other Documents 6 
Reports 5 
Standards 3 
Total Documentary Actants 24 
Human Representatives  
Industry Advocacy 1 
Privacy 1 
RFID Systems Implementation 2 
RFID Tags/Antennae 2 
Security 2 
Technology Design/Research 3 
Total Representative Humans 11 
Table 2: Documentary and Representative Actants 
This approach is similar to that of Bryson, Crosby and Bryson (2009). In their study of 
strategic planning they treated such terms as stakeholder analysis, plans, strategic 
visions, and goals, as artefacts/non-human actants that need to be understood. They 
concentrated on discovering how the artefacts were performed (or how they came 
into being) – in order to understand how they influence organisational performance. 
Following the ANT principle of symmetry, non-human actants are reported in the 
findings in the same way as human actants. Only where it is relevant are they noted as 
being non-human, or are mentioned specifically5. This is especially true of actants such 
as legislation where even the mention appeared sufficient to indicate their action, as 
they were such strong intermediaries their course of action was obvious. 
3.5.4 Knowing when to Stop 
Theoretically, an ANT approach could allow for the following of actants, with no 
boundaries of any type, through black boxes, to any possible destination. As Callon 
(1987) emphasises, each network is made up of actants but is also an actant in and of 
                                                     
5
 This is most obvious where literature is referred to as all literature is cited according to convention. 
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itself. Thus, actor-networks are theoretically boundless as each actor is also a network, 
and following of the network could continue ad infinitum. This is not, however, a very 
practical approach as the decision needs to be made about where the boundaries of 
the study should lie. Different researchers have taken different approaches to solving 
this problem. Akrich and Latour (1992) argue that the ANT researcher must limit the 
network by studying how a specific set of actants interact with each other. Cordella 
and Shaikh (2003) note that the only way to limit an ANT network is to arbitrarily close 
it. Most researchers work within the constraints of case studies to limit their ANT 
networks. Given the aim of this research is to examine the RFID network in the public-
private context, this is considered to be the boundary of the network, rather than 
specific organisations, cases, or RFID systems. 
Within this boundary there still needs to be a point at which the study should stop. 
Bonner and Chiasson (2005) in their study of privacy legislation, followed actants 
through interviews, documentation, statements, and publications, until no new 
actants emerged, a point similar to that of “saturation” defined by Corbin and Strauss 
(2008, p. 143) as the point “when no new data are emerging”. In studying 
telecommunications strategy formation in China, Gao (2005) ceased looking for 
further actants when the actants identified could explain the change seen in China’s 
telecommunications market. Gad and Jensen (2010) suggest taking into account what 
the research is hoping to achieve – the research question – in deciding when to cease 
studying the network. They also note that practical considerations play a part in 
deciding when to stop studying the network, and that knowing when this point is 
reached is part of “good” research.  
This research followed Bonner and Chiasson (2005), stopping where any new actants 
that emerged could be punctualised6, or where the actants that emerged knew 
nothing about RFID systems, and/or were not involved in the network. 
3.5.5 Data Analysis 
The analysis of data is the cornerstone of any research project, without appropriate 
analysis the results are meaningless. Thomas (2006) notes that many qualitative 
                                                     
6
 Treated as a black box for the purposes of the network being studied, following Law (1992) 
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researchers use what he calls a “general inductive approach” (p. 238) in order to 
derive themes and understanding from collected data. The purpose of such an 
inductive analysis is to allow findings to emerge from the data without enforcing the 
constraints of a particular methodology, or in ANT words, the analysis allows the 
network to emerge from a collection of data. As such it fits well with the ANT 
approach which has no specified analytical framework although Law (1992) suggests 
five questions to assist in an ANT based analysis: 
 what different types of actants are present and how are they organised in 
order to generate organisational effects? 
 how is resistance to the network overcome? 
 what (if any) strategies are being used to ensure the network is durable and, 
where necessary, mobile? 
 how far do these strategies spread and how do they interact?  
 how does one part of an organisation come to speak for another part? 
These questions were kept in mind during data analysis. 
In general, where ANT studies analyse qualitative data beyond presenting narrative 
accounts, standard qualitative data analysis is used. Miles et al. (2013) present a 
detailed account of data analysis which is consistent with the inductive approach, 
including three phases – data condensation7, data display, and conclusion 
drawing/verification. Data condensation consists of the on-going process of data 
selection, simplification, focusing, and abstraction for the purpose of organising and 
strengthening the data. This process leads to the production of memos, themes, 
categorising, and coding, and continues throughout the course of the research project. 
Thomas (2006) offers further advice on the process of data condensation8. His findings 
arise from multiple passes through the raw data, developing categories, and from 
these a model framework. He also notes that the pattern coding approach of Miles et 
al. (2013) is more able to identify connections between people (or actants) as well as 
                                                     
7
 In previous editions of their book, including Miles and Huberman (1994), data condensation was 
referred to as data reduction. 
8
 Thomas (2006) also refers to data condensation as data reduction. 
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providing explanations of the data. Both Miles et al. (2013), and Thomas (2006) focus 
on the development of categories to describe raw data, and assist in drawing 
conclusions based on that data. In order to ensure both methodological rigour, and 
the finding of relationships between actants, this research follows both Thomas (2006), 
and Miles et al. (2013).  
Data display is the process of organising the data in various ways for the purpose of 
deriving meaning from the different perspectives presented. Miles et al. (2013), 
recommend a variety of approaches apart from the usual lengthy text, including 
matrices and network displays. However, ANT accounts are commonly related in 
narrative form and this approach is the predominant one used in this study. 
Conclusion drawing/verification is the process of not only coming to conclusions based 
on the data gathered, but of verifying those conclusions based on how easily they can 
be confirmed, together with their strength and plausibility. In this research, 
conclusions have been drawn based on the presence of mediators in the network, as 
well as the narrative description of the network translation.  
3.5.5.1 Data Condensation/Reduction 
Data was coded using the Hyper Research analysis program. Categories arose through 
considered, detailed and repeated reading of the text (of documents and interviews), 
in order to derive meanings within it. Themes and categories were identified, and 
these were constantly revised as new data was analysed. Following Thomas (2006) 
each category was defined by means of a detailed memo which included information 
in respect of the origin of the code, possible meanings, contradictions, and 
implications. Human and non-human actants were coded in the same way. To ensure 
consistency and rigour in coding, portions of the coded transcripts were checked and 
discussed with the researchers’ supervisors, and all codes were discussed and 
reviewed with them. Coding also assisted in identifying the stages of translation, 
actants’ relationships, obligatory passage points and other elements of both ANT and 
Institutional Theory.  
Coding proceeded in the two cycles described by Miles et al. (2013). In the first cycle 
codes were assigned to portions of the data through an inductive coding process. For 
87 
 
this process the codes were based on “elemental methods” (Miles et al., 2013, p. 74) 
of in-vivo coding, descriptive coding and process coding. In-vivo coding uses the 
participants own words to form the codes, and allows for the emergence of words or 
phrases particular to the actants being studied. Descriptive codes are, as the name 
implies, summarising particular parts of a transcript. They are particularly useful for 
providing a source for later indexing. In this research they described various parts of 
the RFID systems studied, hardware and software and details of technology. Some 
deductive codes were also used in this first coding cycle, derived from the elements of 
the RFID system, the hardware and software; and the ontology of ANT and 
Institutional Theory. The theory based codes highlighted particular aspects of the 
theory relevant to the study and these developed over time as new features of the 
RFID network became apparent. These deductive codes are listed in Appendix B. 
Process codes focus on determining action especially where things change, arise or are 
involved in action. These codes included those related to the mediation of the RFID 
network, detailing the various elements that affected the RFID systems studied. The 
inductive codes derived in this process are listed in Appendix A, and are further 
included within the findings, in brackets following the various quotes. 
The second cycle or pattern coding involves grouping the initial first cycle codes, and is 
sometimes known as axial coding. These codes act as higher level summary groupings 
of the first cycle codes, and assist in identifying themes or concepts within data. Miles 
et al. (2013) suggest the pattern codes not only assist in condensing the data, but they 
also help the researcher better understand the range and scope of the data, and in 
drawing a “cognitive map” (p. 86). Pattern codes highlight categories, associations, 
causes, and constructs. 
These cycles of coding assisted the researcher in identifying mediators of the RFID 
network, as well as the various phases of translation, and associations relating to 
institutional behaviour. First cycle codes assisted the researcher in developing the 
narrative story of the RFID network as they allowed for identifying and retrieving 
relevant passages relating to elements of the network. Second cycle codes assisted 
particularly in identifying mediators of the network by allowing for the aggregation of 
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network elements into larger groups from which mediators emerged. The coding 
process is summarised in the diagram below: 
 
Figure 11: Outline of Coding 
3.5.6 Validity and Reliability 
Questions of validity and reliability arise frequently with qualitative studies such as 
those undertaken by ANT researchers. As in most qualitative research with ANT, 
reality is partially constructed by the researcher who participates in the network and it 
can be difficult to replicate studies of this nature in order to produce the same results 
each time. Some authors contend that the terms validity and reliability cannot be 
applied to qualitative research as it is too reliant on context and the interpretation of 
the researcher (Guba & Lincoln, 2005). Others (for example Lincoln and Guba (1985) 
or Bryman (2012)) suggest the use of other criteria to ensure the quality of the 
research, such as trustworthiness and credibility. Richards and Morse (2007), see no 
reason why qualitative research cannot be both valid and reliable, and suggest the 
following principles as ways of ensuring research has these qualities: 
 being rigorous in the design of the project including preparing well, and 
thoroughly reviewing the literature, using it as a basis for the research; 
 being explicit about the theory and method used; 
 ensuring the method and sampling techniques suit the design of the study; 
 coding reliably and keeping track of decisions made throughout the coding 
process; 
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 keeping an appropriate research diary; and, 
 comparing findings with the literature. 
Using the literature review as a basis for research presents the ANT researcher with 
some difficulties. As noted by Law (1992) “If we wish to understand the mechanics of 
power and organisation it is important not to start out assuming whatever we wish to 
explain...” (p. 380). Although he is talking about the importance of symmetry in 
treatment of the social and the technical, the point is clear that it would be outside 
the boundaries of what little ANT method there is to commence study with a model of 
potential results already in mind. Thus the literature review is considered more of an 
actant, advising the research, rather than the source of a model to which the 
remainder of the analysis must adhere. 
However, the remainder of the principles are consistent with an ANT approach, and 
have been followed in this research.  In the case of each interview, the interviewee 
had the chance to read and correct a copy of the transcript produced, and was also 
able to read and correct references made to their contribution in the text. According 
to Brown (1997), and Stake (2005), these ‘member checks’ add to the trustworthiness 
of the data as they ensure the conclusions drawn by the researcher align with the 
perspective of the interviewee – or actant. 
Richards and Morse (2007), also recommend using the technique of bracketing in 
order to ensure the researcher does not find out what they already know, rather than 
recognising what is before them. Bracketing requires that the researcher put aside, as 
much as possible, knowledge already gained from the literature review and other 
studies. This is done by making the knowledge overt through writing it down – either 
in the form of a literature review or as a research diary which includes the personal 
assumptions of the researcher. Once this is done, the researcher can learn from the 
information being collected - in ANT terms, to learn from the actants.  
3.5.7 The Role of the Researcher 
When discussing research methodology, the role of the researcher in the study needs 
to be considered. According to Lewis (2007) the researcher is also part of the network 
being studied. Similarly, Bonner and Chiasson (2005) recognised the importance of 
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following the network without imposing their own rationales on that being studied. It 
is also important within ANT to recognise that the researcher is part of the research; 
this reflexive understanding recognises that the researcher cannot be completely 
objective; instead becoming part of the network under study almost as if an actant 
(Latour, 1993). 
Callon (1986) describes three principles of method for the ANT researcher which 
follows the foundation ANT principles. First, the researcher should be agnostic 
towards everything the actant says, and should extend no judgement on or censor 
anything of the actants words. Secondly the researcher should take a symmetrical 
approach to describing the network, not varying between the descriptions of the 
social and the natural. Finally, the researcher is advised to make no distinction 
between the social and natural, instead the researcher should “follow the actors in 
order to identify the manner in which these define and associate the different 
elements by which they build and explain their world...” (p. 201). These principles 
were followed as much as possible in this research. The interviews were in depth and 
no attempt was made to guide the actants. The language of translation was used in 
the data analysis, and as much as possible the words of the actants were used in the 
findings, in order to reflect their voices and the voice of the network. Non-human 
(documentary) actants in the data analysis were treated in the same manner as 
human actants, and have not been indicated separately in the findings, unless it was 
relevant to do so.  
3.5.8 Issues Arising 
A number of issues arose with the data gathering and analysis stages, which had to be 
dealt with appropriately.  
Firstly, it was not always simple to locate study participants. This was either because 
of the small number of easily accessible RFID systems that crossed the boundary 
between public and private sector, or because it was difficult to locate representatives 
for the various non-human actants. This problem was dealt with by the researcher 
who actively sought out participants at the RFID Live industry event, and partly 
through the process of snowballing.  
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Second, deciding when to cease studying the network was problematic as the second 
interview participant referred back to the first, thus rendering the criteria to cease 
looking for participants when they started referring to other’s moot. This happened a 
number of times with four participants being referred to by at least two other 
participants. The final decision to stop studying the network came when the 
researcher simply ran out of suitable willing participants, and the majority of non-
human actants were considered to be appropriately represented. 
Finally, maintaining the flat ontology of ANT was also a challenge. The researcher had 
to deliberately remain agnostic to the position of the actant, be they human or non-
human. Similarly, the researcher had consciously put aside any tendencies to direct 
the participants, instead strictly following the actant where they pointed, not where 
the researcher thought they should go.  
3.6 Ethics and Funded Research 
Generally published guidelines for conducting ethical research are very similar 
amongst most authors according to Denscombe (2007) and can be summarised as 
respecting the human research participants, ensuring no-one is harmed by being 
involved in the research and the researcher conducting herself honestly. As this 
research is also funded, extra care was taken to ensure participants understood who 
the research sponsor is, and that the researcher retains academic independence.   
In order to ensure the research was conducted in an ethical manner it was pre-
approved by the Victoria University Human Ethics Committee (HEC). Each participant 
was asked to give consent to participating in the research, and to specific terms and 
conditions related to it. They were also provided with a summary of the research and 
a consent form, which they signed. An example of the consent form can be seen in 
Appendix D.. Every effort was made to ensure that the participants understood the 
basis of the research, and they were given the opportunity to correct and approve any 
reference made to their contribution. Each participant received a transcript of their 
interview and was given to opportunity to make corrections, clarifications or 
withdrawals. Further, where quotes were used in this thesis the participants were 
consulted a second time to ensure they were comfortable with their comments. 
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Names of participants and their organisations are kept confidential and concealed in 
this thesis, as Cheek (2005) points out, it can be difficult to ensure complete 
anonymity. No participant contribution was included without their approval 
(Denscombe, 2007).  
3.7 Summary 
Richards and Morse (2007, p. 193) believe that “The golden rule of methodological 
cohesiveness – of ensuring the best fit of the research question with the assumptions, 
strategies, types of data, and analysis techniques – ensures maximal validity”. This 
research has addressed the golden rule of Richards and Morse (2007) by taking a 
qualitative approach to answering the research questions. ANT, accompanied by 
Institutional Theory was used to guide the research, and advise the data analysis. 
Inductive data analysis was used to develop meaning from the data collected by in 
depth interviews, and reading of documentary actants. This coding was then used to 
develop conclusions, and assist in the narrative description of the RFID network. 
Care was taken to follow the actants through the network, ensuring that their voices 
were heard, and that the researcher stayed agnostic to the status of the actant. As 
such, the voice of the actant is always to the forefront of any ANT account. The next 
chapter will present the description of the network derived from the data analysis, as 
well as the mediators identified in the network. 
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4 Findings: The Translation of the RFID Network 
This chapter report’s findings based on the 40 in-depth interviews with human actants 
involved in the RFID network. Input is also included from a number of non-human 
documentary actants such as legislation, reports, books, and project documents9. 
Based on analysis of the interviews, and the input from non-human actants, it was 
apparent there were three major themes or stories running through the study. The 
first was the story of the RFID network told through the lens of ANT. The ANT process 
of translation describes how the RFID network is formed, how the various actants 
struggle for power and position, and how the cycle of translation is broken and 
reformed as the actants jostle for position. The second story relates to the individual 
items, actions, and negotiations that mediate the process of translation. These 
mediators describe the things that drive decision making around RFID systems, and 
the everyday actions that individuals and organisations take around the installation, 
operation and maintenance of such systems. The third story is told through the 
framework of Institutional Theory. It relates to the organisations involved in the RFID 
network and how they are influenced, or attempt to influence others, in order to gain 
power within the RFID network. This story joins with the ANT story as it describes the 
forces that act on an organisation, and how these forces encourage or compel 
organisations to take actions which affect the process of translation. These three 
stories align with the research questions: 
RQ:  How are public-private RFID systems established and maintained? 
 RQa: How does the relationship between actants contribute to this? 
 RQb: What mediators affect this and how are they manifested? 
 RQc. What role does institutional behaviour play in the process? 
                                                     
9
 In order to maintain the flat ontology of ANT, the nature of the actant is only reported when relevant. 
This means that where sources are referred to at all, they are referred to as actants. Sector of the 
actant is indicated by superscript –“PU” for public sector, “PR” for private sector. Also, where the 
nature of the actant may be important it is also described – for example the documentary actant 
legislation is sometimes referred to directly. 
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The following chapter focuses on the organisational stories, first describing how 
organisations and other actants move through the ANT process of translation, and 
how this process forms the RFID network. A brief consideration of the future of the 
RFID network and the Internet of Things follows, although this question is addressed 
more fully in the Discussion chapter. The second part of this chapter takes the sector 
viewpoint, describing how the organisations in the public and private sector interact. 
Finally, the chapter discusses RQb., outlining the role of institutional processes in the 
formation of the network, through the lens of both ANT and Institutional Theory. 
Consistent with the ANT approach, the voices of the actants are used to tell as much 
of the story as possible and their voices are indicated by quotation marks. Thus, any 
words enclosed with quotation marks have come from an actant10. 
4.1 ANT – A Translation View of the RFID Public-Private Network 
The ANT translation view first requires the definition of a problem, design of a solution, 
and allocation of roles to the various actants in the process of ‘problematisation’. This 
seems at first glance to be straightforward in the public-private sector context. From 
the view of RFID as a technological actant the problem is basic, how to get used in the 
public-private context. However, the other actants have their own ways of expressing 
(or enacting) the problem depending on their needs and perspectives. They also have 
their own organisations to consider, thus they jostle with each other to define the 
problem in a way that suits them. 
4.1.1 Understanding the Problem/Problematisation 
The problematisation stage of translation is characterised by the recognition and 
framing of the problem. In all of the RFID systems studied, the problem was defined 
around a recognised business need or imperative. One system had commenced 
because a biosecurity incident led the industry involved to the realisation that they 
needed to be able to locate items accurately. “In response to that [incident], the 
Chairs and CEOs and senior policy people of every [industry] group in the country 
came and met”,PR deciding to create an “identification and traceability program”PR 
which would meet the needs of the industry sector. A working group was formed 
                                                     
10
 In order to preserve the continuity of the story the coding is not included in this section . It can be 
assumed that all quotes within specific headings, such as problematisation, have been coded that way. 
Likewise, references to mediators have been coded to that mediator. 
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which considered a range of options available focused on “an improved traceability 
system as providing more protection... more of a story, which would perhaps enable 
us to provide some market assurances and [reduce] the risk”PR in the event of further 
bio-security incidents.  
Debate continued for some time around a number of issues framing the bio-security 
problem. Requirements for the RFID tags the system was going to use needed to be 
“sat in the happy place between so rigid only one operator could ever provide those 
tags, to so loose that it was meaningless”.PR The system chosen also needed to fit the 
“requirements”PR of the industry members, as well as considering “[are] the 
governance arrangements OK? Are the funding things – do they make sense... who’s 
going to run it?”PR This initial process was primarily industry driven, and the 
preference was for an industry operated system, possibly based on an already existing 
traceability system. However difficulties with the existing system which was barcode 
based, included the cost imposed by the owners of the barcode based system, as it 
was felt “they were charging too much”PR and questions around how data collected by 
the system was being used. These concerns led to this barcode system being rejected 
as a possible solution to the problematisation. The eventual decision to use RFID to 
address the traceability problem, was based not only on its attractiveness as a 
traceability solution, but on global best practice “… because everyone else around the 
world was kind of moving towards RFID it made sense for us to do that as well”PR. 
Alternatives were viewed as either “way too expensive, not entirely proven and 
[looking] too weird against what everyone else was doing”.PR  
However, even the emergence of a general consensus on the nature of the problem 
from the industry perspective wasn’t sufficient. During this process it became 
apparent that the system proposed would be most effective if all the industry 
members participated. This recognition occurred as it became apparent that “this 
won’t work voluntarily (sic)”PR, and that any traceability solution would be rendered 
useless by an incident involving untraceable product. Therefore, some level of 
partnership with government was deemed necessary and “… the industry went to 
government and said, you’ve got to do this, or you’ve got to help us do it, and there’s 
no way it’s going to happen unless it’s mandatory, it will never work voluntarily 
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(sic)…“.PR Despite the initial framing of the problem, and the inclusion of the 
government as part of the solution, the problematisation in this instance still faced 
challenges, on the basis of cost, particularly as the system was to be mandated by 
government, as “the system was a biosecurity insurance policy for the good of [our 
country]. Therefore, in my view, [our country] should pay for it, not just those 
implementing it”.PR 
A further challenge to the problematisation in this instance was aimed specifically at 
whether or not the solution developed could solve the perceived biosecurity problem 
at which it was directed. As one actant explained: 
“…if we all sort of understood what bio security means, what we are actually 
afraid of, how this technology can mitigate those risks, or not, if we had any 
sort of agreement on that, I’m not entirely convinced that we would even be 
going ahead with these type of solutions”.PR  
This actant saw the social/political and technological issues as being disparate 
“running side by side... each on their own paths”.PR Similarly, an actant speaking on 
behalf of systems implementation described how it was important to “[spend] some 
time working with [clients] to find out what their expectations are, and what they will 
do. Everybody we try and work with always wants more than they are going to be able 
to have”.PR The actant had also found that barcode systems were attractive 
alternatives to RFID technology. At times he had “talked someone out of an RFID 
project, and tried to convince them that they don’t need RFID to do what they want to 
do and they’d be better off using barcode”.PR Particularly the actant focused on 
determining what the customers really wanted from a solution, noting that “we all 
end up playing these games in an effort to get what we hope is the thing for the 
customer, but it can be very difficult sometimes to identify what they really want”.PR 
The view that RFID was being presented as a solution to a problem that had not been 
carefully considered was echoed in another system. The design of RFID tags developed 
as part of a traceability solution was challenged by one actant as “they seemed to be 
the answer to the question, but the real question was what was the question that they 
were actually purporting to answer”?PU The actant went on to describe the solution 
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proposed in his system as “not 100% of [the] solution... not sufficiently robust to 
achieve the objectives of the organisation”.PU In this particular instance resistance to 
the tag design, and its application had been sufficient that the solution had not been 
developed further, and the problematisation had failed. A second attempt had been 
made to develop a solution involving similar tags which was still being investigated, 
and initially seemed “really impressive if it can be achieved...”.PU However, this second 
proposed tag was competing against a similar barcode system that was already in 
place, and being used successfully. The actant considered if the RFID technology could 
reach the “reliability and ubiquity”PU of barcodes then the RFID solution proposed 
“could be quite compelling”.PU  
In a similar RFID system, public and private sector teams worked together as “joint 
owners, and subject matter experts working side by side to develop the 
requirements”PU for an RFID system the two were going to share. The initial process 
was commenced by the public sector in order to meet government requirements to 
“achieve value for money, collaboration and co-ordinated agencies”.PU However, the 
private sector was eager to join in the development of the problematisation as they 
were “sick of providing the same information to multiple agencies, and sometimes 
manually, when there was already an electronic system that [could] take it”.PU This 
system was in the later stages of problematisation when the actants were 
interviewed, and debates were continuing around privacy – particularly how the 
organisations were going to “make sure that each [public sector] officer only sees 
what they should now that it’s electronic...”.PU The public sector agency in particular 
was debating how to share their information, and how to manage the resultant 
database. In terms of sharing the data a public sector actant had noted that it was 
“difficult to give away control”PU, as part of the data-sharing agreement. These issues 
were slowing the problematisation as organisations needed to have data sharing 
arrangements in place before the business case (OPP) could be completed. 
In another biosecurity based pilot RFID system, government legislation was already in 
place, and framed the problematisation. The legislation dictated requirements for 
data collected by the RFID system, in order to provide “a set of data that identifies the 
shipper and origin of the shipment”.PR One actant described how the organisation was 
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keen to participate in this pilot as “recognising all the kind of changes that were 
occurring in... law as well as just industry requirements, with regard to all of these 
issues, we thought than when this opportunity came up that we would like to 
participate in it”.PR This pilot system had faced challenges to framing the 
problematisation from “cutbacks in personnel”PR as well as in obtaining funding. One 
of the project managers from the public sector had “some [government] dollars that 
he could utilise for something like this, but without that he would not have won the 
support of his director, and the pilot would not have gone anywhere”.PR However, 
when “the recession kind of hit, and funding was finalised”PR, the pilot implementation 
had stalled. This lack of funding had stalled the translation as well, despite the 
program being in use, further development and wider system implementation was not 
possible without funding from government sources.  
4.1.2 A Short Journey Through Obligatory Passage Points 
In the instances discussed above once problematisation had been determined, the 
development of a business (or use) case anchored the problem and outlined the 
solution. These business cases then became an Obligatory Passage Point (OPP) for 
each of the problematisations, as they provided a “strategy... [what we] promised we 
would deliver when the industry agreed to the business case”.PU Business cases, 
strategies and similar documents are also considered to be documentary actants as 
they influence action within the network. Similarly, if they are transported, and act 
over distance – by email for example – they could also be considered to be immutable 
mobiles as they influence action at a distance. 
It was also apparent that the standards mediator was an additional obligatory passage 
point. A basic level of standardisation was necessary for every RFID system in terms of 
hardware, given the necessity to ensure RFID tags and readers were compatible within 
a single RFID system at least. Further than that, a number of strategies encouraging 
the possibility of interoperability outside the initial system were apparent. These 
included attempts by actants speaking on behalf of standards, as well as documentary 
actants such as standards publications, to persuade organisations that any RFID 
systems should be interoperable, and “vendor agnostic”.PR These arguments were not 
always popular with RFID systems vendors as “it means vendors have to compete on 
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capabilities other than hardware, so it really levels the playing field”PR, as 
interoperability between all available RFID software would remove a point of 
difference for those vendors who were not standards compliant. One actant felt that 
vendors could consider a push for universal standardisation to be a “threat”.PR  
From the software perspective, the need for standardised item identification and 
tracking was emphasised by one actant speaking on behalf of standards who noted: 
“...if you are trying to do traceability for any reason then you have a vested 
interest in having a standardised language to exchange information from 
upstream suppliers, [as well as] downstream consumers that actually wish to 
be able to find out information in a standardised way”.PR  
However, not every organisation was interested in implementing standards that could 
reach outside their own RFID system, as this actant had found some organisations did 
not want to implement RFID standards at all because of risks to “competitive 
advantage”PR, or because competing systems offered data mapping services which 
“did not require a standardised approach”.PR Nonetheless, this organisation speaking 
on behalf of standards had achieved some success in strengthening the place of 
standards as an additional OPP through working with organisations on RFID business 
cases especially where the organisations did not have “the understanding or internal 
capability, or the wherewithal to do a business case to support the use of RFID in their 
operations”.PR Another organisation working on behalf of standards had sought 
“missionaries… from within the industry who we work really closely with, who get it, 
and are seen as influential within [every] sector we are engaging with to actually help 
us evangelise the [RFID standards] message”.PR These missionaries represented the 
importance of standards to other organisations. 
At the global level the standards organisations were struggling to get agreement on 
global standards especially as countries were reluctant to have “just the [one 
country’s] standards”.PU This reluctance was making it difficult to get general 
agreements as to which standards should be accepted in different jurisdictions. Where 
jurisdictions had decided to implement different standards, whilst resisting others, it 
was see to “[force] whoever is selling, other countries, to take a tariff”PR in order to 
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trade with that country. This reduced the attractiveness of admitting the country 
imposing the de facto tariff to the network. 
There were also differences between different standards organisations in terms of 
charges imposed for the use of data services. The imposition of charges was seen to 
be an inhibitor of standards by one actant who was of the opinion that:  
“...unless it’s an open, essentially free architecture I don’t think it will be 
adopted. (Paying) for information is just not going to happen in this age. I think 
they went down the wrong path and I understand they are essentially a 
commercial organisation but they ought to stay in the non-profit (sector) 
handling and helping develop the trading partner information”.PR 
Another actant saw the future of traceability as enabling someone to “type a 
[standardised number] in and it gives you a whole history of where it was and where it 
has been”PR however he acknowledged “we need to be there, but it is not like that at 
all at the moment”.PR 
4.1.3 Recruiting Others – Interessement 
Once the problem has been defined and a solution proposed, the translation moves 
on to recruiting or interesting supporters. So the question must be asked - how does 
RFID interest other actants in joining the network?  
With the biosecurity system discussed at the beginning of problematisation, a number 
of strategies were apparent. First and importantly, the problematisation had identified 
the need for legislation, so the government needed to be recruited as: 
“...they had to get legislation, so therefore the government’s got to be 
convinced, and then you’ve got to do a business case, and it’s got to be able to 
be stacked up and demonstrated and proven [that] it’s not just a crazy 
idea...”.PR  
Apart from the business case, other methods that private sector actants used to 
persuade the public sector to get involved included attempting to “convince 
government that it will create and maintain jobs and profit that can be funnelled back 
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into the nation’s economy… whether it’s true or not people tend to push that”.PR 
Further, one actant had spent time: 
“...persuading officials that they weren’t going to be left holding the baby 
which essentially was their fear. It was that we would go ahead with a hiss and 
a roar, [some organisations] would throw their toys, there would be mutiny, 
and they would be left trying to administer a scheme which was a disaster area 
because we would all walk away… I guess we had to assure them that we were 
kind of deadly serious about it.”PR 
Other actants were also recruited into the translation over time, as the structure of 
the organisation running the system: 
“evolved over the years from a small group of industry stakeholders to more 
formal structures, to more stakeholder consultation, to more meetings, more 
expectations… and then you start to really get some muscle… [when] you get 
to that level of momentum”.PR  
The momentum gained through the work put into persuading stakeholders to join the 
problematisation assisted in interesting other actants “to want to”PR join, as well as in 
“getting the [associated government] Minister’s attention”PR, which helped in forming 
the legislation that was required. Despite this work persuading other actants, there 
was ongoing debate within the industry about the proposed problematisation. This 
debate had been “aggressive and accusatory in tone”PR at times, although many 
members felt “well represented by their industry [while] others didn’t”.PR While there 
was considerable interest in this system, there were also industry members who were 
opposed, and a number of questions arose including: 
“...exactly [what] sort of entity is [this] going to be?  How is it actually going to 
be governed?  What rights are different people/organisations going to have? 
And who sets import stuff like cost recovery, and all of that kind of thing? Who 
has to pay [and how] much? That’s where things started to fracture a bit in the 
sector being entirely unified”.PR  
102 
 
One organisation originally supportive of the problematisation appeared to defect at 
the interessement stage because “the impetus behind [their] involvement changed 
over time”.PR This was mainly due to governance changes as “… every few years we 
refresh our governance, and depending on who’s in what role for which group… it 
changes. In terms of the overarching views we express it has been affected largely by 
the governance coming through…”.PR Although this organisation had eventually 
arrived at the view that “it’s coming in, so let’s make the best of it and best prepare 
our people and make sure it works for them the best it can”PR, some resistance was 
still apparent. This resistance was expected to continue until “the risk profile changed 
and the costs changed, and… where it [makes] sense”.PR However, despite the public 
resistance the organisation still maintained support for the RFID system within the 
organisation. As described by one actant:  
“[our] involvement in [the system] didn’t change from what it was throughout 
that whole time, and there was general acceptance by the others that [we] 
needed to be… angry and do [our] public thing, and they were cool with that 
because privately we were still doing the constructive, collaborative, helping 
shape the thing so it worked better”.PR 
While debate continued within this organisation, other supporters were working to 
strengthen the system. Another actant from a different organisation (in the public 
sector) related difficulties his organisation had in deciding to get involved with the 
RFID system, and commented “it didn't really get good traction until [my organisation], 
and the industry funders decided to front with money, decided to share dollars, share 
resources and enter into an agreement to actually do it”.PU He was also conscious of 
the need to ensure there was a good understanding of how the data collected was 
going to be used, pointing out that “industry had concerns about what the data might 
be being used for and had a suspicion, and paranoia about it being used for other 
things.”PU However, this actant was sanguine about the resistance described above, 
noting that: 
“...it’s about playing that game I just referred to, about building trust, and 
giving people the space that they need to get acceptance, and so industry 
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players and bodies need the space to say they’re adding value to their 
membership, and so there would be the ability to say they are in control. [This] 
is very powerful for them when they go and talk to their members, but trying 
to say to them we’re in a partnership with government is not an easy sell if you 
are going to go talk to a [member]. So, you’ll see quite carefully crafted 
wording around those relationships when an industry [is] talking with their 
members, depending on circumstance.”PU 
The industries involved in this system spent a lot of time promoting the 
problematisation: 
“...because it was really up to our industries to promote the idea so we 
obviously spent a lot of time talking to companies, and to groups of [members] 
etc about what it was all about, and dealing with their issues, whether it be 
about the technology or the need for such a system”.PR 
The industry ran a “technical working group”PR which discussed “about the 
practicalities, and about the types of rules that might be applied in a traceability 
system”.PR They had found the best method to persuade others, especially where 
details had not yet been worked out, was to “be straight up and say look, we don’t 
know just yet, we are trying to work through all of that stuff... we want to make sure 
that it works and that it is as cost efficient as possible, and that means we need to 
work through all of these things”.PR Further, there was still resistance in industry 
meetings despite the presence of a legislated requirement. When in such meetings, 
one actant focused on discussing:  
“…what the system would be like, not having an argument about whether or 
not it should exist. But we want you, or need you, to be involved in all of that 
so that when a decision is made one way or another you are at least up with 
the play and we don’t have to go back over all of this sort of stuff just to satisfy 
you guys. That raised some issues. People sometimes play nicely and 
sometimes they don’t”.PR 
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The process resulting from the ongoing meetings was “cross party, non-political”PR 
according to a different actant, but had also taken quite a few years due to “industry 
politics more than government… they all want to own it, and run it, and share in it, 
and be in charge”.PR However, despite these challenges there had been “sufficient 
support within our community… that we want this sort of thing. So, there’s basic 
support on that level and there always has been.”PR 
Issues seen in this system were also echoed in others. Challenges to the proposed 
problematisation in another public-private system had arisen due to its “voluntary”PU 
nature, making the associated cost of implementation a “highly relevant”PU 
consideration. A point echoed by a public sector actant who noted that to attract 
interest an RFID system his department was considering, the system would need to 
“offer value beyond just our agencies”.PU This, along with the lower cost of barcode 
systems, was providing a considerable challenge to interessement in RFID. As one 
public sector actant commented: “as a commercial provider, I [would] have a free of 
charge bar coding system, internationally recognised, now accepted as part of 
conventional contract packaging, [so] what’s the benefit in RFID, and what’s the cost 
of the benefit?”PU This particular system was also facing difficulties associated with 
different levels of security required by public and private sector users as related by 
one public sector actant: 
“…[It] offers no benefit to government because once it’s completely available 
then in fact what happens is that every criminal can get hold of it, so its actual 
value as a security solution vanishes immediately, and so the challenge for 
RFID or anything else in this space is to be sufficiently unique and carry 
sufficient data that people in compliance roles absolutely understand what 
they are dealing with and know that it is a legitimate consignment”.PU  
Related to this were difficulties with establishing a “common international view about 
where privacy begins and where it finishes”PU, although this public sector actant felt 
that solving the privacy problem would allow “the data and price questions [to] 
become more easily answered, because it’s much easier to talk about what the real 
value of the data internationally is when you overcome the issue of how we manage 
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privacy”.PU Difficulties had also been encountered in this system with infrastructure, 
particularly tags not being “sufficiently robust for their intended use”.PU However, 
there was interest surrounding the ability of RFID to identify items at the item level 
rather than at the box or pallet level, and if this identification could be done with 
“certainty and assurance”PU, it was seen as a “compelling”PU argument for RFID.  
In a different system, interest in cross sector collaboration was being fuelled by a 
governmental drive to provide “coordinated agencies”PU, as the government “didn't 
want to be duplicating IT infrastructure that was largely the same thing”PU, according 
to one public sector actant. This actant went on to discuss how relationships had been 
difficult within one industry, suggesting that problems had arisen as the industry 
management was “a little bit slow,... I think they need a much more informed and IT 
aware governing body to help have those conversations”.PU He also related the 
importance of “talking to people, and getting ten people in a room that can solve a 
problem”PU, as well as the use of various cross sector forums to bring together 
“everyone in the chain”PU to discuss issues.  
RFID technology also had a range of straightforward and easily identified features that 
organisations found attractive which assisted with the interessement. One public 
sector actant had found “no resistance to the technology”PU as the private sector 
organisations involved in his RFID system had quickly recognised that labour savings 
were going to “add extra value”PU to their business. Similarly, a public sector actant 
had found that the novelty of using an RFID system created interest for customers, 
describing their response as “very supportive, they liked it and to be fair it was a little 
bit of fun for them having a little bit of automation...”.PU One private sector actant 
related that the term “RFID” itself generated a level of “buzz”PR that attracted interest. 
Although, this actant also found that many organisations had “no real understanding 
of their problem in many cases, and they certainly have no understanding of the 
methods to solve their problem”.PR The actant had found that the best way to 
maintain interest in RFID was to get “the decision makers involved early on to make 
sure they understand where we’re going and we like to start bringing in the people 
doing the work, getting them to buy in to doing this.”PR The actant went on to describe: 
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“...there’s kind of [a] two sided problem, and the first is if we don’t have the 
decision makers and the money holders involved it can’t happen to start with. 
Then if we don’t have the people actually doing it on board with the program it 
gets sabotaged or for another bunch of reasons it doesn’t happen”.PR  
Another challenge to interessement was also seen arising from allies of a non-human 
actant SpyChips (2006) a book often cited by those opposing RFID technology. This 
actant believed that “RFID is a disturbing technology with frightening implications”PR 
(p. 232), and further that RFID technology was “something that looks surprisingly 
similar to the mark of the beast”.PR Counter to this belief another actant discussed 
how it was: 
“very frustrating every day I see somebody is talking about how RFID is the 
mark of the devil, how here in the US new healthcare the plan is going to 
require everybody to have an RIFD chip embedded in them, and it goes on and 
on and on and it’s all wrong”.PR  
This actant went on to discuss the value of industry conferences and events in 
interesting and educating others as to the value of the technology, as well as noting 
that government mandates would also play a role in “increasing the use of RFID 
systems”.PR 
4.1.4 Defining Roles – Enrolment 
Once the necessary actants have become interested in the network, the next stage of 
translation is the definition and delegation of roles within the network. In the first 
system discussed in both the problematisation and interessement sections, enrolment 
proved difficult, despite both the government agreeing to come on board and 
providing legislation that would frame the nature of the RFID system, and the 
acquiescence of actants that had initially resisted the problematisation. The struggle 
for control of this system still persisted as one actant observed “they all want to own it, 
and run it, and share it, and be in charge”.PR This point was echoed by another, who 
also saw the different places organisations had within the market as causing “constant 
tension between the [organisations] because of their relatively different fortunes and 
market power, and how they see themselves, and the pressures they face”.PR The 
107 
 
relationship between government and industry was also complex as industry and 
government jostled for control, with one private sector actant describing how industry 
struggled at times to retain control of the problematisation: 
“…so when the government’s finally convinced and then it starts putting its 
resources into establishing legislation that will reflect the outcomes that 
industry want. That’s when you lose a bit of the, the tail starts wagging the dog, 
because they then know best and all the policy wonks get involved and it 
grows a life of its own. So then you got to [sic] go and grab them all and bring 
them all back, and that’s where it’s taken a lot of time... So, industry, 
government, industry partnerships aren’t without issues.”PR 
There were also difficulties with industry members accepting the regulated system, 
especially as communication was not always clear enough. One actant speaking on 
behalf of the industry felt that industry members “were told about [our system] in 
such a way that they were hearing about the policy part of it at the same time as the 
fact that they [had] to do it, and it wasn’t well explained, so they got the wrong 
story”.PR 
The members of the organisation that had tried to defect from this system also 
continued to display a breadth of opinion as their actant explained: 
“At one end you have got those that will resign from [our organisation] 
because we are not orchestrating national disobedience to compliance with 
[the system] and there are those at the other end that are quite p...ed off at us 
generally because we are not, we’re failing to see the opportunities that come 
from the use of RFID tags”.PR 
A different actant took a more direct approach, observing that in his organisation “one 
way of dealing with [members who don’t agree] is saying “well it's a bit late now 
because it is the law”.PR In terms of the relationship between the two sectors using 
this system, a public sector actant explained the organisation’s approach was to 
collaborate with industry, relating “we are an equal player with the other parties, so 
we are actually partnered. You’ve got a partnered structure as opposed to two entities 
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trying to work together”.PU His organisation also used a memorandum of 
understanding to give shape to the “complexities of relationship”PU between 
government and industry bodies.  
Political support had been consistent for this application as “[the politicians] are in 
agreement. They can’t not be [as both parties] were pushing for it”.PU Further the 
industry bodies had left the political parties in no doubt as to their preference for the 
system, and “...the politicians understood that the industry push was there, then they 
were buying into it”.PU However, debate was ongoing around one aspect of the system 
that had not been legislated initially, and this point had required “compromise all over 
the place around that element to keep people at the table”.PU This had resulted in the 
contentious point not being included in the legislation until “...the industry bodies felt 
they would be in a place to be able to have, to be able to have the discussion with 
their members, which really comes once it’s proven with [those aspects] currently 
legislated”.PU A delay in the actual passing of legislation for this system had also 
changed the tone of the debate somewhat, improving enrolment, as another actant 
discussed: 
“... the thing that got picked up in a lot of… newspapers was that “[instance A 
is] now optional”, so you have [some time] to pick it up voluntarily before they 
now force you to. It changed the tone of the public discourse, nothing changed 
really, it’s still going to be mandatory, but by telling people that they don’t 
have to do it right now it switched from you have to do it now, to you can, if 
you want to, do it now.”PR 
Some mediation had also been needed around the issue of privacy in this system, as 
one public sector actant found “there were some differing views, and so, 
unsurprisingly, our policy guys would be at the cautious end, and the [industry] guys 
will be at the more bullish end”.PR Obtaining clarity on how data was going to be used 
assisted enrolment as it provided comfort for those who had a “level of paranoia 
about [data] being used for other things”.PR 
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In a different system where participation was governed by guidelines rather than 
regulation, a public sector actant described how the organisation encouraged vendors 
to participate in their RFID system as they: 
“...[paid] vendors faster if they used the RFID system... and if they didn’t use 
the RFID system it would take a lot longer, and we put that in our contracts. 
Now all of a sudden our system had the information we wanted, and it was 
always available, all we had to do was give an incentive to the vendors”.PU  
This incentive encouraged enrolment in the system. Another private sector actant 
took a pragmatic approach noting that most government contracts required 
adherence to a “set process for tendering for supply”PR and that in order to “sell to 
government then you have to meet those conditions”.PR In these instances, tender or 
bid documentary actants clearly set out conditions for enrolment. 
In a similar system one private sector actant had found that being involved in a pilot 
RFID project had helped with “inclusion of the various partners”PR, encouraging them 
to come on board and see the value of RFID. This actant also found that organisations 
could be encouraged to work together by “having everybody work together and they 
can understand what this is going to be about from their highest level, so that it can 
be filtered down, and that it will be supported by the leadership of the company or 
each government entity or whatever it is.”PR However despite the pilot project 
encouraging enrolment this system had difficulties politically as one public sector 
actant observed “it’s just another project [for the politicians], and they always think 
they have bigger problems, they are more concerned about their bigger problems like 
where to put a new softball field”.PU Although, in a separate RFID system, another 
public sector actant had found that relationships were more “a product of its 
individuals… if you have good people at the time then you get good results”.PU 
A number of the RFID systems studied were subject to legislation, in others this had 
not yet happened. In one non-mandatory RFID system the actants were working hard 
to prevent the government legislating, instead attempting to convince the 
government that industry could self-regulate, as one private sector actant describes: 
110 
 
“... and we, the industry itself, the manufacture’s [sic] the distributors the 
[payers], and in some cases the [organisations] have done what we call lean in 
and lean out in making progress towards agreement... saying, we will serialise 
the product, we will do it using this identifier, we will do it using a barcode, we 
will do that, we will exchange that information in the following way. They have 
genuinely attempted to demonstrate to government that they are able to do it 
in a responsible way so that there isn't a necessary regulation passed in 
addition to that which is already out there that says you will do it exactly like 
this.”PR 
In general, one of the most difficult issues faced at the enrolment stage was 
determining roles, and changing organisations to wholly adopt the RFID technology as 
outlined by the problematisation. As one actant found “there needs to be some 
process changes, different ways of doing a job to make allowances for the 
technologies”.PR It was also challenging to enrol those at the non-strategic level, and 
ensure they understood what they were supposed to be doing. A different actant had 
found at times that it was unclear “if people at the [non-strategic] level clearly 
understood the significance of the tags and what they were doing…, and therefore I 
think the communications could have been a lot more [clear]...”.PR Contention 
between different departments about funding and control led to the failure of a 
project in a case related by one private sector actant. This actant had been involved in 
an implementation with a military organisation where “each group wanted control, 
and then not control at different times, and so it became, if you like, lost”.PR Changes 
in staffing, especially in the case of those involved in the military, where there were 
staff rotated regularly, also caused enrolment problems as it was necessary to 
persuade and enrol the incoming staff members. In the military project just discussed 
another element contributing to the eventual failure of the project was “the [officer] 
who wanted it, saw it as a great tool that [he] was going to be able to use, but in the 
end [he] was busy doing other things... By the time we actually came down to the 
point [he] was about ready to rotate out into another job”.PR 
Many of organisations felt as one private sector actant did when dealing with the 
public sector organisations “almost all government suppliers... have to follow a set 
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process for tendering for supply and the government normally will put out basic 
requirements that they have to meet”.PR These requirements, sometimes framed as 
legislation, strictly shaped the problematisation and enrolment, setting out the roles 
required by organisations that wished to participate. The ability to dictate roles was 
also seen in the largest private sector organisations, as detailed by one actant “Wal-
Mart has money and they have the clout. They are the biggest retailer, they wag the 
dog, and they influence the market versus being influenced by the market”.PR 
Discussing a failed implementation, another private sector actant observed when 
dealing with complex organisations it was an advantage to have “people whose job it 
is purely to deal with the process of doing business, and I think we fell apart because 
we didn’t have any of that. Not only did we not have the people to do it, we didn’t 
necessarily have the knowledge to do it either”.PR 
4.1.5 Working Together – Mobilisation 
Once all the actants have been enrolled to support the problematisation, the original 
actants (those involved in forming the problematisation) work to ensure the other 
actants remain enrolled, and that the shape of the problematisation is maintained, 
through the stage of translation referred to as ‘mobilisation’. 
The biosecurity system discussed first in the problematisation section had reached 
mobilisation and could be considered reasonably stable. One public sector actant, and 
the heads of the other organisations involved had become fairly comfortable 
delegating for each other, as he described: 
“So… the CE,… the chair, myself, … [and others], we keep very close, and so we 
are always talking… Just came away from a meeting where some of the 
members of the industry bodies were asking questions around the amount of 
capital and how much, why is [the government] charging that sort of interest 
on the depreciation and whatever, so, in that sort of circumstance it’s great 
when [the CE] or [other industry members], they can stand up and say well, 
here’s the deal, here’s why we have this relationship, and here’s why it is this 
way. It's a lot more powerful than if I stood up and tried to defend something 
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around a, really what’s a [government] position. So the personal relationships, 
they are fundamental, and if they are not strong you’re in trouble.”PU 
The organisation that was initially reluctant to enrol was participating in the network 
as legislated, and was described by their representing actant as “… working to ensure 
that the system works for [our members] as best it can, as efficient, and minimising 
the cost to [members]”.PR Although he was finding his organisation’s members found 
the “terms and conditions that they are being asked to accept”PR irritating. In another 
private sector actant’s organisation, the initial stages of this translation had been 
“relatively hand to mouth…”PR in that not a lot of funding had been available to 
support work on the system. However, after a couple of years “formality gradually 
increased”PR, and more support became available. The final mobilisation saw each of 
the participating organisations becoming “shareholders”PR with each organisation 
appointing representatives to the board of the organisation running the traceability 
program. This controlling organisation had a “completely separate operation with its 
own board”PR, and had been allowed to “basically get on with”PR the running of the 
traceability program. Each organisation also had “control over how the whole thing 
operates, and accountability for that”PU, and in general the private sector actant felt 
his organisation was satisfied with the resultant program. 
Where legislation was in place requiring participation before the RFID system had 
commenced, the resulting solution fitted closely to the requirements of the legislation. 
However, the presence of legislation was no guarantee of stable mobilisation. A 
number of challenges to mobilisation were observed in organisations where a cross 
sector RFID system had been implemented. Not accurately forming the 
problematisation led to difficulties at the mobilisation stage, as one private sector 
actant had found “there’s frustration all round because we think we’ve delivered what 
they wanted, and they are telling us that it isn’t what they wanted, but then we never 
really knew what it is they really did want”.PR The actant also considered the inability 
or unwillingness of an organisation to change their processes to be a “concern”.PR In a 
different system, a lack of training and communication was causing participation to lag, 
as the actant speaking on behalf of the system felt that workers didn’t “have an 
appreciation for the [organisation’s] participation in something like this”.PR 
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Organisations also sometimes failed to see the immediate benefits of their RFID 
systems, with one actant explaining “my particular feeling is that a lot of the best 
benefits of a technology turn out to be [serendipitous], it’s the stuff that we didn’t 
necessarily think of”.PR This was of particular concern to the RFID network as the 
mobilisations that appeared most stable were focused on the benefits gained from the 
RFID systems, and clearly anchored by legislation. 
A number of strategies were in use to maintain these more stable translations. One 
public sector actant found that “socialising the concept”PU of the system with workers 
at various levels of the organisation was successful (in a non-legislated system). 
Combined with ensuring simplicity of design and front end use, this had allowed the 
users of his system to “go from ‘whoops I feel all at sea because this is new’ to ‘hey 
this is cool’. [It took] very few days once they got going, and away they went”.PU 
Similarly, a public sector actant had found that once his organisation’s RFID system 
was implemented those using it had quickly adapted to its use and found it natural 
and easy to use. The actant observed that “...once you get [the RFID system] rolling 
and [the staff] see success, and they see their vision coming alive... it’s kind of second 
nature to them... so it kind of becomes the mode of operating, and you’ve reached 
your goal because you’ve made the change.”PU 
This actant had also found that RFID was “better than barcode because you can read 
the tags from a distance, you can read, 20 tags at a time, so it’s less interference in the 
daily operations especially if you have like a portal”PU, and this had encouraged 
utilisation of his system. One actant believed that while RFID technology might be 
expensive “today”PR, it would be much cheaper “tomorrow”PR, and that this was going 
to facilitate much wider acceptance and adoption of RFID systems. 
4.1.6 The Future of the Network/ Mobilising the Internet of Things 
The RFID systems discussed in this study are shared between public and private sector 
organisations. However, while there is interoperability within each individual system, 
they do not connect with each other, and nor are they likely to in the near future. If 
these networks could interconnect, they would be far closer to the Internet of Things 
concept envisioned by such authors as Slettemeas (2009) and Miorandi et al. (2012). 
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From the current position, further translation would be required to form an integrated 
Internet of Things. The majority of human actants did not mention the term Internet 
of Things, and when human actants were asked directly about the Internet of Things, 
after the conclusion of the interview, most had not heard of the term, or the concept. 
Those actants that mentioned the Internet of Things saw RFID being intimately 
connected to, and facilitating it. As a result they did not see the current RFID network 
as being the end state for RFID, either in the public-private sector context, or the 
global context. As one actant explained: 
“...what we are doing now is only the beginning, I certainly believe there is 
much more to RFID because very often RFID gives the impression that it is only 
the tag and the reader. In fact, what we are trying to do now is the beginning, 
it is really the Internet of Things that is using... the EPC standards of Internet 
data exchange to create end to end visibility. Then we will be able to track 
identify and ship objects anywhere in the world”.PR 
Similarly another actant was of the opinion that “we have not conceived of all the 
power that the Internet of Things is going to bring us”, mainly because the actant felt 
“we’re still in a time where technology development is going very, very fast”.PR A 
different actant, representing systems integration, discussed how rapidly evolving 
technology was allowing RFID systems to change: 
“...previous to about now the last year or so, I would suggest that (people) saw 
RFID as the solution as opposed to a part of the solution, and this includes the 
data systems like ERPs, human readable barcodes, being able to do parents 
and children, privacy issues. We’re are all at that cusp right now where all 
those are coming together. I can see it in the next year or so really hitting the 
top of the curve”.PR 
The observation that many actants had not heard of the Internet of Things was 
supported by one actant who noted “most people don’t know what it is, they don’t 
have a clue... it’s way too early”.PR Similarly, within government it was observed that 
“they are getting more of that vision but I don’t think that the vision of everything 
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being connected to everything else was really well understood, certainly at 
government levels…”.PR 
The mediators of the Internet of Things were seen to be the same as those for the 
RFID systems that enable it. For example, the necessity to fund systems was foremost 
among the barriers mentioned to Internet of Things systems, as noted by one actant: 
“New technology always costs money. Even when we look at RFID, the cost of 
RFID has come down particularly over the last ten years. But, does that mean 
that in order to be able to do some of the work we’ve got to do with sensors to 
enable IoT we should be looking at another 10 years before we are really 
getting to the cost point we can afford it?”PR 
Other mediators of the Internet of Things were considered to be the “data handling 
that we use... so that we can share information...”.PR The governance of such systems 
was also considered to be problematic, as one actant stated “how do we govern it I 
think is a much harder question to answer and one that I don’t really have a good idea 
for”.PR 
However, more than any other mediator, where Internet of Things related issues were 
discussed by actants they mentioned the importance of ensuring that organisations 
understood the concept. As one actant speaking on behalf of systems implementation 
observed: “I think education is a major barrier. When I talk to companies, large ones in 
some cases, and it becomes pretty obvious they don’t even understand what the 
Internet of Things is and could do. I think that we’ve got a long way to go yet.”PR 
The main drive for implementation of the Internet of Things was seen to come from 
the private sector, rather than from government or individuals. One actant discussing 
Internet of Things implementation stated, “we will start to see the industry pushing it. 
I think that eventually government will start to help. I don’t see the consumer being a 
part of the drive until industry is able to show them the benefits”.PR This focus on 
benefits as an avenue to implementation mirrored that seen in RFID systems 
implementation, and was emphasised by another actant who observed “if you go to a 
CEO and you say do you want Internet of Things can help your business you are going 
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to get blank stares. If you go in and say I'm going to improve your inventory accuracy 
from 65% to 99% are you interested [then the answer is] "yes".”PR 
4.1.7 A Summary of Translation 
The ANT translation view allows for the description of how the RFID network is formed 
in the public-private sector context. In the problematisation phase, organisations 
focused on constructing business cases and ensuring they met any obligations put on 
them through such obligatory passage points as legislation and industry self-regulation. 
Funding was crucial at all stages in determining whether a system could continue. 
Standards for both hardware and software were also very important in the 
problematisation phase with organisations needing to decide if they were going to 
accept a common standard such as the EPC, which would allow them interoperability 
with the RFID systems of other organisations, or if they were going to use proprietary 
standards. Once decided, these standards also became obligatory passage points. 
During the problematisation stage, barcode tracking systems provided a strong 
challenge to RFID systems by presenting an alternative tracking technology that was 
perceived as being cheaper, but not offering all the benefits of an RFID system. In a 
number of instances it was apparent that the greatest benefit to implementing the 
RFID system would be seen if participation in the system was mandatory. 
Where legislation had been identified as a requirement in a particular RFID system the 
private sector actants had to persuade government to become involved in order to 
pass the needed legislation. This happened during the interessement stage of 
translation, with the resultant legislation becoming an OPP for the remainder of the 
translation. Interessement was focused on persuading other actants to join in the 
problematisation, not always successfully. Some organisations rejected the 
problematisation due to changes in the governance (where they had already accepted 
it), cost, and privacy concerns. Trust also appeared to be important at this stage 
especially when negotiating between organisations. Where organisations could 
recognise benefits to them in joining the problematisation they were more easily 
interested, with cost and labour savings being foremost among the benefits identified. 
Even the nature of the technology itself attracted some organisations, generating a 
‘buzz’. However, some organisations and individuals were afraid of RFID technology 
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due to health and privacy concerns, as well as the actions of organisations opposing 
RFID implementations. 
The enrolment stage of translation was characterised by organisations jostling for 
control within their RFID systems. Because more than one organisation was involved 
in all the systems there was a considerable range of reactions to offers of enrolment 
from those affected. In some organisations individual actants continued to dispute the 
enrolment while others in the same organisation wanted to move more quickly on 
implementation. Privacy still appeared to be a concern at this stage with debate 
continuing on how data collected by RFID systems would be used. Where involvement 
in RFID systems was not mandatory, enrolment was assisted by the provision of 
incentives to other actants. Piloting RFID systems was also found to assist 
organisations to understand how such systems could be of benefit to them, and 
encourage enrolment. Where legislation was in place, or a large organisation had 
mandated involvement to its suppliers, the requirements of these obligatory passage 
points forced certain roles on participating organisations, with which they had to 
comply at least to a minimum standard. The biggest challenge organisations faced at 
the enrolment phase was changing their organisational structures to accommodate 
RFID systems. This was seen to require strong organisational management and 
direction. 
The final stage of translation, namely mobilisation, was characterised by the number 
of intermediaries compared with previous stages. Standards, infrastructure and 
privacy in particular were not mentioned as being of concern at this stage. 
Mobilisation was characterised by increased formality of RFID systems, and the ability 
of actants in one system to delegate for each other. However, not all mobilisations 
were stable, especially where problematisation had not been carefully formed, 
resulting in dissatisfaction with the outcome of the translation. A lack of training and 
communication of systems requirements was also seen to cause difficulties. 
Furthermore, mobilisation was also the stage where the benefits of implementing 
RFID systems became apparent, even if the benefits were not the same as those 
identified at the problematisation stage. 
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Despite the apparently stable mobilisation stages observed, not all actants saw the 
current state of RFID systems as being its final state. Those actants that understood 
the concept of the Internet of Things believed that in the future RFID systems would 
be far more connected than they are today, moving more and more towards the 
theorised Internet of Things. The mediators (or barriers) to the Internet of Things were 
seen to be the same as those for the RFID systems that would constitute it. However, 
far more emphasis was placed on education as a mediator, primarily because of the 
number of individuals and organisations with no understanding of this concept. 
4.2 Sector Interactions 
The interaction that occurs between sectors is part of the story of the RFID network. 
This relationship is complex and there are differences apparent in the way the two 
sectors act, and perceive each other. These differences become visible around the 
mediators, as some act differently in the different sectors. They are also evident in the 
way the two sectors perceive each other, and the roles they play in the ANT 
translation process that forms the RFID network. 
This section discusses the details of the inter-organisational relationship as described 
by the participants in the network, on a day to day basis, as well as describing how 
each sector views the other, how they work together and the perceived role of 
government in the network. 
4.2.1 Contrasting Public & Private 
The relationship between the public and private sectors apparent in the RFID network 
is complicated. In some instances legislation or regulation required actants in both 
sectors to undertake certain actions and activities, although predominantly legislation 
forced courses of action on private sector actants. In other cases the sector 
relationships were framed by the perceptions each sector had of the other, and the 
perceptions reported by both sectors were largely negative. 
The private sector for example viewed the public sector as being more bound by 
procedures and requirements and thus “less flexible”PR and “slow”PR in action as they 
were required to “undertake due diligence”.PR In the case of the privacy mediator, it 
was perceived that it was necessary for public sector entities to “more carefully 
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understand the privacy implications than private sector companies that sell to other 
businesses (as opposed to consumers)”.PR This was linked to the lack of voluntariness 
when dealing with the public sector as “people have a right to choose what private 
sector companies they work with, whereas in the public sector you’re kind of stuck 
with the government” (Sector Interaction – Perception of Public Sector).PR 
This need to secure public information brought a greater focus on security in public 
sector entities, with one private sector actant noting: 
“... for the users that I know in the public sector, they’ve always automatically 
asked for security, 2005/2006 even 2004, in those years you could not for your 
life find a proposal out of the private sector that had security written into it.” 
(Sector Interaction – Public-Private Comparison)PR 
In terms of willingness to share information, the public sector was perceived as being 
less willing with one private sector actant observing that “government keeps their 
data internally and do not give it out. Data is kept on the government servers where 
government considers it more secure”.PR Though where data could be shared it was 
perceived by another private sector actant that “[in] government and academia there 
is this ethos of sharing and free information flows in the public sector”.PR This actant 
also felt the private sector response to sharing data in RFID systems was “oh s..t, yeah 
competitive advantage, I want to implement it a different wayPR”, pointing to a 
reluctance to share information (Sector Interaction – Public-Private Comparison). 
The public sector was generally seen as being short of funds and not particularly 
cohesive with a private sector actant feeling that: 
“It's the government, you know. It really, let’s be honest, it has to do with 
funding, vision, authority. They don’t have the funds, [and] they don’t have 
someone with a cohesive vision across the enterprise...” (Sector Interaction – 
Perception of Public Sector)PR 
Conversely, the public sector was also seen as not being “very cost conscious”PR 
particularly when the application being considered was critical to security or national 
policy. It was also suggested that this lack of cost consciousness related to the job 
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security, and lack of accountability within the public sector, as one private sector 
actant observed: 
“[in] the private sector you are often rewarded... that does not happen in the 
public sector, and therefore, people in [the] public sector look down upon 
those who work hard as though “you are trying to make me look bad, and you 
are trying to win brownie points”.PR  
This actant felt that this behaviour led to “bureaucracy becoming stagnant”PR as there 
was a lower drive to change processes or innovate (Sector Interaction – Perception of 
Public Sector). In contrast, it was also reported that greater public sector job security 
led to a willingness to take risks with technology innovation, with a different private 
sector actant being of the view that “public sector institutions are innovative and they 
are risk takers, where private sector is not”.PR Further where a particular RFID system 
was considered to be critical, the public sector was seen as being active in pursuing 
solutions by this actant who observed the public sector “[was] not sleeping” on 
security (Sector Interaction – Perception of Public Sector).PR 
Where contract tendering, or bidding processes were discussed the public sector was 
seen as requiring more “due diligence”PR than the private sector according to one 
private sector actant. Another actant discussed how public sector organisations were 
less willing to negotiate the details of bids saying there was “very little opportunity for 
an integrator or solutions provider to influence [a] set of [bid] requirements”.PR It was 
suggested that this lack of willingness may be related to the public sector “looking 
after everybody’s money, so to speak, so they want to get the best deal that they 
can...” (Sector Interaction – Public-Private Comparison).PR In addition, the public sector 
at times called in private sector organisations to assist in the bid process. This led to 
situations where “by the time the proposal gets around [to organisations that might 
want to compete for it] it’s pretty much a done deal, so if you have a different solution 
[to that proposed] you will have an extremely hard time to win the project” (Sector 
Interaction – Perception of Public Sector).PR  
At times it was perceived that the public sector, particularly politicians, were doing 
things – including getting involved in RFID systems - because it was a good idea to be 
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seen to be doing them, rather than because the RFID systems themselves were a good 
idea. As described by one private sector actant: 
“... the traceability issues were kind of secondary too, and RFID; they couldn’t 
care less whether it was an RFID initiative or not other than when there was a 
newspaper [reporter]. They would show up and make sure their picture was 
taken. But in terms of supporting any bills or really helping you, they... like I 
said they’re more concerned about a new softball field, because a lot of people 
like that.” (Sector Interaction – Perception of Public Sector)PR  
Many of the above findings were generally viewed as the “government way”PR of 
doing things with one private sector actant commenting “of course, you know 
government has its proper way that government tends to like it” (Sector Interaction – 
Perception of Public Sector).PR 
The views expressed about the private sector were much simpler than those directed 
towards the public sector. In general the private sector was seen as focusing on short 
term quick returns. One private sector actant described his sector as “looking for a 
very quick return on investment versus more of a long term plan”.PR He tied this to the 
need to provide value to private sector shareholders (or organisation members). This 
was a view shared by a public sector actant who perceived in his system that “industry 
players and bodies need the space to say they’re adding value to their membership”.PU 
The private sector was also seen as being less willing to engage in cross organisational 
RFID systems because they were “nervous about working within that bigger system in 
the same way [as the public sector] because it risks giving away what they perceive as 
their advantage” (Sector Interaction – Perception of Private Sector).PR 
From the public sector side, private sector organisations were seen by one public 
sector actant as being variable in their responses to the public sector. In contrast he 
considered his organisation, which was governed by legislation and policy guidelines, 
was more “constant because we are the same [organisation]... What really drives the 
differences is how the industries chose to interact [with us]” (Sector Interaction – 
Perception of Private Sector).PU 
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Organisational strategy was considered to give rise to differences between the two 
sectors with a private sector actant discussing the three or four year political cycle on 
the public sector side, and contrasting it with the theoretically longer strategic cycle 
on the private sector side: 
“...there is a changeover [of political] administration potentially every four 
years, and just as you’re getting used to the rules of the game by this 
administration the next one comes in and there’s a new group you have to 
contend with. So this is in the leadership arena of course, but still it is 
frustrating because sometimes the rules of the game change and it’s hard.” 
(Sector Interaction – Public-Private Comparison)PR 
It was noted by another private sector actant that private sector strategy also changed 
when leadership of the organisations changed. In the actants organisation in particular 
changing board membership had led to the views the organisation expressed being 
“affected largely by the governance coming through”.PR The lack of a CEO to direct 
public sector strategy was also seen as a barrier to strategic management. One private 
sector actant considered that “in the private sector you have a CEO saying "this is 
important to our business and we are going to do this "there is no CEO of the 
government... every government agency is a unique conversation” (Sector Interaction 
– Public-Private Comparison).PR 
The type of services provided by the two sectors was seen by one public sector actant 
to influence how the sectors interacted, with private sector targeting their services 
towards individuals, while public sector organisations provided service at a higher 
level targeted at populations: 
“From my experience the private sector are much more driven by the market 
and that includes [customer] preferences and things like that. So they are 
much more a service industry than the public sector is. So a service industry, 
you give the customer what they want and you are constantly worried about 
what they want. Whereas in the public sector they are much more focused on 
[general approaches], generally we should provide this for the country.” 
(Sector Interaction – Public-Private Comparison)PU 
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This actant also saw the public sector as being unable to refuse to provide service. This 
led to public sector costs being higher than in the private sector where private sector 
organisations could “offload everything they don’t like so they don’t have to provide 
services to people who can’t pay, they don’t have to provide services when it’s not 
convenient for them... and that's a lot of the costs of any organisation” (Sector 
Interaction – Public-Private Comparison).PU 
4.2.2 Public-Private the Same? 
A number of actants also discussed similarities between the two sectors. These 
similarities were seen as turning on the nature of the individuals who were part of the 
inter-sector relationship, rather than the nature of the organisations. One private 
sector actant was of the opinion that “it is really how educated a person is, and how 
much research they’ve done”PR rather than the nature of the organisation, that 
dictated what kind of reception an RFID system might get (Sector Interaction – 
Individual Based).  
One public sector actant discussed how the views of individuals in both sectors tended 
to be presumed to be the views of their organisations as well. The actant noted that 
the organisation was often viewed as “the bad guys”PU by many in industry. However, 
this actant also acknowledged that that the organisation tended to “react and say, 
‘there goes that industry again saying that, what on earth are they doing,’ and we miss 
the point that well, that's just actually one individual and that individual has a view 
within the context of the industry”. (Sector Interaction – Public-Private the Same).PU 
The view that interaction between public and private sectors was similar was more 
often expressed where actants were familiar with the individuals they were 
interacting with, having worked on the same RFID system for some time. A private 
sector actant for example described working with the public sector from the early 
days of implementation and found that “since then we’ve been working on the 
[implementation] through thick and thin all those years... our dealings with 
[government] on [implementation] stuff happen exactly the same way as our dealings 
with...the other industry guys on the [implementation] stuff” (Sector Interaction – 
Individual Based).PR 
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A number of actants believed that both sectors faced the same challenges in 
implementing RFID systems, as explained by a private sector actant: 
“In the long term, as RFID systems proliferate, the challenges for government-
to-private sector interactions are the same as government-to-government, and 
private sector company-to-private sector company interactions. You need 
hardware standards and you need software standards that enable data to be 
shared. The systems must be secure.” (Sector Interaction – Public-Private the 
Same).PR 
4.2.3 Role of Government 
‘Government’ and/or the public sector was seen as having a variety of roles to play in 
the RFID network. One public sector actant saw the public sector as having a role in 
encouraging “confidence to be established and maintained by [a] wide section of the 
trading community”.PU Although jurisdictions provided varying levels of support for 
RFID systems, as one private sector actant explained “in Europe, the European 
Commission has spent millions and millions of dollars funding projects for industry for 
RFID... [in] Asia, Pacific Asia, they fund a great deal... All of those countries [are] very 
very industry friendly”.PR At times, this friendliness towards their own industry was 
manifested through the government creation of artificial trade barriers. These worked 
by requiring importers to comply with local RFID regulations. For example one public 
sector actant explained “if your [RFID] numbering scheme is different then it forces 
whoever is selling, other countries, to take a tariff. That’s the effect. You can't just 
resell stuff in that country, you have to remake it for that country so it makes 
import/export to [some countries] a little more onerous” (Sector Interaction – Role of 
Government).PU There was also a role seen for the public sector in educating industry, 
and the public as to the usefulness and safety of RFID systems. One private sector 
actant believed “government has a major obligation to educate, and this is something 
that I’m not sure that many governments do a very good job [at]” (Sector Interaction – 
Role of Government).PR 
The public sector was also seen as providing ‘government’ services as outlined by a 
private sector actant, “to get regulation or to get regulations changed... So there’s an 
125 
 
instance where you go to the government to try to help, to set up the right conditions 
for you to compete”.PR Although the actant saw the role of government as necessarily 
limited stating, “why would industry want government to become involved? If you 
think about it, if it’s not something industry is doing for government there are very 
few visions where government acts as a supplier or providing a service or so on”.PR 
Expanding on this, a private sector actant related how organisations the actant was 
involved with had “genuinely attempted to demonstrate to government that they are 
able to [implement product tracing] in a responsible way so that there isn't a 
necessary regulation passed in addition to that which is already out there, that says 
you will do it exactly like this.”PR Where legislation was deemed necessary the 
involvement of the public sector was viewed as a “cost”PR of getting the legislation 
enacted by one private sector actant. The importance of ensuring any policy or 
regulation was matched to actual need was explained by one public sector actant who 
considered there was a “profound disconnect between government policy, industry 
desire, and technological development”PU which was leading to unnecessary and 
poorly thought out legislation in the RFID system in which he was involved (Sector 
Interaction – Role of Government). 
4.2.4 Organisations Working Together 
There were a number of factors seen to facilitate public and private sector 
organisations working together. The ability to get all the interested parties together 
was seen as enhancing cooperation by a public sector actant. This actant explained 
how in one system “there was essentially this pan industry government group made 
up of representatives from [our department]... at senior official level and at a 
technical level; and then representatives from the industries in various parts, some of 
which were going to be funders, and others weren’t...”.PU Another public sector actant 
explained how an important element of success in getting this cross sector system 
going was when the public sector organisations “and the industry funders decided to 
front with money, decided to share dollars, share resources and enter into an 
agreement to actually do it...” (Sector Interaction – Working Together).PU 
Further issues that needed to be solved before organisations could work together 
included determining which organisation was going to be controlling the system. As a 
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private sector actant found “they all want to own it and run it and share it and be in 
charge and so, it’s taken a while to get there”.PR Problems also arose with the sharing 
of benefits as they were seldom shared equally between organisations, requiring 
careful negotiation as a private sector actant explained: 
“If I said to my supplier ‘well I want you to just add that cost and I’m not going 
to pay more and I’ll have all these wonderful benefits and screw you’, well you 
might actually get cooperation but you’re not really getting cooperation. What 
you are actually getting is compliance and there’s a big difference between the 
two. Compliance doesn't enhance the relationship, cooperation does. So go 
back to that supplier and say ‘look, we figure out that we are going to probably 
save 40 cents a unit, we will share it with you’, and people are much more 
inclined to work that way. If you pay people peanuts don’t be surprised if they 
act like monkeys.” (Sector Interaction – Working Together).PR 
It was also suggested by a private sector actant that the inclusion of a neutral third 
party was of assistance in this negotiation process. The actants organisation had found 
that where “a [neutral] organisation works to facilitate work groups and groups of 
organisations to move forward... it seems to work and work well...” (Sector Interaction 
– Third Parties).PR 
Disagreements were seen to arise from arguments about who will supply technology, 
and support the cost of implementation “along the lines of who’s going to be the 
supplier, what particular kind of RFID is going to be used, what’s it going to cost”PU 
according to a public sector actant. Similarly a private sector actant discussed the 
place of the public sector in subsidising or funding RFID systems. Where public funding 
was not available the actant noted “in countries where there is government funding 
available, it’s much easier to move industry forward in collaboration with 
government” (Sector Interaction – Public Funding).PR This actant also outlined 
difficulties surrounded the location, and organisation, of data storage with: 
“Different folks have different points of view... distributors for example, who 
have acted as information brokers [in the past], and they are more accustomed 
to saying ‘oh we’ll handle all the data for you just send it all to us and we will 
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take care of it’. Whereas some are advocating ‘no no no, this data is more 
accurate if it stays where it was created and we just need a mechanism to 
bring it all together’...”PR 
On occasions the private sector was seen to provide services to the public sector, as a 
way of promoting their products. One public sector actant explained how in one 
system “any money which came in was [from a private sector company], which was a 
technology company. [They] wanted to promote their product” (Sector Interaction – 
Private Funding).PU 
It was also found that getting agreement to implement RFID systems required 
persistence on the part of the various organisations, as one private sector actant 
related “that’s a lot of… door knocking and a lot of meetings and a lot of discussions, 
and it isn’t always obvious... Sort of like the invention of the flywheel, you keep 
pushing it and pushing and eventually it spins all by itself” (Sector Interaction – Getting 
Agreement).PR 
The way the two sectors interacted was contrasted by a private sector actant who 
pointed out that the “way the government interacts with industry is regulation, and 
the way industry interacts with government is politics”.PR This actant went on to 
explain how the private sector was resisting politically mandated RFID systems in a 
particular instance and had: 
“Lobbied very hard to have no such mandates on them, because should the 
government pass such a law or create this regulation the implications are huge. 
In the private industry it is hard to do the same because private companies 
don't have the same clout. Private companies can create regulations in a 
couple of ways, one is self-regulation, and one of the aims of that is companies 
coming together and creating a regulation that they will adhere to. They do 
that to pre-empt government action.” (Sector Interaction – Organisations 
Working Together)PR 
Where the private sector managed to gain momentum on an issue, one private sector 
actant working to get legislation in respect of one system had found that you were 
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“more likely... to get the Minister’s attention or somewhere in that level” (Sector 
Interaction).PR 
However, in one instance the public sector was reluctant to become involved because 
of concern that the private sector would walk away from the RFID system, as one 
private sector actant explained: 
“There has always been support at the political level and then it really just 
became a matter of persuading officials that they weren’t going to be left 
holding the baby which essentially was their fear. It was that we would go 
ahead with a hiss and a roar, [the industry group] would throw their toys, there 
would be mutiny, and they would be left trying to administer a scheme which 
was a disaster area because we would all walk away.” (Sector Interaction).PR 
In summary, the interaction between public and private sector was complex with a 
number of different aspects apparent. At a superficial level, the perception of 
organisations was mostly negative on both sides, with the public sector seen as being 
slow, short of funds and bound by procedure. The private sector on the other hand 
was seen as being more concerned with competitive advantage and less willing to 
collaborate for this reason. Differences were perceived to arise as a result of the 
political cycle and the different organisational focus of the two sectors. Similarities 
arose in the nature of individuals working for the different sectors with familiarity 
increasing this sense. Comments were also made as to the role of government, which 
was seen primarily as a regulatory one, although suggestions were made in respect of 
the provision of education and funding for RFID systems. Despite the tension between 
the two sectors a number of successful RFID implementations gave rise to some 
guidelines for success in implementation, including getting all parties together to 
negotiate agreement, and the sharing of resources. However, the need for both 
sectors to collaborate more around RFID systems was also emphasised. 
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Code Description 
Sector Interaction 
Observations about the interaction of organisations in 
the RFID network. 
Sector Interaction – Getting 
Agreement 
Organisations work together to get agreement. 
Sector Interaction – Individual 
Based 
Where individuals are seen to represent 
organisations. 
Sector Interaction – Perception 
of Public Sector 
How the public sector is seen or perceived, either by 
the private sector, or within the public sector. 
Sector Interaction – Perception 
of Private Sector 
How the private sector is seen or perceived, either by 
the public sector, or within the private sector. 
Sector Interaction – Public 
Funding 
How organisations pursue or obtain public sector 
funding for RFID implementations. 
Sector Interaction – Public-
Private Comparison 
Comparison of public and private sector 
organisations. 
Sector Interaction – Public-
Private the Same 
Where public and private sector organisations act or 
are perceived to act in the same way. 
Sector Interaction – Role of 
Government 
The perceived or stated role of government within the 
RFID network. 
Sector Interaction – Third 
Parties 
How the implementations or systems work with third 
parties (parties that might not normally be involved 
with the network). 
Sector Interaction – Working 
Together 
How the organisations work together. 
Table 3: Code Table Sector Interactions 
4.3 An ANT/Institutional Approach to Organisational Interactions
  
As the focus of this study is at the organisational, or institutional level, it is appropriate 
to consider the behaviour of organisations as actants. To facilitate this understanding 
Institutional Theory has been added as an additional lens through which to assist in 
interpreting the findings, as outlined in Sections 3.2 Institutions, Institutional Theory 
and ANT; and 3.3 Institutional Theory. This section will discuss the findings in terms of 
a combination of ANT and Institutional Theory, focusing both on the institutional 
pressures apparent in the network, and on the responses organisations have in 
respect of institutional pressures11. These responses, outlined by Oliver (1991b), have 
been mapped with the ANT responses to problematisation suggested by Latour (1987), 
                                                     
11
 As with the ANT discussion, coding will not be detailed in this section. It can be assumed that quotes 
under each heading are coded to that heading. 
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and the diagram thus produced in Section 3.3 (page 72) is reproduced below for 
convenience: This figure 
demonstrates the close 
relationship between the ANT 
actant responses to an offer of 
enrolment and the Institutional 
Theory responses to institutional 
pressures. As this section is less 
complex than the mediators’ 
section, coding is not included. 
Instead it can be assumed that 
each quote is coded to its 
associated table. 
4.3.1 Coercive Pressures 
The most obvious, and strongest, institutional pressure evident in the RFID network 
was that of coercive pressure. It was mainly apparent around the various legislative 
and regulatory requirements placed on RFID systems in this context. Where an RFID 
system had been implemented, and legislation was already in place, the coercive 
effect of the legislation was seen in the problematisation where it framed the shape of 
the proposed solution. When this happened legislation became an obligatory passage 
point to the ANT translation, as discussed in Section 4.1.2 above. In a number of 
systems studied, legislation was brought to bear because it was felt that compliance at 
a national level was necessary for system effectiveness. As one actant observed 
“there’s absolutely no point in creating something like this [system] if you don’t have 
compliance”.PR Coercive pressures were also exerted at the request of industry. In one 
of the systems studied it was “industry [which] went to government and said, you’ve 
got to do this, or you’ve got to help us do it... it will never work voluntary”PR, although 
it was perceived that “the cost of doing that was to have the government involved”PR, 
where the organisations would otherwise have preferred to have voluntary 
participation. 
Figure 12: ANT and Institutional Theory Responses 
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A range of legislation exerted coercive pressures on RFID systems not only that which 
directly mandated involvement in RFID based implementation. Examples included 
privacy legislation, which varied by jurisdiction although it was felt that privacy 
concerns were likely to give rise to “more controls”12PR than those already in place. 
Food safety laws also affected RFID systems where “new food safety laws... [have] put 
some fairly heavy requirements on transportation of food, and protecting food 
safety”.PU One actant related how “truckers and truck fleet owners are getting more 
and more concerned... about the cargo”PR due to food safety and liability regulations, 
and this was driving implementation of RFID sensor systems. Similarly, requirements 
to be able to provide Customs data “such as who manufacture it, or grew it, who’s 
shipping it, who’s it shipped to...”PU were driving implementation of RFID container 
and pallet tracking systems in some jurisdictions. Although legislation mainly acted at 
the problematisation stage, where legislation changed, or new legislation was 
introduced, existing RFID systems could also be affected, causing changes to RFID 
systems in place. 
Other non-legislative coercive pressures were seen to be applied, in the form of larger 
organisations setting mandated requirements to use RFID tags within their supply 
chains. As related by one actant, an organisation had instituted: 
“... a mandate, we had to tell vendors to do it. This was not a ‘would you like to 
put RFID tags on’, we worked with the vendor community to come up with the 
formats and the technologies and stuff, but let there be no doubt that there 
was a mandate…”.PU 
Self-regulation was also seen in the network, as an attempt to avoid government 
legislation. As one actant related, “… what will happen is the industry will try and fight 
this regulation until they think it is inevitable then they will try and staunch or stem 
the flow, or they will try and pre-empt it by passing some self-regulation…”.PR 
In other systems coercive pressures were applied to supply chain partners in the form 
of “incentives”PU to use the RFID system. In one system this was seen through the 
ability of suppliers “to get paid faster”PU if they used RFID technology. Despite such 
                                                     
12
 Privacy and RFID systems has been discussed from the literature in Section 2.6.5 
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incentives, using non-legislative coercive means to obtain compliance was not always 
perceived as being positive. Some vendors were inclined to simply “slap the label on 
so that they can get paid”PU which was seen to lead to organisations “approaching 
RFID as just something I’ve got to do to get a tag on this…”PU rather than gaining 
business value from the technology. 
4.3.2 Mimetic Pressures 
Mimetic pressures were most obvious in the problematisation phase where 
organisations were seeking to decide the form their RFID systems would take. In these 
cases organisations would seek to discover what others were doing. In one instance 
RFID was chosen over bar-code systems “because everyone else around the world was 
kind of moving towards RFID it made sense for us to do that as well...”.PR Apart from 
following perceived industry best practice, the need for interoperability was cited as a 
reason for replicating RFID systems as “it is a lot easier if what you’ve got looks similar 
to what they’ve got, because then you don’t have to explain quite so much about how 
the intricacies and technical stuff is slightly different to theirs...”.PR This drive towards 
interoperability was also seen in the application of normative pressure, discussed 
below. 
Organisations also kept a “watch on what is working well overseas, and is it 
translatable to [our environment]?”PU Not only in order to acquire ideas that might 
work well in their own organisations, but also to take note of technologies that were 
not working as “they can’t make it work cost benefit wise over there, then we are 
unlikely to here...”.PU 
4.3.3 Normative Pressures 
Although not common, there were some normative pressures apparent in the RFID 
network, particularly centred around attempts by industry to self-regulate through 
various professional organisations. Of particular interest is a recent initiative to create 
an RFID certification which will “provide comprehensive coverage of the fundamental 
information needed to understand the characteristics, proper usage, and 
implementation considerations for the primary types of RFID in use” (RFID Institute, 
2013b). This certificate is supported by the RFID Institute which has the specific goal of 
promoting the “public good that comes from having industry and professionals 
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achieve high levels of professionalism through the research, education, and 
development of the RFID science and knowledge-base; and validation of that 
knowledge obtained through professional certification.” (RFID Institute, 2013a). 
Normative pressures are also seen in other forms of self-regulation, either through 
membership of various professional organisations associated with RFID – such as 
standards organisations or the RFID Institute mentioned above; or through industry 
based self-regulation. These industry based regulations are seen to arise mainly from 
the desire to “pre-empt”PR coercive government regulation, although they can also be 
described as coercive pressure. Like mimetic and coercive pressures, normative 
pressure was mainly apparent in the problematisation phase of the translation, as it 
affected the form of the business case through industry requirements. 
4.3.4 Responses to Institutional Pressures/Enrolment 
As discussed in above sections both ANT and Institutional Theory recognise a range of 
actions that organisations/actants can take when confronted with either institutional 
pressures, or offers of enrolment to the network translation. These responses are 
similar enough that they can be mapped, and discussed together. They are considered 
separately from the public-private sector discussion as this section focuses on the 
response of the organisation rather than sector differences, or perception of sector. 
Because of the size of many of the RFID systems in which both public and private 
sector are involved (especially where involvement in RFID systems was legislated), 
there was often a wide range of different responses to institutional pressures and 
offers of enrolment, from “no” to “OK whatever” to “should have been doing it years 
ago”, and these are discussed below. 
4.3.4.1 Acceptance/Acquiescence/Compromise 
In ANT terms when actants agree to the problematisation they are said to have 
accepted it. Similarly, in Institutional Theory when organisations agree to the 
institutional pressure they are said to acquiesce, although they may also engage in 
compromise through negotiation before they do so. These behaviours were clearly 
evident within the RFID network studied. 
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The easiest way to achieve acceptance/acquiescence within the systems studied was 
through presenting the RFID system as being of benefit to the other organisations. 
One actant had related that in the case of his system the business case was so 
persuasive that it “did not need selling. People were going ‘great! Let’s get on with 
it’...”.PR As a result, the system was easily accepted. In another system involving an 
entry card system “…people were experiencing too many hours wait time… and you 
had a choice if you wanted to wait for two and a half hours [you could use the old 
system], or get in another lane which was 15 minutes [using an RFID card] with a tag in 
it…”.PR Again this system had proven popular due to the reduced wait time. This 
strategy of encouraging other organisations or individuals to join in the RFID systems 
was described by one actant as “the only strategy that ever works in those situations – 
it’s called mutual benefit”.PR Another organisation had encouraged supply chain 
partners to accept their RFID system by incentivising them through an offer to “pay 
the vendors faster if they used [our system]… now all of a sudden [our system] had the 
information that we wanted… all we had to do was give an incentive to the 
vendors”.PU 
Sharing of benefits was also seen as a way to gain acceptance of RFID systems, as 
explained by one actant: 
“If I said to my supplier ‘well I want you to just add that cost and I’m not going 
to pay more and I’ll have all these wonderful benefits and screw you’, well you 
might actually get cooperation but you’re not really getting cooperation, what 
you are actually getting is compliance and there’s a big difference between the 
two. Compliance doesn't enhance the relationship, cooperation does. So go 
back to that supplier and say “look, we figure out that we are going to probably 
save 40 cents a unit, we will share it with you”, and people are much more 
inclined to work that way.”PR  
A range of compromises were also used within the RFID systems studied. Compromise 
was seen to be facilitated by: 
“being able to genuinely... sit in the seat of the other player and know what’s 
driving, what’s going on in their mind, and what’s affecting them… then you’ll 
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be able to understand how you will interact with them, and it’s about being 
able to accommodate compromise or a bit of give and take, and not being 
obstructive.”PU 
In one instance standards had been negotiated through “topic specific working groups, 
and they participate through… a community room interaction, document sharing, 
Internet sharing, meetings, online meetings… and we all agree that this is a best 
practice…”.PR Maturity of the organisations involved was also mentioned as a 
facilitator of cooperation with one actant relating how after initial tensions, competing 
organisations in the system “buried the hatchet”PR and decided to “get mature on this, 
that really working together was the only way forward.”PR 
4.3.4.2 Disregard/Avoidance 
Despite the involvement of the public sector in the RFID systems, and the presence of 
legislation in a number of instances, there were still some individuals and 
organisations that attempted to avoid or disregard the RFID network. As noted by one 
actant “… there’s a percentage that [are] just going to go no…”.PR In fact, the presence 
of legislation in most cases arose from the recognition that there was “…no point in 
creating something like this [RFID system] if you don’t have compliance…”.PR Such 
legislation was designed to reduce the number of organisations refusing to participate 
in the legislated system. The necessity and value of legislation in promoting 
compliance was noted by a number of actants, as was the need “to make sure the act 
is complied with through effective enforcement…”.PU 
Even in non-legislated systems, the large organisations promoting them had 
mechanisms to ensure participation, as was noted in one system “… they [the private 
sector organisation] are driving mandates with penalties, and they are holding people 
accountable, which is something that the Federal government doesn’t do a good job 
of…”.PR In another case, incentives in the form of earlier payment encouraged vendors 
to agree to applying RFID tags to their items, reducing the amount of vendor 
avoidance. 
At a staffing level it was apparent that some organisations were also having difficulties 
with individuals who were afraid of the RFID technology for a number of reasons. One 
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actant related how it was “a juggling act as to who do we get involved, when do we 
get them involved. [Be]cause it’s great if the CEO says go ahead and do it, but then 
[someone] on the shop floor won’t pick up a reader for some reason because he’s 
frightened of it...”.PU Health and privacy concerns also caused individuals, and 
organisations to be reluctant to adopt RFID systems. 
4.3.4.3 Dispute/Defiance/Manipulation 
As with the tendency to disregard or avoid institutional pressures, or the invitation to 
enrolment, many organisations had limited capacity to dispute, defy or manipulate 
circumstances around their involvement in public-private RFID systems, due to the 
legislated requirement for them to be involved. This did not mean that organisational 
involvement was enthusiastic, as observed by one actant “… the companies only do it 
[participate in the RFID system] to the extent that they are liable from a law point of 
view, and so the government regulates and the companies try to fight it until they 
realise they are liable…”.PR  
The form that the attempted manipulation, or disputes, often took was that of 
lobbying. This occurred especially “when [organisations] don’t see the value, they are 
pushing back”PU in order to prevent RFID related legislation. In one instance an actant 
observed “the [government department]… they have contemplated RFID mandates, 
and the industry is very worried about it so they have lobbied very hard to have no 
such mandates on them…”.PR In this instance some organisations already had 
proprietary systems in place, which also strengthened resistance to legislation as 
“those who have got the proprietary system that’s in there are now going to have 
their livelihood threatened… and tell the government first it shouldn’t be 
interfering…”.PR 
Where legislation was not in place, or in instances where legislation was being 
debated organisations were very active in attempting to manipulate the final form of 
the legislation, or in trying to ensure legislation was not enacted. As one actant who 
had been involved in legislating an RFID system noted, another organisation was set 
on “derailing [the system]… because they just saw this as a cost to [their members]”.PR 
In another instance an organisation had “objected to the death that the minister had 
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[a particular] power…”PR, which was opposed because it could cause the organisation 
to change its business processes. 
Others recognised that legislation in some cases was inevitable even though they did 
not agree with it. As one actant related “I think [what] we are facing now today in 
regard to RFID is certainly the privacy issue, and I think that… we’re going to get 
regulated in some way… I’m pretty certain that I don’t think it’s the right thing, but it’s 
going to happen…”.PR In one RFID system studied, industry “were also starting to push 
back because they were sick of providing the same information to multiple 
agencies…”PU, and wanted changes to include RFID legislation.  
In one instance, an organisation had been heavily involved in attempting to 
manipulate the final outcome of RFID based legislation. As one actant recalled “…we 
were in the odd position of having to talk the government out of being involved in it in 
terms of being an industry based scheme, and then having to talk them back in to 
being involved in it for the funding…”.PR However, despite the organisation’s 
involvement they still had some members who did not want to be involved in the RFID 
system at all and took the view that “… no you can’t do that…”, defying any attempt at 
enrolment.PR 
4.3.5 ANT/Institutional Theory Summary 
In summary, Institutional Theory provides an additional understanding of what is 
happening within the RFID network, by focusing on the way organisations respond to 
pressures applied to them.  
Coercive pressures were apparent in the presence of both legislation, and industry 
self-regulation. Self-regulation also presents as a normative pressure, especially when 
regulation arises from RFID standards bodies. Mimetic pressures appear as a result of 
organisations looking to others to determine best practice, and to determine what not 
to do. 
The responses of organisations to institutional pressures were aligned with the ANT 
responses that actants display as a result of an offer of enrolment. Again, all the 
responses proposed by Latour (1987), and Brown (1997) were evident in the RFID 
network. Where organisations had accepted the offer of enrolment, or had acquiesced 
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to institutional pressure, it was apparent that the benefits of RFID systems had been 
identified, and most parties were seen to be able to benefit from them. Often this 
position had been arrived at through compromise. Alternatively where legislation 
mandated involvement, organisations accepted this, but some chose to do the bare 
minimum towards compliance, often because they could not recognise any benefit in 
the RFID system proposed. 
At times organisations resisted or defied attempts to get them to enrol in RFID 
systems, especially where they were not mandated. Individuals also objected to RFID 
systems, generally on the grounds of fear, or health concerns.  
Some organisations were also involved in actively disputing/defying or attempting to 
manipulate the problematisation offered, or the institutional pressure applied. This 
behaviour was most obvious where legislation was being proposed, but had not been 
enacted, and was directed at either preventing or amending the legislation. 
4.4 Summary: Organisational Interactions 
This chapter has focused on answering the research question How are public-private 
RFID systems established and maintained?, and RQb: What role does institutional 
behaviour play in the process?  
ANT allows this study to answer the first research question by viewing RFID systems in 
the public-private sector context through the ANT process of translation. ANT views 
the establishment of the RFID network as moving from defining the problem in the 
problematisation stage (to which the use of an RFID system is the answer), through 
the interessement of other actants and their enrolment, to mobilisation and stability 
of the resulting RFID network. During this process, mediators, discussed in the 
Findings chapter advised, influenced, and at times destroyed the actants’ attempts at 
translation.  
Problematisation was characterised by actants debating various aspects of the 
problem including standards, infrastructure, cost, and whether or not their particular 
RFID systems needed to be legislated. These debates led to the problematisation 
being framed in the form of a business case, which then became an obligatory passage 
point (OPP) for the remainder of the translation. Standards and legislation were also 
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seen to act as obligatory passage points for the RFID systems studied. Where 
legislation was deemed necessary by the problematisation, interessement included 
the industry actants involving government in order to have this legislation enacted. 
Other features of interessement included the original focal actants attempting to 
persuade others to join the translation. They mainly used the perceived benefits of 
joining as inducements, with concerns around cost, privacy and trust being seen to be 
challenges to persuading others to join the translation. During enrolment debates 
continued around how the different actants were going to work together, and who 
was going to control various aspects of the RFID system. Because of the size of most of 
the systems studied these debates were on-going, and represented the complete 
spectrum from total agreement with the problematisation, to total opposition. Where 
systems involvement was legislated the requirements of the regulation framed the 
shape of the enrolment. Process changes, and the organisational management 
required to implement RFID systems, were seen as major organisational challenges. 
The final mobilisation saw actants being able to delegate for each other, and the 
realisation of benefits. Some of the benefits were those promised in the original 
problematisation, whereas others had not been originally envisaged. Not all 
mobilisations were stable, particularly where RFID systems were not legislated, or 
where the problematisation had not been well considered.  
Overlying the story of translation is the way the two sectors act towards each other. 
Their relationship is complicated, and driven initially by preconceptions each sector 
holds about the other. The public sector is generally viewed by the private sector as 
being slow and unwieldy, and the private sector is viewed as being focused on 
competitive advantage. However, as the organisations worked together through the 
process of translation, their attitudes changed and sector differences became less 
important. Nonetheless, there were still differences apparent. This was particularly 
evident around sensitivity within the public sector to legislation already in place, 
mainly in respect of privacy legislation.  
Interactions between organisations, apart from those arising as a result of different 
sector requirements, can be best viewed through the lens of Institutional Theory, thus 
addressing research question 1b. All three institutional pressures are apparent, with 
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coercive pressures in the form of legislation (and mandates in non-regulated RFID 
systems), being the most commonly seen. Mimetic pressure is particularly apparent 
when organisations are looking to determine the solution they will adopt, as are 
normative pressures which appear to be exerted mainly by standards organisations. 
All three Institutional Theory pressures are most apparent during problematisation, 
though coercive pressures particularly, persist throughout translation.  
The responses of organisations on being offered enrolment in the ANT process of 
translation, and the responses of organisations to institutional pressures can be 
considered to be congruent. All three ANT responses (accept, disregard, and dispute), 
and five Institutional Theory responses (acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, 
defiance, manipulation) are seen in this study. Acceptance/acquiescence/compromise 
were seen to be most associated with those actants who could see the benefits of the 
RFID system, or where involvement was legislated. Disregard/avoidance/ behaviour 
was apparent in RFID systems, even when the systems were legislated. Some actants 
simply refused to participate. This was particularly apparent with some individual 
actants who were reluctant to participate in RFID systems due to concerns about 
health and privacy implications. Actants also attempted to dispute/defy or manipulate 
translations from the private sector side, primarily in the form of lobbying in order to 
have legislation changed. A certain amount of dispute was also apparent through 
minimal compliance with legislation or mandates, where organisations would merely 
add tags to the requisite items, and not attempt to gain any other benefit from RFID 
systems.  
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5 Findings: Mediation of RFID Systems 
Within the RFID network a number of mediators were apparent, influencing the way 
the actants behaved, affecting network stability. Mediators were the common themes 
that were seen to influence the network in sometimes unexpected and disruptive 
ways. They were also the most frequently discussed issues seen in RFID systems, or 
they arose most often when describing change or influencing decisions. Mediators 
could suddenly alter the course of an RFID system, change, or even destroy it. Some 
mediators were obvious and strong, such as financial considerations. Others were 
subtle but still important within the public-private context.  
The mediators were sorted into the three dimensions listed below, depending on 
where in the network they were most influential, and/or most frequently seen: 
 Network mediators acted across the entire RFID network and were identified 
as finance, infrastructure, standards and organisational knowledge. They were 
seen both within and between organisations and were the most commonly 
discussed mediators; 
 Inter-organisational mediators acted primarily between organisations, and 
were identified as privacy, security, trust and data sharing. These mediators 
were discussed in connection to relationships and actions taken between 
organisations, and where it was necessary to secure inter-organisational 
agreement or action; and 
 Intra-organisational mediators were most influential within organisations, and 
were identified as organisational management, data management, and 
benefits/business case. These mediators advised organisational decision 
making around the RFID network, and forming the basis of network success or 
failure.  
Figure14 below shows a summary model of these mediators, illustrating how they fit 
together within the RFID network: 
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Figure 13: Mediators of the RFID Network 
This section of findings will be discussed in the three dimensions outlined above. The 
mediators seen within each dimension will be considered separately, along with a 
breakdown of the descriptive, in-vivo, and process codes which were grouped to form 
the mediator. Each quote will be followed by the code it was assigned, and each 
section will end with a table summarising and describing the codes. Some quotes 
appear more than once, as they have been coded to more than one group. This is 
especially true of cost, where cost is relevant across a wide range of different 
mediators, as well as being a mediator itself. Thus cost of infrastructure, for example, 
may be discussed in both the cost sections and the infrastructure section. Differences 
in the way the mediators work in the two sectors are also touched upon, and are 
discussed in full at the end of the mediator’s section under Organisational Interaction. 
5.1 Network Mediators 
Network mediators operated across the entire RFID network. They were present both 
within organisations, between organisational sections or departments, and between 
organisations. These mediators were active participants in either driving the entire 
network forward, or as primary causes of its failure. 
5.1.1 Finance 
Central to every RFID system studied was discussion surrounding finance. This was 
mainly manifest as the cost of RFID systems, or in the case of documentary actants, as 
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financial spreadsheets, breakdowns and cost analysis. By far the most widely and 
frequently discussed of all the mediators, finance, and cost, was mentioned by almost 
all actants and was important to both public and private sectors. A number of 
different aspects of finance were apparent including the cost of RFID infrastructure, 
and systems compliance. There was also discussion of the allocation of costs between 
organisations, as well as the imposition of cost caused by legislated RFID systems.  
The cost of RFID infrastructure, especially of RFID tags, was recognised across the 
whole network. “There’s cost involved as soon as you start asking people to put stuff 
on [objects] then they will probably want them back unless they are at a price that can 
be thrown away” (Finance - Cost)PU. It was apparent that persuading customers to 
accept the cost of tags was difficult, even when that cost represented a minimal 
investment relative to the price of the item being tagged. One actant related that he 
dealt with organisations that owned costly assets yet still took the position that “I’m 
not going to put a $20 tag on, that’s wasteful” (Finance - Cost)PR. 
This struggle to have the cost of RFID tags accepted became especially apparent when 
comparing the cost of RFID tagging against the older established bar coding systems. 
Bar coding was largely seen as being “free” as barcodes “cost… nothing or almost 
nothing, and you can print the label on the can… But, RFID tags cost a lot more even if 
you’re doing huge volumes you are still a few cents versus a fraction of a cent or less…” 
(Finance – Cost/Barcode Comparison)PR.  
Outside organisational boundaries, the allocation of the cost of RFID implementations 
between participating organisations was of concern to those attempting to extend the 
scope of their RFID systems. “If cost wasn’t an issue, of course everyone would do it” 
(Finance - Cost-Sharing)PU. This was often highlighted as cost was seldom spread 
evenly among organisational participants in an RFID system. In one instance 
participation in an implementation was limited as “there are other companies that 
were interested in participating but could not, or would not, have the funds...” 
(Finance – Cost Sharing)PR. 
The allocation of cost was of concern to the public sector, especially where 
compliance costs were imposed on organisations by the necessity to comply with RFID 
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based legislation. The importance of aligning costs with benefits gained by the use of 
RFID systems was highlighted by one public service actant who noted that his 
organisation was “very careful about imposing a compliance cost without really 
proving the benefit” (Finance Cost Imposition)PU. 
From the point of view of the private sector, these compliance costs were not always 
seen as justified. One private sector actant summarised the views of those involved in 
a legislated RFID system by pointing out that the system struggled because “the 
benefits were not focused on [private sector] benefits, but they [the public sector] 
expected the [private sector] to take a lot of the cost”PR. In these cases the private 
sector looked to the public sector to provide funding for RFID systems that were being 
mandated as described by one private sector actant: 
“…the industry wanted the ID system, and the industry wanted the 
government to legislate for it so it was mandatory. The system was a 
biosecurity insurance policy for the good of [our country]. Therefore, in my 
view, [our country] should pay for it, not just those implementing it". (Finance - 
Cost Imposition)PR 
In one legislated asset tracking example studied, some of the cost had been borne by 
the public sector. This cost sharing was considered to “make everybody more willing 
to come to the table” (Finance - Cost Sharing)PU. As a result the system had progressed 
more smoothly than had been expected. 
Criticality of the RFID system was also a factor in obtaining public sector funding for 
RFID systems. The level of importance of the system involved was seen to influence 
whether the public sector would contribute to, or even care about, the cost of the 
application: 
“...where the government is after RFID [it] usually goes after things, 
applications, that are extremely related to national security, and so to some 
extent this lack of sensitivity to cost is justified.” (Finance - Criticality)PR 
While finance seemed to be less of an issue for nationally critical applications, in other 
areas the public sector was attempting to be more cost efficient. This was seen to be 
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linked to the recent economic recession with one actant noting that “funding just kind 
of disappeared”PU on his RFID system when the recession hit (Finance - Funding) 
Further, the private sector perceived the public sector as being unwilling to finance 
RFID systems even when the business case was persuasive. In one instance a private 
sector system implementer related a case where he had sought public sector funding 
on a project where “…payback is one year, a one year payback. But it means investing 
3 to 5 billion dollars in order to get 3 to 5 billion dollars [in the first year], and oh by 
the way you get 3 to 5 billion every year in payback. You make a onetime investment 
with a minor operating [cost], and they are not going to do it” (Finance – Funding)PR. 
However, reluctance to spend on RFID implementation was not limited to the public 
sector. A private sector actant related the difficulties of balancing systems costs with 
the capability provided, and found that at times “we can inevitably solve the problem. 
[But], either it is going to cost some more money than what they want to spend; or 
the compromises we are going to put into effect are going to hurt them in other ways” 
(Finance - Funding)PR. Despite all of the discussion about cost, it was recognised that 
costs of RFID systems would decrease over time, as they had with other IT based 
technologies: 
“… the tags are too much, the tags don’t work well enough and the readers are 
far too expensive… with decades of watching how electronics develop my 
projection was, yes readers might be expensive today, they won’t be 
tomorrow…” (Finance – Cost Infrastructure)PR 
In summary, concerns about finance underpinned the entire RFID network through 
both public and private sectors. Where applications were perceived as critical, finance 
while still important was less of a factor. Strained economic times limited spending on 
both critical and more commonly, non-critical applications. More generally, the 
allocation of costs between organisations was also of concern with cost seldom being 
shared equally. The public sector was conscious of costs incurred where regulation or 
legislation led to the mandating of RFID applications. In many instances private sector 
organisations felt this cost should be borne by the public sector.  
146 
 
Code Description 
Finance – Cost Cost associated with the RFID network. 
Finance Cost /Barcode 
Comparison 
Comparison of the cost of RFID and Barcode systems. 
Finance – Cost Imposition 
How cost is imposed on one sector or organisation by 
another. 
Finance – Criticality 
Cost of RFID systems and willingness to pay, related to 
the criticality or otherwise of the system. 
Finance – Funding Funding/financing of RFID systems. 
Finance – Cost Infrastructure 
Cost of RFID related infrastructure including tags, 
readers, data storage etc. 
Finance – Cost Sharing 
Sharing and/or allocation of costs between members 
of the RFID system. 
Table 4: Code Table Finance 
5.1.2 Infrastructure 
Infrastructure was seen as fundamental to the RFID network, with the combination of 
RFID tags, readers, transmitters and data architecture providing the basis of network 
functionality. The effectiveness and efficiency of the network’s infrastructure affects 
the usefulness of the individual RFID systems as well influencing how users perceive 
the systems, even though users don’t always think about RFID infrastructure or realise 
its complexity. 
From the point of view of users, the importance of ease of use of RFID infrastructure 
was highlighted in a number of instances. Being able to “[easily] affix [a tag] without 
cost or training or anything else, and the tag will work 100% of the time”PU was 
considered highly desirable (Infrastructure – Tag). Simplicity of systems design was 
also valued: 
“… you have got to keep it absolutely as simple as possible. If you start trying 
to get clever with writing stuff and reading stuff then you put a lot more 
pressure on your physical layout, your processes, your speed and all the other 
things that come into it.” (Infrastructure – Design)PU 
Further barriers were related to configuration of various parts of the infrastructure 
including readers. In one public sector system the organisation struggled with “can it 
reach… does orientation matter” (Infrastructure – Design)PU. Difficulties were also 
encountered where systems were expected to operate in challenging environments 
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including “[around] metal and a lot of moisture laden environments, cold 
environments, environments where there might be a lot of machinery...” 
(Infrastructure – Environment)PR. 
Where the design of the RFID infrastructure was perceived as being poor, the 
organisations involved struggled to persuade employees to use systems. In a health 
care system, where multiple passwords were required to access asset information, 
difficulties were encountered with persuading employees to use the systems. Instead 
the project manager changed the hardware interface ensuring there was a “touch 
screen on every floor, so they can easily locate where [the asset] is and go there” 
(Infrastructure - Design)PU. This simple change resulted in much higher use and 
acceptance of the asset tracking system. 
Another important dimension of infrastructure ease of use was compatibility with 
partner systems. The use of infrastructure standards was seen to “make it a lot easier 
if what you’ve got looks similar to what they’ve got” (Infrastructure – Standards)PR. 
The standards used by other organisations also influenced infrastructure choice as 
other organisations were “moving towards RFID it made sense for us to do that as 
well…” (Infrastructure – Standards)PR. 
Cost of infrastructure was also of concern, as has been previously reported, although 
it was recognised that infrastructure costs would drop as the technology became more 
common, in a similar way to that seen with Internet infrastructure: 
“You harken back to the days before you could affordably put in a network. It 
was very expensive to put in a switch and a router and data was slow. I can still 
remember dial-up days. I think RFID is at that point where it is dial-up mode 
still for most users.” (Cost - Infrastructure)PR 
Problems also arose with the integration of RFID based data into existing enterprise 
systems, with “legacy systems that don’t provide for [data integration because] the 
data structures don’t comply or integrate easily with the systems or the solutions that 
they are looking for” (Infrastructure – Design)PR. The very nature of RFID data, and its 
high level of detail caused difficulties. As one organisation found: 
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“The technology is a lot more complicated, it is a bit more expensive initially. 
There are the issues... particularly around item level, ‘crickey I have got to 
capture that data, this is a level of granularity which I have never dealt with 
before. My ERP doesn’t support it...’” (Infrastructure – Design)PR 
Beyond issues arising with the implementation and operation of the technology itself, 
concerns were also expressed by individuals regarding possible health consequences 
from exposure to RF radiation. This was cited as a possible barrier to acceptance of 
RFID systems by an actant speaking on behalf of systems implementation, although 
solutions were proposed including “RFID gear could listen before talking...”PR, where 
the readers would not turn on and query tags until they were triggered (Infrastructure 
– Health Concerns). 
However, despite the issues outlined above, in general RFID based infrastructure was 
considered reliable to the point where one actant observed “RFID is yesterday’s news. 
It just happens to be RFID because it’s so well known, proven, reliable off the shelf 
stuff that works.” (Infrastructure)PR. 
In summary, infrastructure forms the framework of the RFID network. Although it is 
considered largely reliable, problems still occur with existing systems especially during 
systems implementation or in challenging environments. The importance of keeping 
the infrastructure design simple, and of standardising components as much as 
possible, was emphasised. This standardisation was seen as ensuring interoperability 
between organisational systems. In some ways, RFID networks were considered to be 
early in their development and parallels were drawn with the Internet where costs 
and technical problems experienced with Internet architecture eased over time.  
Infrastructure coding table follows: 
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Code Description 
Infrastructure Infrastructure associated with the RFID network. 
Infrastructure – Design 
Covers the design of the RFID system infrastructure, 
placement of equipment and simplicity. 
Infrastructure – Environment 
Environment in which the RFID infrastructure is 
operating, includes humidity, presence of metals, 
location etc. 
Infrastructure – Health Concerns 
Health concerns associated with human exposure to 
RFID systems. 
Infrastructure – Standards 
Standards related specifically to RFID infrastructure 
tags, readers, transmission spectrum. Does not 
include data. 
Infrastructure - Tag 
Infrastructure comments related specifically to RFID 
tags. 
Table 5: Code Table Infrastructure 
5.1.3 Standards 
“It’s hugely complex, just standards setting alone.”PR 
As discussed in the literature review, there is a significant body of research dedicated 
to the importance of standards in RFID systems, and indeed to standards in IT systems 
where integration across applications and platforms is required. The picture seen in 
the RFID network studied is also complex, as might be expected from the literature 
review. 
Standardisation of both software and hardware infrastructure was discussed. 
Hardware standards were seen to be important in ensuring interoperability of systems: 
“If you are part of the supply chain [and] they have a different reader, and 
different tags that it’s using, and yet I have to read every tag that comes in, 
with my reader. Therefore I need interoperability which is what the standard’s 
world was for.” (Standards - Hardware)PR 
Hardware standards were also seen as being important to ensure a minimum quality 
of hardware being used in RFID systems, mainly to ensure that systems worked with a 
“minimum standard of device…” (Standards – Hardware)PU.  
As with most elements of the RFID network, cost was also a factor driving the desire 
for common standardised infrastructure. Especially in the large systems where: 
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“The [organisation] doesn't want to have to use different infrastructure for 
RFID in the same place. It doesn't make sense at all, it is too expensive and 
difficult to maintain and so on. So it wants a standard and a consistent 
standard.” (Standards – Cost)PR 
Though it was noted by one actant that the standard needed to be flexible enough to 
make sure competition between suppliers was still possible ensuring “competitive 
pricing but not so much that the tags that [our members] ended up buying were 
worthless or didn’t work or they were told they had the wrong ones” (Standards – 
Cost)PR. 
Decisions surrounding standards setting were complex and contentious. Vendor 
organisations were perceived as not: 
“[caring] about standards. They care about the standards at the hardware level, 
that is are your tags compliant, and is your reader compliant… The vendor 
community don’t care about the data, they only care about does my tag work 
and can I read your tag with my readers” (Standards – Hardware)PR.  
Although this was not always the case with one actant being more concerned about 
data standards and sharing than hardware, pointing out that “it doesn’t matter if the 
RFID tags that my refrigerator reads are completely different from the ones my car 
reads, that doesn’t matter. What matters is that the communications techniques, [and 
the] data handling that we use becomes compatible at some point so that we can 
share information (Standards – Hardware)PR. 
At the international level standards were seen by one public sector actant as being 
“great if you could just pick one”PU. The actant also observed that compliance with 
standards “is not always very strong… as they are generally voluntary anyway” 
(Standards – Compliance)PU. 
In order to solve the problem of participation in particular RFID systems, the public 
sector had legislated involvement in some instances, dictating standards in order to 
ensure interoperability between systems, and mandating participation. In cases where 
legislation was passed, non-human documentary actants became essential to the 
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network as they formed the framework to which RFID systems had to comply. In 
respect of pressure brought to bear on the government to legislate in the case of RFID 
standards in health systems, one private sector actant observed that: 
“… they’re smart to say ‘government you have to cough [up] some kind of 
standard here’ because one corporation will have one, another corporation 
will have another etc, etc. So, when you have all those standards what you 
have is no standard.” (Standards – Compliance)PR 
The criticality of the system was seen to be a driver of public sector legislation and 
standards setting, as one actant, speaking on behalf of security observed “I see the 
government highly involved, they are proposing cryptographic standards and 
whatever, they are not sleeping on this one” (Standards – Criticality)PR. 
However, the public sector outside of the few public-private RFID systems, was seen 
as having “a general lack of understanding about any sort of standards”PR. This was 
also discussed by others, and connected to the lack of interoperability between 
different departments by a one actant who observed that government departments in 
the actant’s country had “standardised [department] ways of doing it, but they don’t 
standardise across [departments]” (Standards – Public Sector)PR. 
At a high level, political manoeuvring between countries was seen as being a barrier to 
standards setting with some countries reluctant to use standards set in other 
countries, even though the need for standards at the international level was 
recognised: 
“They know they need standards. No one wants just the [country 1] standards 
across [our association of countries]. You are never going to have [all our 
countries] agreeing to the [country 1] standards. They have got to find a way; 
so actually global standards [are] what everybody can agree to.” (Standards – 
International)PU. 
In some cases standards had been mandated by default through what were described 
as “trade requirements”PU. In these cases the use of particular systems or technologies 
was required before participation in the RFID system was permitted leading to a de 
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facto standard being in operation (Standards – Setting). This was seen across both 
public and private sector organisations, with well-publicised examples including the 
United States Department of Defense, and Wal-Mart systems. 
However, not all saw the need for standardisation. In the case of public sector 
departmental standards, the drive for single RFID data standards was seen as 
unnecessary “to install a one size fits all would sub-optimise what it is the 
[departments] are doing”PU. Similarly in the private sector it was considered by one 
actant that some systems “don’t need to adhere to anybody else’s system. It’s an in 
house closed loop thing and you can do whatever you like”PR. The internal nature of 
some private sector RFID systems was also considered to protect a certain amount of 
competitive advantage as private organisations did not want to run the risk of 
exposing proprietary information. When it came to supply chains in the private sector 
one actant speaking on behalf of standards discussed a number of instances where 
the actants organisation had “lost some customers that wanted to use [standards] 
because they suddenly realised that they are not committed to an open supply chain. 
They think that a proprietary approach is preferable because of the competitive risks 
around doing it in a standardised way”PR. The actant went on to outline the frustration 
felt with organisations that took this approach in their supply chains, pointing out that:   
“If you are trying to do traceability for any reason then you have a vested 
interest in having a standardised language to exchange information from 
upstream suppliers. Or what about downstream consumers that actually wish 
to be able to find out information in a standardised way?” (Standards – 
Proprietary)PR 
Similarly, in some public sector organisations proprietary systems were seen as being 
more secure with an actant pointing out that non-standard systems were less well 
known. This lack of familiarity meant “there’s virtually no known attacks that are 
around for this [system]”PR. Consequently organisations that wished to breach security 
on their proprietary system would have had to spend “hundreds of thousands if not a 
million dollars to just develop a requisite set of (attacks)” (Standards – Proprietary)PR. 
153 
 
In summary, standards were seen as extremely important within the RFID network 
and were seen to ensure interoperability, quality and lower costs. However, the need 
for standardisation was controversial to some extent, with parts of the network in the 
private sector preferring closed systems in order to gain competitive advantage. In the 
public sector some parts of the network liked proprietary systems as they felt they 
enhanced security. The selection of standards was also seen as being difficult with the 
number of standards available, and different partners preferring different standards 
being cited as problematic. Compliance with standards was variable, and the public 
sector had legislated standards in some instances to ensure compliance. In other cases, 
the standard was not legislated but was de facto mandatory as the standard had to be 
complied with before participation was possible in the RFID system. 
Code Description 
Standards – Compliance 
Why and how organisations comply or decide to 
comply with standards. 
Standards – Cost Cost of implementing standards specifically. 
Standards – Criticality 
The need for standards related to the criticality of the 
application. 
Standards – Hardware 
Standards, standards setting etc related to RFID 
systems hardware. 
Standards – International 
Standards at the international level, including 
international organisations. 
Standards – Proprietary 
Standards specific to a particular system, not 
designed or intended to be shared outside that 
system. 
Standards - Private Sector 
Standards related specifically to private sector 
attitudes, systems and knowledge 
Standards - Public Sector 
Standards related specifically to public sector 
attitudes, systems and knowledge 
Standards – Setting 
Setting of standards, including those shared between 
public and private sectors. 
Table 6: Code Table Standards 
5.1.4 Organisational Knowledge 
During the course of this study, it became apparent in the RFID network studied that 
the level of knowledge an organisation, and individuals, had about RFID systems was 
important. Although not every interviewee talked about the amount of knowledge an 
organisation had of RFID systems, and the literature only barely discusses it, the need 
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for organisational knowledge was especially apparent when implementing, or looking 
to implement RFID systems. The need for organisational knowledge was shown in 
several ways from the necessity to ensure every level of the organisation understood 
their RFID system, to the need to educate clients and users to achieve this.  
From the point of view of systems implementation, there was a need to ensure that 
systems owners understood and appreciated what they were installing, as well as 
having an understanding of the limitations of a particular system: 
“We always make sure our customers understand the technologies that they 
are getting into...what it’s going to provide you, what it’s not going to provide, 
and by the way all we are really doing is collecting data, we are not solving a 
problem. So in order to solve a problem we have to change some processes. 
That’s the kind of education that has to go ahead up front otherwise you’re 
going to end up doing it much later and then there’s going to be 
disappointment.” (Organisational Knowledge)PR 
The requirement for organisational knowledge was seen in both private (as above) 
and public sectors, as one actant observed “as with all things governmental we are 
spending a lot of our time just educating them on what that means, and how industry 
is using standardised identification for products today”PR. Even in organisations where 
there was some knowledge of RFID it was often necessary to educate higher level 
managers so they could “drive their systems in the same directions, and coordinate 
between them”PR. There was also a requirement to train those that were going to use 
the system in order to ensure “getting the data in right” (Organisational Knowledge – 
Training)PU. 
The need to educate regarding the data entry was coupled with a feeling that 
organisations on the whole didn’t “understand the effectiveness of the data and 
working with supply chain partners” (Organisational Knowledge)PR. 
Overall, the effort put into education had positive benefits especially in promoting 
involvement within the network as one actant found “I find you need to hand select 
who is going to participate and that they need to be educated in some sense, one to 
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understand the project and its implications, but also to have something to encourage 
participation.” (Organisational Knowledge)PR. 
Outside of the organisational use of RFID systems, there was also a recognised need to 
educate the general public about RFID technology and its use, to encourage 
acceptance and counter misinformation. Similar to the issue of the effect of RFID 
radiation on people, there was a reported perception amongst some individuals that 
RFID technology was going to be used to track individuals. One actant reported “every 
day I see somebody is talking about how RFID is the mark of the devil, how here in the 
US, new healthcare plan is going to require everybody to have [an] RFID chip 
embedded in them, and it goes on and on, and it’s all wrong. So, how do I help 
educate people, on the benefits of this?” (Organisational Knowledge – Public 
Perception)PR. This actant related how he countered misinformation with an effort to 
educate about the benefits of RFID:  
“I start asking questions like ‘how many of you have got frequent shopper 
cards in your wallet?’ ‘Do you realise they are tracking you with those frequent 
shopper cards?’ ‘How many of you have got a cell phone in your pocked – do 
you realise that you could be tracked with that?’; and in every case there will 
be people who go ‘oh I didn’t know that’. My answer is and it doesn’t matter 
does it because they’re not tracking you for bad reasons, it’s things that are 
being done to help you achieve what you want to achieve...” (Organisational 
Knowledge – Public Perception)PR 
In summary, the amount of knowledge an organisation had of RFID was found to 
reduce confusion around the implementation process. More knowledge also led to 
better outcomes for the RFID network in the form of understanding of the system, and 
better use of the data generated. Also an understanding of the business process 
change involved in the RFID systems assisted organisations with gaining full benefit 
from their implementation. From an individual point of view, education regarding RFID 
systems and capabilities was seen as necessary to counter negative perceptions 
regarding the technology.  
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Code Description 
Organisational Knowledge 
The amount of knowledge an organisation has related 
to RFID. 
Organisational Knowledge – 
Public Perception 
Perception the public has of RFID systems, and how 
organisations respond to that perception. Includes 
negative perceptions. 
Organisational Knowledge – 
Training 
Training provide to, or needed by, organisations in 
order to understand or use their RFID systems. 
Table 7: Code Table Organisational Knowledge 
5.2 Inter-Organisational Mediators 
Inter-organisational mediators were found influencing events between organisations. 
Although, like all mediators they could also act across the entire network, in many 
contexts, they acted predominantly in interactions between organisations or between 
organisations and other actants.  
5.2.1 Privacy 
Privacy was a multi-faceted mediator. It appeared across many aspects of the network 
from consideration of the privacy of individuals, to data and organisational privacy, or 
confidentiality. Despite these many aspects, privacy is still considered an inter-
organisational mediator as it was mainly active between organisations (or between 
organisations and individuals), rather than being considered of much concern within 
organisations. 
The need for understanding of the level of privacy protection required for data 
collected by RFID systems, and the purpose of collecting that data, were extensively 
discussed. A level of uncertainty about how to handle collected data was apparent 
even though all the countries covered by the network had privacy legislation of some 
description in place. However, the level of protection offered by the privacy legislation, 
and the requirements on organisations to protect the privacy of their customers was 
variable. 
This variable approach to privacy was seen to present difficulties where international 
borders were crossed by RFID networks: 
“We don’t really have a common international view or common legislation 
regarding the release of information provided for a particular purpose, or 
privacy constraints, and because we don’t have a common international view, 
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in the end most conversations around trade facilitation actually pivot on 
privacy as opposed to being facilitated by meeting privacy requirements.” 
(Privacy – International)PU 
Solutions to difficulties created by privacy concerns were considered to arise from 
having “a clear understanding of the purpose for which the information was collected” 
(Privacy – Purpose of Collection)PU. If a solution to the confusion surrounding 
international views on privacy definitions was to be found, it was seen to provide a 
platform on which other issues surrounding data and cost could be based: 
“Once you’ve solved the privacy question then you would think the data and 
price questions become more easily answered, because it’s much easier to talk 
about what the real value of the data is internationally when you overcome 
the issue of how we manage privacy.”PU  
As well as clearly understanding the purpose for which data was collected, the nature 
of the data being collected was also important. Data that could be connected to 
individuals or organisations was seen to require a degree of protection. Whereas, data 
that pertained merely to things was seen to be less sensitive. As pointed out by one 
actant “mangoes have no privacy, they are a vegetable or fruit... why would their 
privacy be infringed?” (Privacy – Nature of Data).PU 
The ability to understand the data being collected, and to design privacy solutions, 
was seen to rest on understanding “what the technology can do, what it can’t do, 
what it is designed to do, what it is designed not to do”PR. Although it was commonly 
recognised that this understanding was lacking in many organisations as one actant 
discussed “for most of [my customers] they don’t really know what’s going to happen 
and they don’t really know the implications of what they are doing”PR. The actant went 
on to outline how it “usually ends up in discussions about how [the data] is being 
used, have you thought about any privacy aspects for what you’re doing if that is even 
applicable” (Privacy).PR 
Once data had been collected, tailored access, limited to only those who needed to 
access it for work related purposes was also identified as a component of good 
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privacy. As a actant speaking on behalf of privacy explained “...if you have a database 
of all your customers you want to have that database only accessible by the people 
that need to access it for their jobs, you don’t want it to be completely open so that 
anyone in the [organisation] can dip in and out” (Privacy – Access)PU.  
Different issues arose where data collected by RFID systems was stored out of the 
country where it was collected, in cloud based or distributed databases, with the 
organisation collecting the information being seen as being accountable for the 
privacy of that information: 
“Just because they’ve stored it overseas, the [home] company is the one that 
collected it off the customers here, so the [home] company is the one that’s 
responsible for that information.” (Privacy – Data Storage)PU 
Privacy legislation was also a strong actant in this sense, with various legislations 
setting out the rights and expectations of individuals in relation to their personal 
information, where it was collected by IT systems including RFID systems. These 
various privacy and enabling acts were important participants, and immutable mobiles 
in the network, as were guidelines produced by organisations themselves as to how to 
handle customer information.  
The sector of the organisation also played a part in the organisations approach to 
privacy. The public sector was seen to be more sensitive to privacy concerns than the 
private sector, “...the public sector may have issues around privacy whereas in the 
private sector issues of privacy while they are known, they are not so much of an 
issue” (Privacy – Sector Differences)PR. In part this difference was considered to occur 
because of the nature of the information being held by public agencies as 
“governments need to more carefully understand the privacy implications than private 
sector companies that sell to other businesses (as opposed to consumers).”PR This 
understanding clearly ties back to the need to understand the nature of the data that 
is being collected by RFID systems (Privacy – Nature of Data). 
The lack of choice (or voluntariness) individuals face in the provision of information to 
public agencies was also seen as a reason for the increased sensitivity of public sector 
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agencies towards privacy. Individuals were able to choose whether to interact with a 
private organisation whereas there was no choice with the public sector organisations, 
“if [the government] muck up how they handle your information, you’ve still got to 
keep handing them information...” (Privacy – Voluntariness).PR This also applied to 
RFID systems where involvement was legislated. Public agencies within the network 
were careful to ensure the nature and types of information collected were separated 
and defined by the enabling act: 
“Under the [enabling] legislation it is very clear in the purposes of the Act what 
exactly information collected can be used for, and it is very narrow... There is 
an entire section within it around rights of access to information and it quite 
clearly separates the personal from the impersonal, non-personal.” (Privacy – 
Legislation)PU 
However, from the private sector point of view, industry generally preferred to self-
regulate privacy, with one actant being of the opinion that “an important thing for us 
for the next probably two years is ensuring that governments don’t step in and 
legislate or mandate [privacy] things that are not necessarily in the best interests...”.PR 
This self-regulation, coupled with data sharing agreements between partners was 
seen to facilitate information sharing as “you can get around the privacy concerns and 
everything else around the use of data because [organisations] should be in 
arrangements with their suppliers that [sharing of data] is okay to happen” (Privacy – 
Self-regulation).PR 
In summary privacy was seen as an issue that is still to be resolved, especially in an 
international context. The different views various countries and organisations have 
about privacy was seen as an inhibitor to trade. However, some solutions were 
apparent within the network, especially where systems were based on data that was 
well understood, and procedures controlling access were in place. The public sector 
was found to be more sensitive to privacy issues than the private sector, possibly 
because of the nature of the data collected or the lack of voluntariness in its provision. 
Industry on the other hand preferred to self-regulate, maintaining confidence through 
partner agreements.  
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Code Description 
Privacy 
General discussion of privacy associated with the RFID 
network. 
Privacy – Access Access to information or data, in the privacy context. 
Privacy – Data Sharing 
Relates to the privacy issues surrounding the sharing 
of data and information between organisations or 
individuals. 
Privacy – International International privacy related issues. 
Privacy – Data Storage 
Privacy issues surrounding the storage of data, 
including jurisdiction. 
Privacy – Legislation Privacy Legislation, development and application. 
Privacy – Nature of Data 
The nature of data being collected or stored in RFID 
systems. Its origin and sensitivity. 
Privacy – Private Sector Privacy in the private sector context. 
Privacy – Public Sector Privacy in the public sector context. 
Privacy – Purpose of Collection 
The purpose for which data was collected, or about 
the relevance of purpose of collection. 
Privacy – Sector Differences 
Highlights the differences between sectors in their 
treatment of privacy related issues. 
Privacy – Self-regulation 
Self-regulation of privacy matters, as opposed to 
legislated regulation. 
Privacy - Voluntariness 
Covers the voluntariness of interaction with the public 
sector. 
Table 8: Code Table Privacy 
5.2.2 Security 
Security is considered to be a network mediator because of the different levels of the 
network at which security appears as a concern. From the consumer worrying about 
whether they will be tracked via an embedded RFID device, to the network security 
manager concerned about possible hacker intrusions, security appears as central to 
the RFID network. 
Security displayed a number of different aspects depending on which layer of the RFID 
network was concerned. At the tag layer the necessity to ensure that “tag information 
is not available for everyone…”PR was of concern. From the database perspective it 
was important to balance information availability with “…how tightly do you have to 
lock [information] down”PR as well as appreciating the different approaches to 
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database location asking the question “do you centralise a database so that is better 
protected than using a distributed data approach?”.PR In any event the necessity to 
address each layer of the network individually was emphasised by an actant speaking 
on behalf of security, who pointed out “…it’s quite important that you secure for each 
of those layers in a way that’s appropriate to that layer.” (Security)PR 
However, an in-depth understanding of the use of tags and data was seen as being 
integral to understanding the level of security required. In some instances it was 
considered un-necessary to secure information. In the case of an organisational 
vehicle identification program one actant observed that the actant’s organisation 
“don't really care if our tags get used for somebody else’s entry point”.PU  
Nor was security considered necessary in the case of information that was already 
publicly available, although security of the systems holding that information still 
needed consideration: 
“Agencies are required to protect Official Information as well as any other 
information they hold. In practical terms this means protecting the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of the information and supporting 
systems. Where published information and public websites are concerned the 
confidentiality principle is less relevant to the information itself but will still 
apply to the systems and systems management.” (Security – Necessity)PU 
The nature of the asset being protected was also important in the consideration of 
security with one actant pointing out that “nobody has asked us to secure library 
books”,PR although it is worth noting that RFID is commonly used in library 
applications. (Security – Necessity) 
The public sector was generally seen as being more sensitive to the need for security, 
especially when interaction was required between non-secure and secure systems. 
One private sector actant described a project worked on where the public sector 
unsecured system would have been required to communicate with a secured system, 
and that RFID system failed as the organisation “balked because there was a need to 
communicate data upward from an unsecured to a secured environment, and they 
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didn’t want the two touching” (Security – Public Sector).PR Although it was generally 
observed that public sector entities were more sensitive to privacy, some private 
sector entities were also security conscious. This largely depended on the nature of 
the private sector organisation, the type of data they dealt with, and the use of the 
RFID system they had installed, “I have some financial services customers in the 
private sector, and medical sector, they are highly sensitive to security” (Security – 
Private Sector).PR 
Further, from the public sector side in terms of using RFID systems for secure 
identification and compliance “The challenge for RFID or anything else in this space is 
to be sufficiently unique and carry sufficient data that people in compliance roles 
absolutely understand what they are dealing with and know that it is a legitimate 
consignment” (Security – Necessity).PU 
However, the overall importance of at least some level of security was emphasised 
even where the application might not be thought to be particularly sensitive, as an 
attack on an organisations’ computer network could disable their systems. One actant 
discussed the various ways RFID systems could be compromised and pointed out “I 
can actually bring your warehouse down if I send stuff that you’ve seen two weeks ago, 
your SAP system is going to cough that up real quick” (Security – Necessity).PR The 
actant went on to discuss future use of RFID systems, particularly the Internet of 
Things model, where the actant warned that even home owners would have to think 
about how RFID systems worked, and how various elements of their households 
interacted:   
“With the Internet of Things it’s going to be a lot more complicated, and you 
also now have to think about how your appliances are going to interact with 
other people in your home, visitors, guests and so on, or maybe your cleaning 
services or your plumber… if your plumber is alone in the house and your 
fridge opens, or your jewellery box, you would want to monitor that very 
strictly.” (Security – Internet of Things)PR 
Despite security being seen as critical by those that discussed it, not every interviewee 
mentioned security, or the security of their systems. This may not be too surprising 
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given that it was also recognised that security was not always central to every RFID 
system, “this is true for most information technologies that I know, that security is 
always an afterthought.” (Security).PR 
In summary, security was seen as being essential to some RFID systems, depending on 
the sensitivity of the data being held. The public sector was perceived as being more 
security conscious, although where data would be considered sensitive, both sectors 
were aware of security concerns. The perceived need for security very much turned on 
the nature of data being held, and the items being secured. However, the need to 
secure apparently non critical items was not always understood as the organisational 
effects of security threats were not always appreciated. Nor was the need to secure 
systems in order to ensure data integrity where the RFID generated data might be 
expected to play a part in authenticating the item being tagged. 
Code Description 
Security Security of or associated with the RFID network. 
Security – Internet of Things 
Security related specifically to the RFID in the Internet 
of Things context. 
Security – Necessity The necessity of security in particular RFID systems. 
Security – Private Sector Security in the private sector context. 
Security – Public Sector Security in the public sector context. 
Table 9: Code Table Security 
5.2.3 Trust 
Trust was seen as necessary both between individuals and organisations, and between 
human and non-human actants in the form of infrastructure and data. Although trust 
is often seen as being connected with privacy and security, it is treated separately in 
this analysis as this is largely the way it was discussed by the various human actants. 
Trust was perceived as the foundation of RFID based automatic identification with the 
view that “… we will only automate to the degree that we trust”PR was expressed 
(Trust). Trust in the accuracy, timeliness and comprehensiveness of data produced by 
RFID systems was necessary before either organisations, or individuals, found the data 
useful. One actant advised customers to:  
164 
 
“...focus on the data rather than on individuals or organisations. If you can 
show that the data has been collected in a manner that is more timely, more 
accurate and more complete than before, then this will generate overall trust 
in the RFID supported environment” (Trust – Accuracy).PR 
Where data was inaccurate trust could be lost, as was described in relation to a weight 
based application “...the worst case is that it comes back showing that our site was 
inaccurate which is just going to really hurt us in terms of them in the future believing 
us” (Trust – Accuracy).PU It was also noted that when RFID based data revealed 
process problems trust could be lost as the data was considered to be inaccurate, 
even if it actually wasn’t. One actant related experiences where “implementing an 
RFID system into processes often reveals flaws, sometimes serious ones, with the 
existing processes. The owners of those flawed processes don’t generally react very 
favourably to this and will often proclaim that the RFID data is wrong and can’t be 
trusted” (Trust – Accuracy).PR 
Even between two non-human actants, a loss of trust in the form of authenticated 
accurate data (generally due to security breakdowns) led to problems within the 
network as “...it doesn't take more than defeating one or two percent of the global 
tracking before the whole system shuts down simply because it doesn't know which 
[data] to trust and which not to trust any longer” (Trust – Loss).PR 
It was also necessary at times to prove the reliability of infrastructure through 
independent checking. In a cold chain application the need to prove “with 
independent data that you are maintaining controls over the transportation process, 
so we know you are not reducing shelf life or causing other types of problems in our 
shipments…”PR was seen as essential (Trust). However, once trust was established 
there were clear benefits. In a trade based application, trusted data allowed an 
organisation to “trust that’s where [the item] came from and just let it go.” (Trust)PU 
Relationships between the various actants was seen to turn on the amount of trust 
between them, “whether it's a government or an SME, the fact is that making things 
work between those entities really does depend on that trustful relationship” 
(Trust).PU 
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In terms of the relationship between sectors, in one instance where a large application 
covering many different private sector entities (as well as the public sector) needed to 
be developed, the public sector was approached to build the application as it was 
perceived as being more trustworthy. One actant in this system observed “… industry 
is always concerned about it being well run and the information not being misused, so 
they always look to government agencies to do it” (Trust – Between Sectors).PU This 
trust was fostered by organisations being clear about the data being collected, and 
protected by the various privacy acts, as “public trust is quite important and it’s the 
perception of trust as well, it’s not just ticking the boxes in the Act, it’s being able to 
keep people happy” (Trust Building).PU  
Familiarity between actants was also seen as building trust, with a number of actants 
mentioning their previous experience with partner organisations as being an 
important element of building trusted relationships. For example a public sector 
actant observed that the actant had “an advantage in a sense in my role because I 
came out of industry,… so, having that familiarity makes a big difference around 
building trust too”.PU As was being involved in the process of forming and running the 
network, and being able to “talk amongst each other a lot and participate in joint 
initiatives a lot, and network a lot, and have a lot of industry stakeholder groups that 
talk with each other” (Trust – Building).PU 
Organisationally, willingness to behave in a collaborative manner was seen to be 
important. One actant compared some of the organisations he dealt with and noted 
that: 
“…some other [organisations] around town are quite adversarial antagonistic 
and unhelpful and obstructive and we don’t know how to trust them. Another 
body will be completely different and we feel a level of trust.” (Trust – 
Building)PU 
The actant saw this as being partly linked to the “maturity of the organisation again, 
and the players”.PU Interestingly, the actant also reflected that in a particular instance 
where the network formation was critical trust was able to form immediately: 
166 
 
“...I guess the obvious thing there is the ‘you’re at war’ kind of thing, so a sense 
of urgency. Sense of urgency can create trust, whereas in peacetime, you don’t 
have that sense of urgency so everybody wants to play and it takes a lot of 
time to build the trust around being able to know that you’re getting the 
honest discussions.” (Trust – Building)PU 
In the long term a lack of trust, especially by public agencies, was seen as inhibiting 
the formation of a more expansive Internet of Things RFID network. Discussing the 
need for trust between organisations and sectors to enable the kind of data sharing 
that formation of the Internet of Things would require, an actant suggested: 
“While the Internet of Things might be seen as a no brainer someone’s got to 
operate this global system and be trusted... This is a global responsibility and 
maybe that is a bridge too far for some people or organisations especially 
within the context of government.” (Trust – Internet of Things)PR 
In summary, trust was seen as necessary for the RFID network to form, and to be 
useful. Trust displayed three aspects, trust in data, trust in infrastructure, and trust in 
and between organisations (and/or individuals). This trust was fostered by familiarity 
as well as ‘trusting behaviours’ such as honesty, collaboration and being involved in 
the network. The presence of clear guidelines, and legislation, was also seen to 
engender trust. On the other hand, lack of honesty and poor behaviour diminished 
trust.  
Code Description 
Trust 
General discussion of trust associated with the RFID 
network. 
Trust – Between Sectors Trust between public and private sector entities. 
Trust – Building 
The building of trust between organisations and 
individuals. 
Trust – Internet of Things Trust in the context of the Internet of Things. 
Trust – Loss Loss of trust between organisations and individuals. 
Table 10: Code Table Trust 
5.2.4 Data Sharing 
The RFID network studied fell short of the idealised Internet of Things model discussed 
in the literature review. Data was not shared across the network, instead data sharing 
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was limited to individual RFID systems operating between public and private sector 
organisations, or even to individual organisations within a system. A number of 
reasons for this were apparent. A lack of willingness to share data was observed. 
Between public and private organisations data flowed predominantly in one direction: 
“...if the government uses commercial data it’s for referenced data feeds not 
for action type data feeds... I can’t think of any circumstances where the 
government provides out, in the things that I deal with I cannot think of any 
times where they feedback data to a commercial system.” (Data Sharing – 
Cross Sector)PR 
Within the public sector context there was also a reluctance to share data between 
secure and non-secure data sets as was observed in one application where there was 
“a need to communicate data upward from an unsecured to a secured environment 
and [the organisation] didn’t want the two touching” (Data Sharing – Secure to Non-
Secure).PR 
Despite this reluctance to share data, a number of successful systems in which some 
data was shared were observed within the network. A number of factors were noted 
that facilitated the sharing of data within RFID systems, including the use of the non-
human actant of legislation by the public sector to outline the boundaries of 
information sharing. Further, public sector organisations were conscious of privacy 
legislation affecting how data could be collected, used and shared. A public sector 
actant discussed how data needed to be treated within an agency pointing out: 
“If you have a database of all your customers you want to have that database 
only accessible by the people that need to access it for their jobs. You don’t 
want it to be completely open and anyone in the agency can dip in and out” 
(Data Sharing - Privacy).PU 
A number of strategies to facilitate data sharing were used, or suggested, within the 
network. These included the use of standardised data formats in order to lessen the 
cost of data sharing, and increase interoperability of organisational systems. This was 
seen within organisations where there was a need to “exchange data and the only way 
168 
 
to do it is via industry standards, where we exchange information at the lowest 
possible cost” (Data Sharing).PR 
Between jurisdictions one actant explained that the “focus at the moment is actually 
on data, so the problem is [ensuring] compliance with international standards on 
types of information that are declared to [authorities]”.PU Where different jurisdictions 
were involved in exchanging data, the lack of commonality around a definition of 
privacy presented a challenge to data sharing as has previously been discussed in the 
privacy section. One public sector actant suggested “if you are going to create those 
business to business relationships there have to be some accepted rules around how 
the data will be managed and how the owners understand it will be managed. If you 
don’t have those then in effect the value proposition starts to vanish pretty quickly” 
(Data Sharing).PU 
In the private sector the use of linked data, which could be shared based on 
permissions, was seen as a source of competitive advantage by one actant whose 
organisation “want[s] to link whole supply chains and make the data available to 
anyone with appropriate permissions, based on the originator of the data” (Data 
Sharing – Cross Jurisdiction).PR 
Despite this, not all actants were seen by others as caring about using standards to 
facilitate data sharing, either in the private sector where one actant stated “...there 
are a lot of vendors out there that don’t give a rat’s about standards” (Data Sharing – 
Private Sector)PR; nor in the public sector where a private sector actant contracting to 
the public sector observed “six different solutions and six different protocols. But 
because the data stays within their vertical pipeline, we don’t care what their protocol 
is... All we care about is what the data looks like when it shows up on our door” (Data 
Sharing – Public Sector).PR 
In less specific application areas, anonymisation of data was suggested so it could still 
be shared without identifying organisations or individuals as: 
“You have got none of those benefits that come from data shared, but you 
could find a way of doing it so that there isn’t the risk that your direct 
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competitor can find out what you’re doing...anonymised across all of the 
manufacturers in [our country].” (Data Sharing – Anonymisation)PR 
In summary, there were a number of inhibitors to data sharing within RFID systems. 
These included an unwillingness in both public and private sectors to share data. This 
lack of willingness was seen to be related to concerns about security and privacy in the 
public sector, while the private sector was concerned about competitive advantage. 
The need for common rules and definitions was highlighted, especially where different 
jurisdictions were involved. The lack of these guidelines was seen to hinder data 
sharing. Apart from the establishment of standards, careful access to datasets based 
on profiles, or even anonymisation of data were seen as ways to maintain data sharing 
without breaching privacy or confidentiality requirements. 
Code Description 
Data Sharing Data sharing associated with the RFID network. 
Data Sharing – Anonymisation 
Anonymisation of data could lead to increased data 
sharing. 
Data Sharing – Cross Sector Data sharing across sectors. 
Data Sharing – Privacy 
Privacy issues related specifically to the sharing of 
data and information. 
Data Sharing – Secure to Non 
Secure 
Sharing of data and information between secure and 
non secure environments. 
Data Sharing – Cross Jurisdiction Privacy Legislation, development and application. 
Table 11: Code Table Data Sharing 
5.3 Intra-Organisational Mediators 
Intra-organisational mediators were found predominantly in interactions within 
organisations, where they influenced the internal organisational action around RFID 
networks. Again like the other mediators they could also act at inter-organisational or 
network level, and they were most commonly found within organisations.  
5.3.1 Organisational Management 
Within organisations there is a significant amount of work done to plan for, implement 
and manage RFID systems. The organisational management mediator covers those 
aspects of the management of individual organisations that can affect the organisation 
itself, rather than the whole RFID system, or RFID network at a higher level. This 
mediator covers a broad spectrum of organisational management from leadership, 
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change management, organisational culture, and personnel management to features 
of the organisation such as size, which affect its performance.  
The most critical aspect of organisational management was identified as being the 
right leadership for RFID projects, implementations and systems. Top management 
support was considered essential to achieving good outcomes with one actant 
describing systems in which the actant was involved “…where we have had success 
there has been an individual who had their head screwed on the right way at the top 
of the project, and knew what they wanted and..., we gained their confidence”.PR 
Where he was involved with a less supportive management structure, he noted that 
the project became difficult to deliver and was of the opinion that “you get better and 
better at going ‘I think we should just walk away from this ‘cause we are going to 
waste our time with this...’” (Organisational Management – Management Support).PR 
Thus it was recognised as important to get management and staff on board at the 
beginning of an RFID project as outlined by one actant speaking on behalf of systems 
implementation: 
“I like to have the decision makers involved early on to make sure they 
understand where we’re going and we like to start bringing in the people doing 
the work, getting them to buy in to doing this. There’s kind of [a] two sided 
problem and the first is if we don’t have the decision makers and the money 
holders involved it can’t happen to start with. Then if we don’t have the people 
actually doing it on board with the program it gets sabotaged or from another 
bunch of reasons it doesn’t happen.” (Organisational Management – 
Management Support)PR 
The benefits13 of RFID systems made good selling points as was “trying to just 
articulate simple wins for people”PU as one actant found in his asset tracking system. 
When the RFID system was clearly explained so those having to use the system saw it 
as a “win”, or where they perceived their jobs were getting easier, acceptance of the 
system by staff was higher. At the lower level an actant had emphasised to staff how 
                                                     
13
 Benefits as a mediator are discussed in the Benefits/Business case section. 
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“their lives were getting better”PU and their jobs easier as a result of the system, in 
order to encourage staff buy in (Organisational Management – Staff).  
However, at times it was necessary to compromise in order to keep people “at the 
table”. One actant discussed the complexity of dealing with multiple organisations and 
trying to get agreement, the actant had found that if some issues were: 
“…pushed too hard too early it all would have fallen over into disarray. So 
some things were just taken off the agenda until those [organisational] bodies 
felt they would be in a place to be able to have… the discussion with their 
members” (Organisational Management – Agreement).PU 
In some organisations governance changed regularly. In these instances the level of 
interest in RFID systems, and the business strategy around them, also varied as one 
actant had found in his organisation “the reasons for our interest have changed largely 
because every few years we refresh our governance…”.PR At times change in 
governance also led to the re-visiting of previous decisions, with the result that 
“without the continuity of funding, and more particularly lack of continuity of 
personnel, we would sort of start going round re-litigating things which had been 
previously decided”.PR Change in governance was also identified as a particular 
problem in the public sector as “there is a political landscape that you need to have 
consideration of and a three year cycle that sits within that. So that can obviously 
impact a lot of different priorities” (Organisational Management – Governance).PR  
At the project management level the lack of “clear project management”PU was seen 
to cause one project to have “a lot of false starts with the ability of the people 
involved”.PU In one instance where an organisation was “unable to find a program 
manager to manage it”PR the RFID system failed. Retaining experienced staff that 
worked on RFID systems was also identified as problematic. Where key staff or 
management left, systems were seen to “stall” or even fail, with one actant relating an 
instance where “the guy [who was managing the implementation] left and that stalled 
[the project] for two years”.PU Bad documentation was seen to exacerbate this 
problem as “somebody leaves and nobody knows what they were doing, so that’s 
where the main drive for documentation is [coming from]” (Organisational 
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Management – Staff).PU One actant also described how RFID systems were rejected at 
times because managers were scared of the technology noting “if they are frightened 
of it enough they will find a reason why it’s not the right thing” (Organisational 
Management – Management Support).PR 
It was widely recognised in the network that implementation of RFID systems resulted 
in organisations having to undertake what was described as “some process changes, 
different ways of doing a job, to make allowances for the technologies”.PR This change 
wasn’t always viewed positively by organisations with one actant citing examples 
where: 
“I’ve had people tell me point blank we can’t change our processes, and my 
answer is then, then you cannot do this with this, nearly always, because it’s 
really hard to implement our kinds of systems without changing their 
processes…If you come up against someone who says ‘oh no, I can’t change 
the way we do business’ then I can tell pretty much from the start that this is 
not going to be a good project to be involved in.”PR 
Another actant, also discussing the amount of change an organisation was required to 
undertake, noted the importance of: 
“keeping it simple, not getting carried away with any kind of strange ideas, 
[asking] how do we keep it simple, how does this go to the lowest common 
denominator of people who need to issue it, who don't need to think hard, 
how do you use existing process without too much change…” (Organisational 
Management – Change).PU 
It was also noted that organisations seldom appreciated the management problems 
they had before their RFID systems were implemented. The implementation of RFID 
systems assisted with both the highlighting of, and development of, solutions to these 
problems. One actant speaking on behalf of systems implementation was of the 
opinion that “I think most companies, certainly that I see, have a problem, they have 
no real understanding of their problem in many cases, and they certainly have no 
173 
 
understanding of the methods to solve their problem” (Organisational 
Management).PR  
The need to get more than just the technology side of an RFID implementation correct 
was emphasised by a number of respondents, with one actant summarising challenges 
faced by the actants system which included “getting the technology to work, getting 
the breeding right, getting the harvest right, getting the shipping cold chain 
management right, getting the marketing right”.PR Even so, RFID systems were found 
to be only a part, but not all of, the solution to these business problems as one actant 
found “we are still in this [way of] thinking that RFID was going to solve it all. [We] 
have not understood or embraced that it is just part of a solution, it is not the solution.” 
(Organisational Management).PR 
Size of organisations was also seen to present challenges to RFID systems. Larger 
organisations, especially in the public sector, needed to produce solid business cases 
to support any change to business processes. One public sector actant described the 
difficulties of implementing RFID in “massive” organisations and noted that, “bringing 
about change in one of those supply chains, you have to have a very compelling use 
case and it’s just very difficult pretty much, unlike in the private sector”.PU One private 
sector actant saw larger organisations as having an advantage as they could have 
“people whose job it is purely to deal with the process of doing business”.PR In the 
public sector smaller public sector organisations were seen by a public sector actant as 
being more “agile”, whilst at the same time having to “try to do things once well and 
make [them] serve many purposes” (Organisational Management).PU 
Many actants also discussed the impact of organisational policies on staff. It was 
noted by a private sector actant that public sector staff: 
“…do not have the career pressure of ‘if this goes wrong I’ll be fired’ and I think 
that makes a big difference in implementing technology, and you see the 
public sector also is in a way an early adopter in innovation, in most 
categories”.PR 
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Although another private sector actant saw the opposite, with public sector staff being 
less hard working and unlikely to innovate as the rewards that occur in the private 
sector “[do] not happen in the public sector and… it’s not looked upon as a good thing 
if they are proactive or initiate new things or whatever, which is why much of the 
bureaucracy becomes stagnant” (Organisational Management – Staff).PR 
In contrast, the hire and fire mentality of the private sector was seen as making long 
term decisions around RFID systems difficult with one private sector actant observing: 
“people are really, especially in [my country] are really afraid of being fired. 
The hire and fire mentality certainly makes for a very difficult culture when it 
comes to making long term type decisions, or even risky decisions and 
knowingly doing so”.PR 
Differences in work habits of staff between public and private sector organisations 
was further contrasted by a private sector actant who considered that “in the private 
sector and dealing with private companies, even on just this project alone the speed 
with which the private partners can move, make decisions and changes, is just 
lightning speed compared to government” (Organisational Management – Staff).PR 
In summary, the importance of leadership was emphasised in the network, with 
strong leadership being associated with success. It was necessary to get top 
management on board at the start of any implementation, and to be aware that as 
governance changed so did management attitudes towards RFID systems. The 
willingness of an organisation to change processes affected the outcome of RFID 
implementations, with those that were unprepared to change either finding 
implementation difficult, or not reaping full benefits from their RFID system. The way 
staff were treated within an organisation was also of influence, with the hire and fire 
attitude of the private sector seen to inhibit innovation. Contrastingly, the job security 
perceived to be enjoyed by the public sector was seen to slow organisational 
processes and lead to ‘bureaucracy’.  
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Code Description 
Organisational Management 
Organisational management associated with the RFID 
network. 
Organisational Management – 
Agreement 
Organisational management involved in getting 
agreement. 
Organisational Management – 
Change 
How organisations deal with the issues and 
complexities surrounding the changes required by 
RFID implementation. 
Organisational Management – 
Governance 
How governance affects RFID systems. 
Organisational Management – 
Management Support 
How support from various management layers affects 
RFID implementation and system. 
Organisational Management – 
Staff 
How the treatment and attitudes of staff affect RFID 
networks. 
Table 12: Code Table Organisational Management 
5.3.2 Data Management 
Although decisions regarding data standards, sharing and privacy are made at the 
inter-organisational level, data management is still a significant mediator within the 
RFID network, and thus is treated as separate from the data sharing decisions. This 
mediator is intra-organisational as decisions regarding management of organisation 
specific data, or decisions made as a result of data reporting occur within the 
organisation and largely do not appear to impact on other parts of the network. 
Conversely, decisions regarding data privacy or sharing have implications for other 
organisations within the RFID network. 
Underlying the usefulness of any data to an organisation is the appropriateness of that 
data. It is important to have the right data, as “[it] is becoming very obvious that RFID 
doesn’t work without having the right data...” (Data Management – Data Quality).PR 
The importance of understanding the data received was also emphasised as “it comes 
back to what does the data mean? What are you actually capturing and what are you 
going to do with it, and not focusing solely on the technology.”PR This was a point 
made by a number of actants who saw that there was significant value in 
understanding data generated by RFID systems, as one actant found “The industry is 
recognising that the accumulation of data over time will be an extraordinarily valuable 
asset, and potentially industry wide has lots of other uses...” (Data Management).PR 
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The importance of aligning RFID generated data with business process in order to turn 
data into “business intelligence” was noted by one actant, who also highlighted that 
“all you have is an expensive data carrier” if the data is not used properly by 
organisations”.PR Similarly, the ability to actually use RFID data, “connecting the dots… 
about [how] we can read data coming off a tag, can we align it with a process and then 
start making better business decisions about that process”PR was also seen as being 
crucial to the utility of systems. RFID data was also seen to be important in 
highlighting organisational risk, in order to “see what’s successful and start to exclude 
the things that they find weren’t a risk, and more and more sharpen that tool towards 
what is a risk.” (Data Management – Using Data)PU 
It was the more reliable collection of data that was seen as being the major advantage 
of an RFID system by one actant, “so most people think technology solves problems, in 
fact it very rarely does, what solves the problem is the more reliable collection of data 
that goes on.”PR 
Despite the advantages, there were still difficulties recognised in using RFID data, 
notably an unwillingness by organisations to accept data that was interpreted as 
negative. One actant outlined his experience where RFID systems highlighted flaws in 
business processes “the owners of those flawed processes don’t generally react very 
favourably to this and will often proclaim that the RFID data is wrong and can’t be 
trusted” (Data Management – Negative Data).PR 
In summary, although data management was closely tied to data sharing it was seen 
to be more aligned with internal business processes and practices. It was found that 
the data generated by RFID systems was not always put to good use, and that 
organisations struggled to know how to deal with the data as opposed to the 
technology itself. In order to gain maximum benefit from data, it was necessary to 
have high quality and accurate data, which was then useful in directing business 
processes.  
Data management coding table follows: 
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Code Description 
Data Management Data management associated with the RFID network. 
Data Management – Data 
Appropriateness 
How the nature of the data being gathered and its 
appropriateness to the task for which it is being used. 
Data Management – Negative 
Data 
How data that is perceived to be negative is received 
by the organisation. 
Data Management – Using Data The specifics of using data generated by RFID systems. 
Table 13: Code Table Data Management 
5.3.3 Benefits/Business Case 
While benefits realisation might be considered part of the finance mediator, it was 
quite clear that the RFID network separated the costs of RFID systems from the 
benefits they derived, and that the benefits of RFID systems were generally realised 
within organisations rather than at the network level. Although benefits were outlined 
in the business cases produced by organisations, they were not always the same as 
the benefits derived by organisations, thus the separate discussion of business case 
and benefits which follows. 
The reported benefits of an RFID system were numerous and included (but were not 
limited to): 
 Better supply chain control, as outlined by one actant who found that the 
biggest benefit from his organisation’s RFID system was the ability to “maintain 
quality”PR, achieved through the “supply chain insight”PR offered by RFID. 
 More efficient industrial processing, and the ability to “build more correct 
things and less things that are not correct”.PR 
 Determination of business risk as “being able to efficiently capture information 
to then determine risk profiles...”PU was a major advantage of RFID systems 
(Benefits). 
Although more efficient and effective internal organisational processes were found to 
be one of the benefits of RFID implementation, where organisations were unwilling to 
change processes they often failed to realise the benefits of their RFID systems. As one 
actant related “if you just change out the data capture mechanism and you don't 
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change those internal processes, and you don't change what you are sharing, the 
business benefits get lost…”PR  
It was also apparent that many organisations discovered these benefits over time, 
rather than benefits being apparent when the system was planned, or even when the 
planned RFID system became operational. As one actant explained: 
“My personal feeling is that a lot of the best benefits of a technology turn out 
to be serendipitous, it’s the stuff that we didn’t necessarily think of. Even the 
barcode... was only ever sold as offset to the cost of labour in 
marking/remarking stuff on the shelf – That was the return on investment. The 
biggest savings to the barcode today come from inventory management, not 
labour.” (Benefits – Discovery/Realisation).PR 
This apparent delay appeared to be related to organisations not clearly linking the 
issues they were attempting to address with appropriate solutions, RFID based or not, 
with one actant discussing how the: 
“…social, political issues are remaining unresolved just as the technological 
issues are, and they’re not coming together they are just trucking on in 
parallel. So, maybe disconnected isn’t the right word but, they are not 
reinforcing each other they are running side by side. So they, they’re each on 
their own paths.”PR 
This actant went on to discuss the issue of how an organisation derived benefit and 
which organisation in the RFID network derived it, stating “what will become 
interesting is who benefits when and how, and who doesn’t. Who’s given the capacity 
to benefit, who’s given the capacity to gain something from it, and what they gain 
being relative to what somebody else gains” (Benefits – Discovery/Realisation).PR 
Although as one actant acknowledged, it was difficult to calculate benefit as “... it’s 
the classic sort of situation where if you don't have any sort of benefit idea of the 
value of something, then you won't do anything because it’s just purely a cost, it’s just 
a way to spend more money” (Benefits).PU 
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The delay in realising benefits, and the difficulty in connecting benefit and cost tied to 
an apparent lack of enthusiasm for RFID solutions were seen in organisations that had 
not researched the business case for RFID implementation as: 
“In the early days of EPC the technology was not robust... and there was price 
points and probably looking back over the years, the one variable that we 
probably overlooked was a clear cut business case. And if you don't have that, 
then the technology it’s a solution looking for a problem. You say look at this 
technology you can read a thousand tags per second and dense reader mode, 
and all these things that we sorted out, but until you have ‘that something’ 
that the senior executives in these companies can relate to and resonates with 
them you just really have a really cool technology.” (Business Case)PR 
There was also evidence that the public sector was conscious of the need to connect 
the cost of legislated compliance with benefits for participating organisations. As one 
public sector actant explained “you have to be very careful about imposing a 
compliance cost without really proving the benefit, and so we can’t quite do that yet 
in the whole RFID space”.PU 
The initial benefits expected on implementation of any of the RFID systems were 
outlined by a business case, written to support organisational arguments for such 
systems. Both sectors recognised the importance of “a solid business case, and in 
making sure that stacks up for bidding, funds, and investment”.PR This need to prove 
the benefit of RFID systems was emphasised where government was imposing the 
system on the private sector through legislation. As observed by one public sector 
actant “you have to be very careful about imposing a compliance cost without really 
proving the benefit” (Business Case).PU 
Where systems had been successful they were based on “a business case, and it’s got 
to be able to be able to be stacked up and demonstrated and proven, it’s not just a 
crazy idea” (Business Case).PR Developing such business cases took considerable time 
and collaboration by all organisations concerned, with one actant describing “a lot of 
door knocking and a lot of meetings and a lot of discussions… a lot of engagement 
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through lots of different stakeholders”.PR Where there was a lack of clear planning the 
systems struggled, or failed as one actant related: 
“...and I often say to them, “well, have you done the business case? Or have 
you done any discovery on understanding both technologies, what they can 
and can’t do, and not so much the cost of what it will cost you but the benefit 
that you will derive as a consequence of the technologies, and have you 
actually done that due process?”  Almost invariably ten times out of ten the 
answer is “no”, and so poor RFID gets relegated to the too expensive form of 
AIDC technology.” (Benefits)PR 
In summary, there was shown to be a link between clear business case, system 
benefits and project implementation. Where benefits were unclear, or business cases 
were not written or clearly linked to the business problem, implementations either 
struggled or were not commenced. Despite this, it was commonly found that further 
benefits were discovered after implementation. 
Code Description 
Benefits 
Description of actual benefit derived from 
implementation of RFID system. 
Business Case 
Case written to support the implementation of RFID 
system. 
Benefits - Discovery/Realisation 
How the organisation found the benefits, or how 
benefits arose, as a result of RFID systems 
implementation. 
Table 14: Code Table Benefits/Business Case 
5.4 Mediators – In Summary 
This chapter has focused on answering RQa. What mediators affect (the process of 
establishing and maintain public-private RFID systems) and how are they manifested? 
The mediators identified were found to operate at three different levels, with some 
operating generally between organisations (inter-organisational mediators), some 
within organisations (intra-organisational mediators), and other across the whole 
network (network mediators). This does not mean that mediators operated only at 
those levels, more that these were the levels at which they predominantly operated.  
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Network mediators include financial considerations, network infrastructure, standards, 
security, and the knowledge that organisations have about RFID systems. Three of 
these mediators are very strong, financial concerns were mentioned by nearly all 
actants. The loss of financing or the cost of systems could cause an RFID 
implementation or system to fail at any point. Standards needed to be resolved before 
systems could even be implemented, as they allowed for interoperability of RFID 
infrastructure. Similarly questions surrounding infrastructure design and choice 
needed to be resolved before RFID systems could be implemented. Standards were 
also important here as not all RFID devices were interoperable, as was the varying cost 
of infrastructure options, non-human actants were also strong here in the form of 
published guidelines surrounding industry standards. Surprisingly the amount of 
knowledge an organisation had about RFID systems also occurred as a network 
mediator. This was seen to be the result of the amount of effort actants had to put 
into educating others when they wanted them to join into their RFID networks, thus 
highlighting a relative lack of widespread knowledge of RFID technology.  
Inter-organisational mediators operated primarily between organisations, or between 
organisations and individuals. They included privacy, security, trust and data sharing. 
Privacy was another very frequently discussed mediator, but despite the level of 
discussion questions still remained about how to resolve privacy issues. This was 
especially apparent when discussing privacy in an international context, where 
different levels of the supply chain were involved, or where one part of the RFID 
system required more or different privacy to another. Again, non-human actants were 
strong here with some legislation surrounding privacy playing a part in how personal 
information was treated within the network. The public sector was seen to be more 
sensitive to privacy concerns, and this was linked to the nature of the information 
being held by this sector, and the need for the public sector to comply with legislation 
and regulation. Security was much less frequently discussed than privacy but was 
perceived as being critical by those that discussed it, although a number of actants 
viewed security as being an afterthought in RFID systems. Where security was 
discussed it was related to the nature of the data being held by RFID systems, and to 
the various layers of RFID systems, with each layer requiring a tailored security 
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approach. Trust is frequently discussed in relation to privacy and security, and this 
connection was also apparent within the RFID network. Trust had three aspects 
related to trusting RFID infrastructure, data and organisations. Familiarity was seen to 
encourage trust, as was the presence of non-human actants in the form of strong 
legislation or guidelines. Finally, data sharing was considered to be an inter-
organisational mediator as it is necessary to share data across organisations in order 
to fully utilise RFID systems. Without the sharing of data, the utility of RFID systems 
was seen to be much reduced, as was the potential of any Internet of Things type 
system. The lack of agreed guidelines, and an unwillingness to share data for reasons 
of privacy and competitive advantage, were both seen to be inhibitors of data sharing. 
Within organisations, intra-organisational mediators included organisational 
management, data management and business case/benefits. These mediators were 
most active within organisations themselves, driving decisions to implement RFID 
systems and influencing how the systems operated once implemented. Organisational 
management had several critical aspects, the most important of which was the quality 
and consistency of leadership. A lack of leadership, or sudden change in leadership 
was seen to cause RFID systems to stall or even fail. Other important factors included 
staff management, and the willingness of the organisation to implement change 
associated with RFID systems. Data management might normally be thought of as part 
of organisational management. However, in the RFID network it was important 
enough to appear as a separate mediator. The way data was managed within the 
various RFID systems dictated its usefulness. In a number of instances the alignment of 
data with business processes, and even the way data was used within organisations, 
was seen to be lacking. Associated with this was business case and benefits realisation. 
Again these might be considered part of organisational management but they appear 
separately here as they also mediate the RFID network. Business cases were important 
non-human actants as they framed any RFID system. However, the business case often 
did not fully realise the benefits that could be gained from RFID systems, and some of 
these benefits were tied to the management of RFID related data. Interestingly 
benefits derived from RFID systems were often discovered after business cases were 
written, and sometimes after systems implementation.  
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6 Discussion 
The findings reveal a complex RFID network encompassing countries, organisations, 
industries and sectors. Individual RFID systems operating across a number of 
organisations link to other RFID systems through standards organisations, and other 
similar organisations. Furthermore, when humans speak on behalf of the technology 
actants within an RFID system, 
even more associations are 
observed both within, and 
exterior to, the RFID system in 
question. Figure 15 (repeated 
from Section 3.5.2) attempts 
to demonstrate the 
complexity of this relationship, 
where actants (human, non-
human, or organisational) link 
through a complex network of associations, together forming the RFID network and 
assisting in understanding the multi-faceted nature of the network studied. 
This chapter will review these findings in respect of the RFID network and relate them 
to the theory and concepts outlined in the literature review. The way the RFID 
network is established and maintained will be discussed through the ANT lens focusing 
on how the relationships between the various actants contributes to the network 
formation and maintenance. The chapter will then consider how mediators affect the 
process of translation by both facilitating and challenging attempts to enrol actants. 
The role of institutional behaviour in this process will also be discussed along with a 
brief consideration of the utility of combining ANT with Institutional Theory.  
In order to remain true to the ontology of ANT, some parts of this chapter will take the 
more heroic style of an ANT account. At times it may appear that the non-human 
actants are given a certain amount of agency, and this is consistent with the ANT 
approach. 
Figure 14: The RFID Network 
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6.1 RQa.: Translating the Network – How the Relationship Between 
the Actants Contributes to Establishing and Maintaining the 
Network 
In his book Aramis, or, the Love of Technology (2002), Bruno Latour delves deeply into 
an attempt to introduce the Aramis public transportation technology into Paris in the 
1980’s. In his account Aramis gains a voice and even comments on events, attempting 
to gain the sympathy of readers, and relating how allies are acquired to support its use. 
Unfortunately, Aramis is fragile, eventually succumbing to a myriad of problems 
relating to finance/cost, inconsistent political support and technological difficulties. 
However, Latour highlights one problem with the technology that surpasses all others, 
the treatment of Aramis as “an uncomplicated development project that could unfold 
in successive phases from the drawing boards to a metro system that would run with 
14,000 passengers an hour in the south Paris region every day, twenty-four hours a 
day” (Latour, 2002, p. 292). There was a clear misunderstanding of the nature and 
complexity of the Aramis network. Similarly the RFID network, whilst appearing to be 
a simple collection of technological pieces, is in fact a complex assemblage of 
technology, human and organisational actants struggling through the process of 
translation. 
This research has been directed at understanding how the RFID network is established 
and maintained in the public-private context. The language and concepts of ANT, 
including that of translation, give insight into how this network is formed, and the 
challenges it faces. But, like Aramis, the RFID network is not fully formed in the public-
private context. As is shown in the findings, the individual RFID systems are still 
disparate, and they have not yet merged into a fully interconnected RFID network in 
the style described by the Internet of Things concept. Nonetheless, the ANT 
translation of the RFID network in the public-private context, can still be examined by 
observing Latour’s advice to “follow the actors” (Latour, 2005, p. 68), examining how 
they interact with each other. 
The ANT concept of translation suggests that networks are formed through the four 
stages of translation, these being problematisation, interessement, enrolment and 
mobilisation. At the beginning of the story of translation in the RFID network studied, 
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is the problem of how the network defines what it wants to do, and what informs the 
problematisation. From the findings it can be seen that there is a focus at first on 
outcomes, “the benefit that you will derive“, costs, and the purpose of the network. In 
the RFID systems studied the objectives were diverse, from biosecurity to 
infrastructure protection. Bar-code identification, the major rival to RFID, also 
appeared early in the problematisation, as the choice of technology (RFID or barcode) 
had to be dealt with at this stage. Bar code systems tempted actants with promises of 
cheap product identification, although they could not offer the benefits of item level 
identification seen in RFID systems. Between problematisation and interessement it 
was necessary to pass the obligatory passage point (OPP) of business case 
development, and also of standards (OPPs will be discussed later), before the 
interessement stage of translation could be reached.  
Interessement was characterised by the interplay of the various actants. Here we saw 
lobbying, consultation, and dissidence. In one instance the initial focal actants went so 
far as to interest the government in producing legislation which had the effect of 
requiring their industry members to participate in the network. It’s at this stage that 
the novelty or “buzz” surrounding RFID becomes an advantage, drawing actants into 
the network. On the challenging side, it’s during interessement that a dissident was 
seen in one instance, attempting to overturn the decisions made in the 
problematisation. However, this dissident was drawn back into line by the inevitability 
of legislated participation, and by the desire to be part of the development of the RFID 
system. The lure of bar coding was still present at interessement, with organisations 
struggling to decide between the two technologies.  
Enrolment was seen to be strengthened by the running of pilot projects as these 
helped organisations understand the benefits of participating in the network. It was 
also during enrolment that the various actants reached agreement – producing 
memoranda of understanding, and aligning themselves with requirements of the RFID 
system. Training and communication were important parts of mobilisation allowing all 
members of the network to understand the new system. “Socialising” the change was 
seen as being effective, and the importance of organisational leadership was 
continually emphasised. At lower organisational levels, seeing the project come to life 
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and succeed helped with mobilisation. At higher organisational levels, partners could 
speak or delegate for each other. 
Throughout the translation stage, RFID technology itself plays a part in shaping the 
form of the network. Implementation “can be difficult” and this difficulty “is a barrier 
to present wider adoption”. Part of this difficulty can be seen to arise from problems 
aligning the interests of all actants in the network. As Sidorova and Kappelman (2011) 
found in their study of enterprise architecture, it is necessary to align the interests of 
both the organisational actants, and the non-organisational technology actants, such 
as infrastructure and standards, for a successful translation. The strength of both the 
standards and infrastructure mediators in the RFID network demonstrates this 
necessity as they sit outside the organisations and systems concerned, yet must still 
be integrated within the network, or the network itself will fail. The presence of 
legislation as an OPP, along with various RFID standards in place for both RFID 
hardware (infrastructure), and software, assisted in aligning the interests of RFID 
technology with organisational and human requirements through regulated 
requirements to operate RFID systems in particular ways. Interestingly, Sidorova and 
Kappelman (2011) also found that the risk of compromising organisational interests 
during the process of translation is related to the degree to which these processes 
become inscribed. Documents such as business cases, for example, can be considered 
to be inscriptions, and all of the systems studied had produced such business cases. Of 
course, legislation, policy, standards and mandated requirements, are all strong 
inscriptions seen in the RFID network studied. The need for actants to be involved in 
the process of inscription in order to fully represent their organisational interests 
demonstrates that the dissident seen in one instance resisting interessement was in 
fact clever to resist while still retaining the ability to contribute to the inscription of 
the business case and legislation. As the organisation’s representative had recognised: 
“[we] needed to be… angry and do [our] public thing, and [the other members of the 
network] were cool with that because privately we were still doing the constructive, 
collaborative, helping shape the thing”PR. In other instances the inability to align what 
the technology could provide with the needs of the organisation caused the 
translation to fail, especially where the organisations involved were resistant to the 
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kind of organisational changes required to implement RFID systems. However, a 
number of non-profit14 and non-human15 actants worked to assist alignment through 
the provision of education about RFID systems, technical assistance and standards 
negotiation.  
Law (1992) describes some of the features that help maintain a network making it 
strong and durable. He suggests that when power is translated through durable 
materials, such as bricks and mortar, texts and laws, the translation will be more 
stable. This can be seen in the study network as legislation (a strong and durable 
inscription) stabilises the network by requiring enrolment according to the legislated 
regulation. In those systems not stabilised by legislation other methods of 
encouraging actants to join the translation were seen. In the most successful systems 
these methods could be considered to be similar to legislation, as they took the form 
of mandates driven by large corporations, which were enforced by penalties against 
those not complying with the mandate. Where organisations were not in a position to 
rely on legislation or mandate to stabilise their networks, they had to rely on weaker 
factors such as mutual benefit, or business cases to stabilise their translations. This 
pattern follows that suggested by Law in that the more durable materials led to 
stronger more lasting translations. 
6.1.1 Inscriptions 
Another important driver of a network is the network’s inscriptions, or programs of 
action, written into the devices (or text) that make up the network. Mähring 
Holmström and Montealegre (2004) argue that such inscriptions are essential to any 
network, as they act to stabilise it. At the very basis of the study network, RFID 
enabled devices are inscribed with product identifiers that drive the data collected by 
such systems. This data also forms the basis of the benefits derived from RFID systems 
such as the ability to track and trace individual items, or sensor capabilities, which are 
directly linked to the data provided by individually numbered (inscribed) RFID tags. 
The lack of understanding of this data and its management, has already been linked to 
a disconnect in organisational benefits, and can now be seen to be linked further back 
                                                     
14
 Such as standards and industry bodies 
15
 Such as industry publications and conferences 
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to a lack of understanding of how the inscription of RFID devices can be used to derive 
organisational benefit.  
The network itself has a number of higher level inscriptions such as business cases, 
and legislation (already discussed). The RFID enabled technology artefact itself 
inscribes a way of behaviour on those organisations using it. This is clearly shown 
within the study network as organisations and individuals have to change their 
processes to accommodate the implementation of RFID systems. Once in place, Latour 
(1992) believes that inscriptions are mostly irreversible, and the strength of the 
inscription dictates how likely it is to be followed. Legislation is a strong inscription, 
dictating, and indeed forcing, a course of action on the network. Inscriptions such as 
business cases, memoranda of agreement and other formal documents also frame the 
relationships between actants, and dictate to a certain extent the form of the network. 
6.1.2 Obligatory Passage Points, Dissenters and Challenges 
It is a requirement of translation that actants wanting to join the network navigate 
one or a number of obligatory passage points (OPP). Defined by the focal actant/s, the 
OPP is essential to the network, and it must be accepted by any actant who wants to 
join the translation. Actants who wish to join are persuaded that their interests are 
best served by accepting the OPP proposed by the focal actant/s. In the instances 
studied, project or business plans can be seen to be an obligatory passage point (OPP), 
as can legislation or standards. 
Legislation, where it is already in place represents an OPP after the problematisation, 
as it constrains the shape of the network – saying “you must do this in a certain way”. 
Standards also represent an OPP in the network. Even in an RFID system designed to 
be used exclusively within one supply chain or organisation a basic level of 
standardisation is necessary, as the RFID tags must be able to talk to the readers, and 
the readers to the database. However, this is where the story of the network becomes 
interesting. In the more extensive network studied, the RFID public-private sector 
network, standards are also necessary for different RFID systems to talk to each other. 
This is a major challenge that must be met before completely connected RFID systems 
can be enabled. A number of global standards bodies are interested in providing 
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standardised naming services. These would all like to be involved in the network, to 
not only provide the Internet of Things style connectivity that would allow 
anyone/anything/anywhere to discover the parts of the network, but to also provide 
baseline standards for network infrastructure. How is this challenge met? Various 
systems use a number of standards, and on the international stage both standards and 
privacy mediators are still disputed, therefore full scale global Internet of Things 
connectivity is not possible at this time. Further, questions over trust and security are 
still unsettled, as demonstrated by this research. However, this does not mean that 
globally interconnected standards will not happen in the future as translation is an 
ongoing process, and a number of bodies are working towards implementing Internet 
of Things style systems. 
The next challenge to the RFID network in the public-private context comes from 
another form of standard identification, the classic barcode. Barcode appears a 
number of times to challenge the network. The use of RFID or barcode technology was 
seen to be debated at problematisation when the question about which technology is 
best needs to be decided, with bar coding perceived to be both cheap and ubiquitous. 
As one actant related: “as a commercial provider, I have a free of charge bar coding 
system, internationally recognised, now accepted as part of conventional contract 
packaging. What’s the benefit in RFID, and what’s the cost of the benefit?”. Bar codes 
use the lure of ubiquity, standardisation and low cost to draw interest away from RFID 
as a solution. Cost in fact is an on-going mediator in the network, and bar codes can 
still compete with RFID technology based on this mediator alone. However, RFID is 
strong, using the additional functionality of RFID systems compared to bar codes to 
hold off the challenge.  
But there are other challenges in the form of dissidents, actants that disagree with the 
network. In one instance already discussed, an organisation initially accepted the OPP 
but later, due to a change in internal management, decided to resist the network. This 
dissident eventually conceded under pressure from legislation. In another instance 
there was a non-human dissident resisting the system in the form of a number of 
extensive cross organisation ERP systems, which were considered too costly to 
integrate. As a result, though the RFID system was implemented, the size and 
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complexity of the ERP resisted the integration of data and ERP systems, and the 
system was weaker because of the inability to share data across all departments of the 
organisation. Finally dissidence is seen from individual human actants who fear RFID 
technology on the basis of health, privacy or philosophical grounds. This dissidence 
was met within the network with education where necessary. 
6.1.3 Micro and Macro-Perspectives and the Internet of Things 
If we look at how RFID works in the systems studied we can see that RFID enabled 
artefacts move through the individual RFID systems, identifying objects/or 
transmitting sensor information based on unique identifiers. These identifiers are 
considered to be inscriptions or immutable mobiles – capable of transmitting meaning, 
in the case of RFID enabled devices, identity or sensor information. Thus the devices 
make visible what was otherwise remote and invisible. However, currently the 
information produced by such systems remains limited to individual systems, and 
organisations within those linked RFID systems; the “intranets of things” that 
Slettemeas (2009) proposes, as the widespread, cross organisational, cross system 
network that would represent the idealised Internet of Things style system is not (yet) 
in place. However, Callon and Latour (1981) note that micro actors can grow into 
macro actors “with all due power and influence to speak or act on behalf of another 
force that comes with the increase in scale” (p. 285). This principle is demonstrated in 
this study as the most micro of actants – RFID tags and data – can grow into large 
organisational RFID systems, and may grow further still. However, in the context of 
this study, particularly with the involvement of the public sector, concerns about 
privacy and security would present barriers to out of system sharing of data, as seen in 
this study and described under the data sharing mediator in Section 5.2.4. This lack of 
willingness to share data would limit the potential growth of a more widespread 
Internet of Things style network, even if the infrastructure requirements are met. The 
most this study can do is point to the mediators as indicators of the factors that must 
be considered before the Internet of Things in the public-private sector could become 
ubiquitous.   
Yet a number of actants discussed the Internet of Things, for them this concept 
represented the future of the network, something that would eventually occur. So 
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what is the place of the Internet of Things within the network? ANT does not 
accommodate predictions about the future, but it could accommodate a concept 
appearing as an actant, attempting to shape the network in its own way. The Internet 
of Things as an actant certainly has representatives within the study network, 
speaking about it, and on its behalf. It could also be considered to be a dissident 
within the ANT framework. Like the bar code the Internet of Things drives the network 
to take a different shape, pressuring the mobilisation and attempting to change the 
problematisation by offering a more connected view of how the network could (or 
should) be formed. 
What about other emerging computing concepts, the ubiquitous pervasive, 
disappearing, invisible, and experiential? As with the Internet of Things there are 
indications of these “working away in the background”. According to Ye et al. (2008) 
the difference between the ubiquitous and pervasive concepts turns on the ubiquitous 
provision of its infrastructure, and the pervasive provision of computing services. So 
RFID technology is not completely ubiquitous according to this definition as 
infrastructure is not ubiquitously available, and cost still limits the provision of the 
necessary infrastructure to some extent (although these costs are dropping). Nor is 
RFID pervasive except in the system in which the technology is implemented. So again 
it can be said that there are signs of these concepts in limited cases, but they are not 
yet completely realised. These concepts could also offer temptations to the network, 
attempting to persuade with visions of what might be if only the infrastructure were 
available to realise their interconnected visions. Similarly, the experiential model 
proposed by Yoo (2010) would require a far more extensive infrastructure and RFID 
network than the one currently in existence. But do these computing concepts have 
representatives within the network, are they actants? The answer would have to be 
no, none of the study actants mentioned these concepts, and they did not appear to 
have any influence on the network design, or actions. Unlike the Internet of Things, 
the disappearing, invisible, pervasive, ubiquitous and experiential concepts are 
descriptors rather than actants, at least at the moment. 
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6.1.4 Sector Relationships 
Because this research is focused on cross sector RFID systems, the relationship and 
interaction between different sector organisations is also an important part of the 
network. At the sector level the relationship was framed to some extent by what could 
be considered the stereotypical views each sector had of the other, with some public 
sector actants viewing the private sector as being solely concerned with profit, and 
some private sector actants levelling accusations of bureaucracy at the public sector. 
However, beyond the stereotypes there were a few differences apparent between the 
sectors. 
The public sector was seen to be more sensitive to legislation that was already in place. 
Thus where privacy legislation applied to data collected by an RFID network, the public 
sector was more considerate of this. Similarly public sector organisations were also 
more sensitive to the need to secure data collected by networks, which was seen to 
be related to the nature of the data held by the public sector. Public sector 
organisations also had more procedures and processes in place, and at times this led 
to frustration from private sector actants, some of whom saw these procedures as 
being barriers to interaction. As a result some of the large private sector organisations 
studied had employees dedicated to dealing with their public sector partners, 
although no actants discussed the number of staff necessary to deal with private 
sector partners of those same organisations. In the private sector, frustration was 
expressed at the political cycle changing government policy. Similarly, the change in 
private sector leadership also affected the direction of private sector organisations, 
and their attitude towards their cross sector RFID systems. 
The place of legislation was contentious. In some instances the private sector had 
approached the public sector wanting legislation enacted, and had been successful. 
Despite the legislation being an industry initiative, others within the industry 
continued to resist it. In at least one instance of RFID based legislation, it was felt that 
the public sector should subsidise the involvement of industry, even though industry 
had originally asked for the legislation to be enacted. In other instances, industry was 
working hard to demonstrate that legislation would not be necessary, and that 
industry could self-regulate.  
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The two sectors were also seen as being similar in a number of ways, with actants 
noting that the nature of the individuals they were dealing with was more important 
than their organisation or sector. This view was expressed in both public and private 
sectors. Familiarity and time spent working together lessened the feeling that the two 
sectors were different, instead normalising working relationships. In those systems 
that were successfully implemented, respondents considered that a cooperative 
approach was essential, as was good organisational and systems management.  
6.1.5 “Public Sector” as a Multiplicity 
As the network has moved through the OPP, answered dissidents and met challenges 
on its way to mobilisation - is there more to understand about the network? Like 
Aramis which exists in both the states of “real” and “unreal,” parts of the network 
have different aspects. The work of Cresswell (2010) and Mol (1999) help here. They 
suggest that ANT allows multiple realities to co-exist, each reality representing a 
different view, depending on the perspective of the human or technology actant. This 
multiplicity (or ability of the same actant to appear and act in a number of different 
ways) allows us to deal with different performances; different ways actants behave in 
order to build relationships or networks, depending on their context or the actants 
they are interacting with. The ability to do this gives us a much more subtle 
understanding of the network and its struggles. 
The most obvious multiple in this study is the public sector (or as it is most commonly 
referred to by the actants, government). Four different roles are apparent for the 
public sector/government as: 
 a member of the network; 
 a provider of legislation or regulation; 
 an enforcer of legislation; and 
 a funding and service provider. 
As a member of the network, the public sector acted in the same way as a private 
sector member of the supply chain. Goods were received, tags were read and data 
was recorded. As a provider of legislation, the public sector worked with politicians 
and the private sector to legislate based on the perception that the legislation was for 
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the public good, including setting legislation to favour organisations within their own 
jurisdiction, amounting to a tariff on other jurisdictions. Any legislation passed had to 
be enforced, leading to the third role of the public sector/government. Finally, actants 
also saw the public sector as having a role in providing services such as education on 
the value of RFID, and on how business might implement RFID technology.  
The private sector actants also displayed multiple views of the public sector, with the 
most common being that of the public sector as ‘government’ with little distinction 
made between government and public sector functions. This view was driven by what 
could be described as a stereotypical view of government such as those seen in [the 
contrasting public and private Section 4.2.1. However, in other instances the public 
sector was viewed as a partner – a shareholder in the governance of cross sector RFID 
systems.  
These multiple roles and views are considered to have caused confusion within the 
network; from the private sector writing off public sector organisations as “just being 
government”, to the difficulty of managing policy that was being developed at the 
request of the private sector. In one instance, policy development was made more 
difficult when the industry representatives and policy analysts needed to negotiate 
issues surrounding policy development, as the industry actant had observed “the 
policy wonks get involved and it grows a life of its own. So then you’ve got to go and 
grab them all, and bring them all back…”.  
From the private sector side the conflating of the term ‘government’ with public 
sector led to difficulties identifying the role the private sector wanted the public 
sector to play. The most successful cross sector RFID systems displayed a good 
understanding of the various roles played by the public sector, and targeted their 
actions accordingly. As one industry actant related, the actants organisation had been 
“in the odd position of having to talk the government out of being involved in [the 
system] in terms of being an industry based scheme and then having to talk them back 
in to being involved in it for the funding”. 
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6.2 RQb.: How Mediators Drive the Network 
While the process of translation formed the network, and it was stabilised by durable 
materials and inscriptions such as legislation, the actions of mediators gave the 
network shape. Mediators also could cause sudden changes in direction of the 
translation, or the actants, adding to the complications faced by those wanting to 
implement RFID systems. To reiterate Latour (2005, p. 39) mediators “transform, 
translate, distort and modify the meaning or the elements they are supposed to carry”. 
Intermediaries, on the other hand, are unsurprising and their input predicts their 
output. However, the state of intermediaries and mediators is not always settled; an 
intermediary can transform into a mediator and vice versa, depending on the actions 
of actants.  
The literature review suggested nine possible mediators of RFID systems in the form of 
issues most commonly discussed by researchers, either individually or in combination 
with other mediators, whereas this study identified 12 mediators. Differences in the 
mediators identified lay in the emergence of organisational knowledge as an 
important mediator in the public-private RFID network, and the refining of 
organisational and data management categories from the more general governance 
category seen in the literature review. It can be seen from this study that the 
mediators of RFID systems operate in various places within the network, some 
operating across the entire network, some predominantly within organisations and 
some between. This is shown in Figure 13 which is repeated here for convenience: 
 
Figure 15: Mediators of the RFID Network 
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Although the majority of the mediators were identified by the literature review, it is 
their strength and how they act within the network that is interesting, and in some 
cases unexpected. Going over the translation of the network and analysing where the 
various mediators occur, an interesting pattern emerges in respect to where within 
the process of translation the various mediators are most active16, as demonstrated by 
the following table: 
 
Table 15: The Place of Mediators in the Translation 
The stages where mediators are active as such are coloured; where they act as 
intermediaries, or are not discussed in any appreciable way, the cells are blank.  
It can be seen that those mediators considered to be ‘inter organisational’ are 
generally not apparent during problematisation. The problematisation is dominated 
by internal intra-organisational mediators, and by those mediators affecting the entire 
network. Until the initial focal actants go out and begin attempting to interest others, 
the inter-organisational mediators are fairly quiet, acting more as intermediaries. This 
even appears to be true when cross organisational bodies are put together to 
investigate a particular implementation. For example in one RFID system studied, the 
committee put together from various bodies to design the RFID system appeared as 
an actant in and of itself, thus allowing a dissenter to keep a member on this body, 
while resisting the application externally. This is what would be expected from 
                                                     
16
 Where mediators are most active is where the mediators are discussed more often than in other 
phases of translation. This does not mean that the mediators are not discussed in the other phases of 
translation (although they may not be), just that they are only occasionally mentioned in these less 
active phases. 
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Latour’s vision of actants, each actant being made up of loose combinations of other 
actants, each with their own motivations. It is also apparent that many of the 
mediators are not discussed at mobilisation. Returning to Latour (2005) we might 
expect that the nature of these mediators would have changed, now they merely 
translate action from one point to another rather than being active participants in the 
network – in other words they have become intermediaries. However, a number of 
the mediators, especially security and privacy, were found to be afterthoughts in some 
instances, ready to turn back into mediators from their intermediary state at 
mobilisation, after RFID systems had been implemented. Although privacy and 
security did not appear to influence the mobilisation in any of the specific instances 
related to this study, actants speaking on behalf of these mediators were concerned 
about their ability to disrupt established RFID systems. These are fragile 
intermediaries indeed, ready to leap out of their boxes at any moment. 
Overall as can be seen in Table 15 the strongest mediator was finance, consistently 
discussed across every phase of translation. It was lack of finance that caused the 
failure of one RFID system studied, and financial problems that delayed others. It was 
on the point of cost that bar-codes presented their strongest challenge. Finance never 
appeared to settle into intermediary status, it was always there. The mediators of 
organisational management and data sharing were also strong, either positively 
through data and organisational management facilitating RFID systems or negatively 
through organisations struggling just to manage their RFID systems, let alone 
maximise the use of the data they generated through them. This was best 
demonstrated in combination with the benefits mediator, as findings indicated that 
benefits derived from the data gathered by RFID systems were at times disconnected 
from those expected by organisations. In one example studied data was not able to be 
shared between the public and private sector organisations due to the use of a secure 
system on the public sector side. This inability to share led to the need to employ a 
manual process to exchange data, thus reducing the benefits of the RFID system. 
Better data sharing and organisational management, and understanding of the 
benefits attainable from RFID systems would be likely to resolve this disconnect.  
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Even though the importance of management, especially leadership, is often discussed 
in information systems literature (for example in Yoong (2010)), it has only recently 
begun appearing in RFID based literature. However, management mediators such as 
organisational management, data management, business case, and organisational 
knowledge, were strongly expressed in this study, appearing first in the 
problematisation phase, and continuing throughout the translation. This highlights the 
need to understand the nature of any RFID systems implementation, and to be able to 
manage the data (and the organisation) in order to ensure benefits from RFID systems 
implementation are fully realised. 
The presence of organisational knowledge as a mediator was unexpected as it has only 
been touched upon in previous studies (such as Li, Godon and Visich (2010), or 
Wamba and Chatfield (2010)), as was the degree to which it was apparent in RFID 
systems. Organisational knowledge appeared important in problematisation, where 
the amount of knowledge an organisation (or a particular human actant) had about 
RFID systems influenced the amount of time the focal actants had to spend educating 
other actants about RFID systems. The presence of various non-human actants such as 
published guidelines, books, industry web sites, and conferences was particularly 
influential here. These non-human actants often provided the first point of contact for 
organisations curious about RFID systems, as well as being reference sources for those 
with existing RFID systems. The organisational knowledge mediator reappeared during 
enrolment, as actants attempting to influence others to join the network first had to 
educate others as to the benefits of joining the translation. It was here that the loss of 
trained and knowledgeable staff influenced the translation, in one instance causing 
the translation to stall as “there [was] no one to champion the cause”. During 
mobilisation it became important to ensure all staff using RFID systems understood 
their operation, and were comfortable with it, in order to reassure those who may 
have been fearful of RFID technology on health or privacy grounds. 
Standards and infrastructure both dropped from sight after interessement. In both 
cases this could be expected as questions regarding these mediators needed to be 
solved early in translation with standards becoming an OPP. Similarly, infrastructure 
requirements were written into business cases and then treated as a black box for the 
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remainder of the translation, at least in the instances studied. Organisational 
interaction occurred mainly during the interessement and enrolment stages as 
organisations forged links, decided on processes and agreed the structure of their 
networks. Related to these mediators, trust occurred primarily in the interessement 
stage, as it was necessary for the building of organisational relationships. Trust 
returned to being an intermediary once these connections were established. Privacy 
persisted as a mediator through both interessement and enrolment, only becoming 
settled at mobilisation. Like security, privacy appeared as an afterthought in some 
instances indicating that its settled intermediary state was unlikely to be permanent.  
Data sharing is often considered to be a result of trusted relationships, for example in 
Dawes et al. (2009). However, the link between data sharing and trust was not 
strongly apparent in this study, possibly because of the presence of legislation in a 
number of the RFID systems studied. Luhmann (1979) found that the presence of 
legislation can reduce the effect of trust in data sharing, making it less necessary to 
form a trusting relationship in order to share data. Although this was not clearly 
evident in the RFID network studied, teasing out this relationship through further 
research would prove interesting. 
The benefits mediator shows an interesting pattern of activity in the network. It 
appears in problematisation, advising on the outcome of the network, be it biosecurity, 
traceability or similar – even though these have been shown to be contested even at 
this early stage. Benefits then appear to support interessement with the promise of 
benefits to be gained, attracting other actants to the network. However, on 
mobilisation the benefits attained sometimes do not match those anticipated by the 
business case and problematisation. This observation supports the contention by 
Wamba and Chatfield (2010) that RFID systems seldom realise their full benefit, and 
may help to explain their observations. This may also explain why RFID applications 
struggle to define benefits for business cases as the benefits discussed at 
problematisation are not always those delivered by mobilisation. Finally, associated 
with the initial expectation of benefits, the business case appeared only during 
problematisation as might be expected since the production of a business case 
outlined the problematisation. Despite this brief appearance, this was still an 
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influential mediator as business case went on to become an OPP to the remainder of 
the translation. 
The changing of state of mediators to intermediaries at mobilisation shows that they 
are no longer controversial at this stage, instead they are carriers of meaning, but not 
active. According to Kaghan and Bowker (2001) , intermediaries assist in interpreting, 
or negotiating, between black boxes. However, the status of intermediary is not 
permanent. It is still possible for an intermediary to return to influence the network, 
rising from its rest to become a mediator again. Gherardi and Nicolini (2005) find that 
well defined intermediaries are essential to the creation of an actor network – giving 
the network shape and allowing it to “travel in the world as a recognizable entity” (p. 
5).  
It is also interesting to note the persistence of mediators such as finance, 
infrastructure, privacy or standards within the network, as these mediators have 
received considerable academic and industry attention. Their persistence over time 
shows the issues surrounding them are not yet resolved – possibly due to the speed of 
technology change, and the necessity for such mediators to keep up with the changing 
translations required.  
6.3 RQc.: Macro Perspectives, Sectors and Institutional Theory 
This research focuses on the macro view – the larger network of RFID systems shared 
between the public-private sectors - deconstructing the network and investigating the 
networks translation in order to understand it better. It is important in the light of the 
macro view taken by this research, to remember the place of the institutional actant 
government in the network. Government, however poorly defined (as can be seen 
from the discussion of the public sector as a multiplicity) is the largest and most 
complex actant in the network. Made up of a combination of public sector and 
political actants, government is a leviathan in the sense used by Callon and Latour 
(1981), able not only to persuade actants to join the network but to force them 
through legislation. Government is a combination of smaller actants gathered up to 
create one macro-actant. But as Callon and Latour (1981) point out, there is no need 
to be frightened of exploring what this Leviathan means, instead this study applied the 
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same methodology to the government leviathan as to the smaller actants, in order to 
discover how it acts within the network, and identifying government as a multiplicity. 
While it has been relatively easy to follow the actants through the network, it quickly 
became apparent that the RFID network, like Aramis, is fragmented and defined more 
by individual RFID systems than by a cohesive whole. Thus, the discussion so far has 
taken a high level translation view with an emphasis on the action of mediators, but 
there are other stories to tell, and a range of actants are involved. These include the 
stories of individual RFID systems, and larger (more macro) organisational or 
institutional actants, which Roberts (2012) argues are also translation devices, aligning 
actants within the network. The small organisations and individuals working within the 
network also have stories to be told, and have only been briefly mentioned in this 
research.  
In order to account for the presence of the organisational actants, other perspectives 
were brought into play, as suggested by Cresswell, Worth and Sheikh (2010) who 
advise combining ANT with other theoretical approaches, especially when analysing 
data. As discussed in the chapter on methodology and theoretical approach, ANT and 
Institutional Theory have been combined in a number of studies to successfully 
interpret the actions of institutional actants, so it is appropriate to utilise Institutional 
Theory to assist with interpreting the actions of the institutional actants. Institutional 
theory as outlined by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) recognises three pressures acting 
on institutions namely; coercive, normative and mimetic pressures. 
Coercive pressures are readily apparent within the RFID network as the presence of 
legislation, or regulation is never far away. In a number of the instances studied, 
legislation was being sought or was already enacted. Normative pressures are also 
applied by the various industry bodies and standards organisations wanting (or asking) 
the other actants to come into alignment with their standards. Mimetic pressures, 
although less obvious are also present with organisations looking to what others are 
doing before deciding on the shape of their RFID systems. Mimetic and normative 
pressures also appear when organisations join RFID systems already in place, as the 
OPP of business case, and the decisions made by the other actants, require them to 
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shape their RFID systems to suit the existing network (or to persuade the others to re-
form the network).  
Aligning the responses to institutional pressure proposed by Oliver (1991a)17, with the 
three responses to offers of enrolment recognised by Latour (1987)18, allows 
additional insight into the creation of the RFID network as it illuminates the ways 
actants respond to offers, or coercive requirements to join the RFID network. A 
summary diagram of this combination is 
repeated at Figure 17 (from section 3.3) for 
convenience. These forces/responses are 
clearly present in the study network. 
Acceptance was shown by those that joined 
the network. Some just acquiesced to the 
problematisation, while others joined in 
enthusiastically. Yet others compromised by 
negotiating their involvement. Avoidance 
was shown by those that chose to use bar 
code technology instead of RFID, disregarded offers of enrolment, or simply chose not 
to participate in the network at all (where they had the option in non-legislated 
systems). Dispute was evident from those actants that openly opposed the translation, 
usually by resisting legislation. In one instance an organisation openly resisted (defied) 
the problematisation while still keeping a member in place on the project team 
ensuring input into the final shape of the translation, thus both defying and 
manipulating at the same time. 
Powell and Colyvas (2008) call for institutional theorists to take more notice of the 
micro foundations of organisational development. This research shows that ANT can 
be of assistance in giving insight into these micro foundations, particularly through the 
process of translation where the construction of the network is laid bare. 
                                                     
17
 The responses are acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance and manipulation. 
18
 Being accept, dispute or disregard. 
Figure 16: ANT and Institutional Theory Responses 
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6.4 Summary 
This thesis has taken a journey through the RFID public-private sector network using 
ANT, and later Institutional Theory, as the means to illuminate this network. But, 
despite the ANT approach we haven’t really heard from our hero – RFID the 
technology. Just as Latour (2002) provided Aramis with a voice, so too could RFID have 
a voice. What would it say if it did? Please use me, perhaps. Or maybe there could be 
advice RFID could offer in the public-private context, advice that can be drawn from 
this research: 
Remember the mediators, make sure you understand what each of them does 
in the network and account for it. Ensure you know what benefits you want 
from your RFID systems, and use the data I give you. Talk to each other, and me, 
through the use of standards. Remember each sector has slightly different 
needs, and that the public sector comes in many different forms.  
This advice can be translated into a more formal outline for practice. The mediators 
identified in this research highlight issues that organisations wishing to engage in cross 
sector RFID systems need to consider. Some of these mediators have been discussed 
many times in this research and in literature yet still remain important, particularly 
finance. Other mediators are not so commonly discussed, especially the importance of 
knowledge of RFID within organisations, and the need to educate both higher level 
managers and workers as to the nature of RFID systems. The speed of technology 
change makes it difficult to keep up with the organisational knowledge mediator (as it 
does with standards and infrastructure) because the knowledge required to 
understand and implement RFID systems also changes rapidly. This indicates to 
industry the need to be aware that those they talk to about RFID systems may not 
have the same level of knowledge they do.  
The importance of benefits within the RFID network has also been under reported. 
The need to align benefits with the obligatory passage point of business case is 
emphasised by this research. It is the business case that spells out benefits expected, 
and these benefits draw other organisations into the network through interessement. 
The importance of good organisational and data management in achieving the 
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benefits of RFID systems has also been highlighted, through the identification of a 
disconnect between benefits expected and attained in some RFID systems. While this 
might not be an unsurprising finding, this study makes it explicit. 
The obligatory passage points of standards and legislation point to the need to 
understand how these will operate in any cross sector RFID system. It is important to 
note that these mediators often lag behind technology developments, especially 
legislation which takes time to enact. Organisations need to be aware of this, both in 
planning for legislation which may be enacted in the future, and in realising the 
importance of establishing trust as a mechanism for enhancing data sharing, as 
legislation cannot always be enacted rapidly enough to take the place of trust. As has 
already been discussed, data sharing is necessary for attaining the hoped for benefits 
from RFID systems. 
The multiple nature of the public sector has also been demonstrated in this research, 
emphasising how public organisations can have more than one role within an RFID 
system. This is something that was not apparently considered within the study 
network, and again is something that organisations both public and private need to 
consider when working with RFID technology. The role the public sector is taking in a 
particular system is important, and easily confused. Keeping focused on the role 
required is important as it assists to clarify how the other mediators (such as finance 
and legislation) need to interact with the translation, and to reduce uncertainty in the 
RFID public-private network. 
So finally, is the public-private sector RFID network like Aramis? Is it fragile and 
unstable or is there strength in its current translation? The findings make it clear that 
there is no widespread Internet of Things style RFID network between the public and 
private sectors with separate systems able to interact seamlessly. Instead, each RFID 
system exists within its own individual silo, not interacting with other systems, even if 
it may be technically possible. There are also examples of failed systems, like Aramis 
too fragile to survive translation. However, the pieces that can be seen (the individual 
systems), like the fragments of Aramis, can be studied, and conclusions can be drawn 
based on them. The RFID network that does exist allows this study to paint a rich 
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picture of what currently is – and comment on what might become the public-private 
sector RFID network. 
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7 Conclusion 
This study has investigated the state of RFID technology in the context of RFID systems 
that cross the boundary between the public and private sectors. The aim of the study 
was to examine how the RFID network comes to be established and maintained in 
systems that cross the boundary between the public and private sectors; discuss how 
the relationship between the various actants involved contributes to establishing and 
maintaining the network; identify the mediators that influence it, and understand how 
ANT and Institutional Theory can assist in understanding such networks. This study has 
explored the relationships between the organisations involved in these public-private 
RFID networks. It has revealed network mediators and intermediaries that serve to 
drive the relationships between the various actants, as well as dictating the networks 
stability of the network. The combination of ANT and Institutional Theory provides an 
insight as to the complexity of the construction of the network, and to the struggle for 
RFID to become established in a broader public-private context.  
This conclusion will reflect on the use of ANT, and discuss how Institutional Theory 
adds additional insight into the results. It will summarise the network mediators, 
outline how the various parts of the network work together, and detail the challenges 
faced by the network especially at the organisational level. Finally, the future of the 
network is discussed, along with the contribution of this study, and suggestions for 
future research. 
7.1 ANT and the Network 
The use of ANT in this study has allowed RFID technology to take centre stage. The 
ANT model of translation uncovers the interactions that caused the RFID network to 
be created, and maintained, and could lead to it being destroyed, or reformed. Driving 
these interactions and relationships were mediators/intermediaries that stabilised (or 
destabilised) the network translation, along with various obligatory passage points 
and inscriptions. These concepts, based on the language of ANT, gave a framework 
with which to describe the interactions observed between the various human, 
technological and organisational actants. 
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Methodologically ANT steps through the network from actant to actant without 
regard for the actant’s nature, or its place in reality. A technological actant is allowed 
to speak through representatives, either human or non-human. Thus subject matter 
experts (such as RFID engineers) could be consulted as representatives of RFID 
technology. Similarly documents such as business cases or legislation could also be 
consulted in a role as representatives for the organisation’s RFID systems. Not only 
does this approach avoid the problem of technological determinism, it also means that 
technology can participate in its own network. The view allowed by this approach, 
combined with the language provided by ANT, gave a much richer view of the RFID 
network than that which would be found using other more conservative approaches.  
7.1.1 Network Mediators 
In total twelve mediators were identified by this study, acting within or between 
organisations, or across the whole RFID network. Varying in activity they moved 
between mediating interactions and being intermediaries – carrying meaning but not 
influencing the translation. Some of the mediators were familiar from information 
systems literature, such as finance, infrastructure, standards, data management and 
sharing, security, privacy and trust. That these familiar mediators continue to appear 
in technology networks, despite the on-going academic focus on them, shows that 
issues surrounding them are not yet settled. But, would we expect these issues to ever 
be settled? Technology is constantly changing, as are organisations, the environment, 
and the expectations of individuals. This rate of change, combined with the complexity 
of human/technology networks such as the RFID network studied here, means that 
these mediators will have little opportunity to settle into an intermediary state  
Other mediators were less familiar within the RFID in the public-private sector context, 
such as organisational knowledge, benefits, business case, and organisational 
management. These more organisationally focused mediators were made apparent 
partly through the ANT process of translation, where they occur in relation to the 
interactions surrounding the implementation and management of the RFID network.  
While the combination of mediators uncovered could be considered unconventional, 
in that some are conceptual rather than technological, these are the mediators that 
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were apparent in the RFID network. Their unearthing highlights one of the strengths of 
the ANT approach, allowing both technology based, and sociological or organisational 
interactions to become evident in the study network, and allowing them to act in its 
formation, as suggested by Latour (1985). 
7.1.2 Network Translation 
The influence of the mediators in driving relationships between the actants was clear 
as the various actants moved through the process of translation. During the 
problematisation phase the mediators were focused primarily on the internal 
management of the organisation (intra-organisational mediators), or on the whole 
network. However, where mediators were intra organisational they predominantly 
occurred in the interessement phase, where organisations wanted to recruit other 
actants to their networks. Many mediators were settled, becoming intermediaries by 
the mobilisation phase. This is expected in the ANT model of translation where 
mobilisation is characterised by a certain amount of stability in the network. However, 
it is particularly interesting to note that this observation applies to interactions 
occurring between organisational as well as human actants. 
While most mediators moved to intermediary status, others took different paths 
within the translation. Legislation, once made, becomes an obligatory passage point 
and inscription, able to dictate meaning throughout the network over time and 
distance. Durable and lasting, legislation anchored the RFID systems in which it was 
relevant, forcing compliance on other actants. Legislation obliged the translation to 
occur in a particular way. Hanseth and Monterio (1997) found that alignment of 
networks with their inscriptions dictated its strength. Where networks were anchored 
by legislation they were indeed strong, as participation in the network was required 
and the inscription of legislation framed the RFID system. Business cases, once written 
also became obligatory passage points (and inscriptions), providing guidance as to 
how the translation should progress. But they did not have the strength of legislation 
in dictating the translation process. Standards also attempted to become an OPP. At 
the technology level (in the various instances) it was successful as technology 
standards were required for the components of the various RFID systems to interact. 
However at the public-private sector level the question of the place of standards is still 
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unsettled with a number of global standards available, and no agreement as to which, 
if any, to follow. 
The use of ANT has allowed this study to expose the interactions of technology with 
humans and organisations without becoming deterministic, as well as complying with 
Hanseth and Monterio’s (1998) call to better understand the detail behind the 
formation of technology networks. ANT allows the technology to have a voice, 
important in a network which so strongly relies on the connectivity of technology 
components (the RFID tags, readers and databases). However, the forces acting on 
organisations are not easily deciphered by using ANT. Through the course of this 
research it became apparent that institutional forces were better explained by 
including a second theoretical framework namely Institutional Theory. As noted by 
Orlikowski and Barley (2001): 
“Technologies are simultaneously social and physical artefacts. Consequently, 
neither a strictly constructionist nor a strictly materialist stance are adequate for 
studying technologies in the work place. Elements of both perspectives are 
required” (p 149) 
7.1.3 ANT and Institutional Theory  
Orlikowski and Barley (2001) recommend combining Institutional Theory with other 
theories, specifically recommending theoretical approaches from Information 
Technology and Organisational Sciences in order to integrate an understanding of how 
the social and technical interact, “building a bridge” (p. 149) between the two. They 
speculated this would allow for the avoidance of technological determinism as well as 
avoiding an excess of social constructionism in the description of technology/social 
systems. Despite Institutional Theory being constructivist in nature (while ANT is not), 
this study has shown that the two work well together as lenses into a network which 
contains both technology and organisational actants. ANT describes how RFID systems 
come into being and how are they performed; how they become established, 
stabilised and maintained. Institutional Theory describes how organisations act or 
change when influenced by various forces, operating on an institutional or macro level. 
In the context of an organisational approach these two theories are complementary, 
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able to observe both the nature of technology and the organisation to expose the 
relationships between the actants. Further, the symmetrical view adopted by ANT 
(where all things human or non-human are considered to be able to act or have 
agency) struggles with complex institutional or organisational actants as it 
theoretically requires extensive investigation of each individual element of the 
organisation, as macro actants are made up of micro actants. Such an in depth 
investigation is not practicable in the case of large institutional actants. Instead, the 
addition of Institutional Theory allowed for the behaviour of organisational actants to 
be further explained without the need to examine each actant in micro-detail. 
Although it is acknowledged that the Institutional Theory concepts could themselves 
be considered to be black boxes. 
From an Institutional Theory viewpoint, coercive, normative and mimetic pressures 
are clearly apparent in the RFID network. For example, legislation represented a 
strong coercive pressure requiring compliance, and matching with its ANT role as an 
inscription or OPP. Similarly the drive for standardisation was a normative pressure in 
the institutional sense and an inscriptive one in the ANT sense. Mimetic pressure while 
less obvious was still present, partly shown through the need to align standards 
regimes, and also through organisations falling into alignment with what other 
organisations were doing in the RFID network. At a more macro level, the action of the 
Internet of Things (treated as an actant in this research) might also be considered to 
be Institutional in nature, if the Internet of Things itself is considered to be an 
institution. This would be unconventional but still acceptable under the definition of 
institutions proposed by Jepperson (1991, p. 145), in that the Internet of Things is 
indeed a “pattern that has attained a certain state or property”. As an actant the 
Internet of Things tempts the network with a vision of complete connectivity. As an 
institutional actor the Internet of Things could be considered to exert either a 
normative pressure, through the action of various professional bodies influencing RFID 
systems owners to comply with Internet of Things standards, or a mimetic pressure as 
organisations wanting to join the Internet of Things copy the actions of other 
organisations. If indeed the Internet of Things could be considered an institution, 
could other complex socio-technical networks be thought of this way? Such a 
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discussion is outside the scope of this thesis but does suggest an area where further 
research might prove interesting. 
The complexity of modern information systems, which include numerous 
technological as well as human and organisational actants, leaves us asking how best 
to understand them. The use of ANT at an organisational level is unusual compared to 
the majority of ANT studies where a far more micro (case based) perspective is taken. 
However, in this study the macro view has allowed for a rich picture of the 
forces/mediators that act on the network to be discovered. In combination with 
Institutional Theory this has allowed the actions of larger organisational actants to be 
exposed and understood, along with those of smaller micro actants. Thus a multi-
dimensional view was presented that would not have been possible with the use of a 
single theory alone. The ability to map the types of pressures exerted in an 
Institutional situation, with the responses to the offer of translation suggested by 
Latour (1987) further demonstrates the compatibility of the two theories.  In short, 
while ANT can open up the black box of institutions, Institutional Theory can help 
explain it. 
7.2 The RFID Network in the Public-Private Sector Context 
The story of the network, and the influence of the mediators described how the 
various actants constructed the network. However, this study was also interested in 
the higher level issue of how the sectors acted together. Framed by the perceptions 
that actants in each sector had of the other sector, this story became more mundane 
the longer the sectors worked together. As the actants became familiar with each 
other they appeared to forget the differences between their sectors and behaved 
simply as organisations working together, with the relationships focused on the 
individuals. Often criticisms or compliments that could be directed at one sector, 
where many mediators were concerned, could be directed at both. Interestingly, this 
observation is also a reflection of what might be expected by Institutional Theory; with 
its focus on isomorphism suggesting that organisations are driven to become more 
similar over time through institutional pressure. However, there were still differences 
between the two sectors notably in the way privacy and security were handled. This 
was seen to be related to the nature of data being held by the public sector which 
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meant that this sector was more sensitive to considerations around security and 
privacy. These differences showed the importance of understanding the data held by 
RFID systems, and putting in place appropriate protections, as the private sector 
particularly were less concerned about matters of security and privacy. It is important 
to take note of these differences when considering cross sector RFID systems as the 
mixing of the sectors changes translation by strengthening the effects of the privacy 
and security mediators. So, while there was some evidence of public-private 
isomorphism, it was clear that there were still considerable and significant differences 
between the two sectors.  
The appearance of the public sector as a multiplicity, with at least four different 
performances of the public sector apparent, added to the complexity of the network. 
In particular the difficulty some actants had distinguishing the public sector from 
government, and problems around public sector actants being clear on what role they 
should be performing in relation to the network, led to confusion. There is no question 
that the roles of the public sector are multiple, and an understanding of which role is 
being enacted is essential to a smooth translation/mobilisation. In other words, when 
operating in a particular network it is important for public sector actants to 
understand whether they are operating as a regulator producing legislation to frame 
the network; an enforcer of such legislation; a member of the network participating in 
the RFID system; or a funder or provider of services to network members. Where 
acting as a regulator this study has shown it is also necessary to understand the 
strength of legislation and how this might affect the operation of the various networks.  
But the question still remains at the higher level RFID network in the public-private 
sector – is the network cohesive and complete or is it fragmented? As Latour (2002, p. 
291) finds with Aramis “the demand for it [Aramis] is undefined, the feasibility of the 
vehicle is uncertain, its costs are variable, its operating conditions are chancy, its 
political support – like all political support – is inconsistent.” These are the very 
problems seen within the RFID network studied. Some systems studied are complete 
and well maintained, supported by politicians, and with strong inscriptions such as 
legislation and standards in place. Others are not well supported; they suffer from 
financial problems, the mediators act unpredictably, and the network does not appear 
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to be particularly feasible. Overall the individual RFID systems do not, and due to a 
lack of an agreed standard often cannot, interconnect with each other. The sensitive 
nature of data collected by some public sector organisations was also an issue. It is 
unlikely that this data would ever be available for sharing, nor would it be appropriate 
to do so. However, a nuanced understanding of the nature of data collected was seen 
as being central to the ability to share it. A more open approach by some public sector 
organisations, based on this understanding, offers hope of greater public-private 
sector integration around RFID networks. Further questions arising around the 
problematisations themselves, whether the technology being used is appropriate to 
the problem, or even whether the correct questions are being asked, are also 
challenges that need to be addressed.  
This conclusion has so far focused on what was observable within the RFID network 
studied. However, the stability of the network translation itself has not been 
addressed. If the network is not stable, something that might be implied from the 
actions of the mediators changing between mediator and intermediary state, the 
question can be asked is there a future state (or translation) for the network? 
Although the ANT paradigm does not allow for more than a description of what is (and 
what has been), it does offer some assistance here. ANT suggests that micro networks 
can join together to form macro networks, especially in the presence of strong 
inscriptions such as standards or legislation. If we lift the context of our discussion for 
a moment from “RFID used in applications that cross the border between public and 
private sectors” to all RFID applications, we can see that the translation we are 
investigating is by no means the only translation that has been undertaken by the 
network. The already discussed IFF system was an initial translation of the RFID 
network, it was followed by others, influenced by various technology changes, leading 
to the network translation studied here. There will be more translations, occurring at 
the speed of technology change, stabilised in part by standards and legislation, where 
necessary. These may eventually lead to a widely available, fully connected Internet of 
Things within the public-private context. 
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7.3 Contribution to Theory 
This study makes a number of contributions to theory, research and practice. First, 
this study makes a theoretical contribution by offering a possible method by which to 
study complex technology systems. The combination of ANT and Institutional Theory 
suggests that at the organisational/institutional level it is possible to understand both 
the formation of networks through the ANT translation, and the pressures put upon 
organisations and institutions to join (or reject) the network through the Institutional 
Theory lens. The way organisations respond to institutional pressures, and offers to 
enrol in the network translation, were seen to be related, and this relationship was 
invaluable in understanding organisational behaviour, answering a weakness in ANT 
which struggles to understand organisational behaviour. Further, ANT also offers 
Institutional Theory a way to understand the micro-foundations of Institutional 
behaviour, which have been difficult to locate using just the Institutional Theory 
framework. The combination of ANT and Institutional Theory answers the call by 
Bardaki et al. (2010) to provide a framework to assist in understanding the complexity 
of modern organisational systems and points towards a combined theoretical 
framework through which complex socio-technological systems can be understood. 
7.4 Contribution to Research 
This study also addresses the gap in literature outlined in the introduction by 
expanding understanding of how RFID systems that cross the boundary between the 
public and the private sector are established and maintained. Specifically the finding 
that a combination of mediators influences the RFID network has not been previously 
reported. Some of these were identified in the literature, either individually or in 
combination, but the importance of prior organisational knowledge has been under-
reported. Also, the disconnect between benefits expected from RFID systems, and 
those realised, has not been comprehensively investigated. This research was able to 
determine that poor understanding of data gathered by RFID systems may explain this 
observation, as shown in Section 5.3.3, Benefits and Business Case.  
The theoretical nature of the mediators model also contributes to research by offering 
a framework that could be used as a guide in studying other similar technology 
systems, either quantitatively or qualitatively. Further, The use of ANT, with its lack of 
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constraints on the form the actants take, allowed for the identification of the public 
sector as a multiplicity. This would have been difficult if a more restrictive technology 
implementation or adoption framework was used. The use of ANT in this way 
contributes to research as it suggests a method by which complexity in large 
distributed technology systems can be understood. 
7.5 Contribution/Implications for Practice 
The mediator’s framework contributes to practice by pointing towards issues that 
need to be considered, when implementing and managing RFID systems in the public-
private sector context. The nature of mediators, and their ability to change between 
mediator and intermediary states assists organisations in understanding the issues on 
which their RFID systems can falter. Some of the mediators identified were 
unexpected, especially the need for understanding of the benefits derived from RFID 
systems, and the need for organisations to understand and appropriately manage 
such systems. The mediators identified present a road-map to practice, highlighting 
the factors that should be considered for successful RFID systems. Further, combined 
with the understanding of RFID systems derived from ANT, it can be seen that those 
implementing cross border RFID systems need to ensure they address all the 
mediators in problematisation. This is especially true of the inter-organisational 
mediators which currently appear as intermediaries in problematisation stage of the 
ANT translation. 
This study also contributes to understanding the interaction of the public and private 
sectors around complex technology systems. The uncovering of the multiplicity of the 
public sector is important for practitioners as it alerts them to the different aspects of 
the public sector that need to be taken into account when participating in public-
private RFID systems. Further, the understanding that the public sector is multiple, 
should reduce confusion, as practitioners will be able to highlight which aspect of the 
public sector they need to interact with and focus on that aspect thus increasing 
efficiency of interaction. For researchers this finding offers a possible reason for some 
of the confusion surrounding public-private sector technology systems, and suggests 
research directions for determining the effects of this multiplicity.  
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Finally, this study adds to the understanding of the place of RFID technology within 
the range of technology concepts, suggesting that while RFID technology definitely 
contributes to the pervasive/ubiquitous/invisible concepts, it does not yet approach 
the experiential model. Nor can RFID systems in the public-private context be 
considered to be part of the Internet of Things as they still exist within individual silos, 
although the possibility still exists that Internet of Things style systems could be 
implemented in the future. 
7.6 Limitations 
This research is partially limited by the descriptive nature of ANT. ANT is interested in 
what is and what has been, and thus is not able to predict outcomes. This prevents 
any speculation on the future of the network and also limits any generalisation to that 
which is observed within the network, although this limitation is also common to 
qualitative interpretivist research. However, sound methodology allows for a certain 
amount of trustworthiness in the results. The methodology adopted by this study 
(outlined in the Methodology chapter), includes rigorous design based on explicit 
theory. Attention was paid to coding reliability and sampling techniques in order to 
address this concern. Sound research design also addresses concerns around the 
researcher’s place in the construction of reality by ensuring the researcher recognises 
any bias or misinterpretation that might arise from this. Further, Hardy and Williams 
(2008) in an ANT study of e-government procurement, suggest that while ANT 
translations within a similar context vary according to local practices, the framework 
remained similar. They also found that broader government/institutional processes 
were similar – or isomorphic. This may allow for some higher level generalisation, and 
suggests that the mediators/intermediaries might be able to be applied to similar 
contextual networks. 
Another limitation of this study is its focus on the macro organisational and sector 
actants. Hanseth (1997) accuses ANT of manageralism, focusing on strong actants, and 
therefore making it difficult to locate those that refuse to be involved in the network. 
Institutional theory could also be accused of this as it focuses on pressures affecting 
organisations much more than individuals. As this study has also focused at the 
organisational level it is likely that the voice of the weaker actants (members of the 
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public for example) have not been fully represented. However, it would never have 
been possible to capture all the actants in the network because of time and distance 
constraints. Likewise, cultural differences may have been apparent in a larger more 
geographically distributed sample, but were not clearly observed in the network as 
studied. 
A further limitation arises from the maturity of the network. As the RFID network 
becomes more mature, and assuming issues such as infrastructure and standards are 
resolved, the mediators within the network may be expressed differently. There is no 
real way within the limitations of the ANT framework to anticipate what these 
differences may be.  
7.7 Future Study 
A number of aspects of this research could be interesting to investigate further. 
Theoretically, the utility of the combination of ANT, and Institutional Theory, has been 
demonstrated by this research. Given the number of complex technology systems 
where human and non-human actants interact on a daily basis, it would be valuable to 
further test this combined theoretical approach as it shows promise as a method to 
understand such human/technology networks. Further, the ability to deconstruct 
multi-organisational networks in order to determine their mediators would be of 
assistance in understanding both the networks and the nature of their interactions. 
Avenues for future research are also apparent from the uncovering of the mediators. 
The mediator model produced can be tested quantitatively in order to confirm the 
relationship of the various mediators, their relative strengths in different situations, 
and whether the grouping is appropriate. It may also be interesting to apply the model 
to other technologically distributed systems like those related to cloud computing or 
big data systems. This would test the applicability of the mediators’ model to other 
complex human/technology systems. The nature of the relationship between some of 
the mediators such as privacy, trust, and the type of the data being shared could also 
be further explored. Similarly, the question of the differences in treatment of privacy 
between the two sectors could be examined. The issue of the nature of benefits, and 
the disconnect between benefits anticipated and those actually realised is intriguing 
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and could be studied further. This disconnect in benefits might also be seen in other IT 
systems. Additionally, the effect of the uneven distribution of benefit and cost 
between actants in the network, is an important one especially for practice. This study 
has only briefly touched upon this issue and it warrants further investigation, 
especially given the strength of the finance mediator.  
The multiplicity of roles for the public sector, and the resulting confusion within the 
network, was only highlighted by this study, and might prove fruitful for public sector 
researchers. The effects of the different multiples could be further described, 
especially in relation to their influence on the network mediators. The private sector 
may also display multiple roles, and it could be worthwhile to explore this. The 
apparent lack of information systems focused research in respect of the multiplicity of 
roles in the public sector, suggests that this could be a rich area for researchers. Again 
it might be valuable to compare the situation seen within the RFID network with other 
networks that cross the boundary between the public and the private sector.  
From the institutional theory perspective, it may be interesting to explore the place of 
Institutional forces in driving public-private networks towards isomorphism, and 
whether or not this drive is changing the way the public-private sectors are defined. 
The possibility that technology systems may also act as institutions is one that was not 
explored in this research, but that may also provide a rich area for research, not only 
in the understanding of technology systems themselves but also in challenging the 
definition of an institution. 
All of the areas for future research suggested above provide good grounds for study, 
both in order to contribute to understanding how RFID enabled artefacts and the 
Internet of Things act in society, but also to understand more broadly the role of 
complex technological systems. The utility of the combination of ANT and Institutional 
Theory in understanding such systems is only just being explored and the power of 
this combination to unpick the complexities of socio-technical networks has not yet 
been realised. Future research will determine the usefulness of this combination and 
in doing so expand understanding of how technology systems interact with society in 
networks that cross the boundary between public and private sectors. 
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9 Appendix A – Inductive Coding Table 
Code Description 
Sector Interaction 
Sector Interaction 
Observations about the interaction of organisations in 
the RFID network. 
Sector Interaction – Getting 
Agreement 
Organisations work together to get agreement. 
Sector Interaction – Individual 
Based 
Where individuals are seen to represent 
organisations. 
Sector Interaction – Perception 
of Public Sector 
How the public sector is seen or perceived, either by 
the private sector, or within the public sector. 
Sector Interaction – Perception 
of Private Sector 
How the private sector is seen or perceived, either by 
the public sector, or within the private sector. 
Sector Interaction – Public 
Funding 
How organisations pursue or obtain public sector 
funding for RFID implementations. 
Sector Interaction – Public-
Private Comparison 
Comparison of public and private sector 
organisations. 
Sector Interaction – Public-
Private the Same 
Where public and private sector organisations act or 
are perceived to act in the same way. 
Sector Interaction – Role of 
Government 
The perceived or stated role of government within the 
RFID network. 
Sector Interaction – Third 
Parties 
How the implementations or systems work with third 
parties (parties that might not normally be involved 
with the network). 
Sector Interaction – Working 
Together 
How the organisations work together. 
Network Mediators 
Finance 
Finance - Cost Cost associated with the RFID network. 
Finance Cost /Barcode 
Comparison 
Comparison of the cost of RFID and Barcode systems. 
Finance – Cost Imposition 
How cost is imposed on one sector or organisation by 
another. 
Finance - Criticality 
Cost of RFID systems and willingness to pay, related to 
the criticality or otherwise of the system. 
Finance - Funding Funding/financing of RFID systems. 
Finance – Cost Infrastructure 
Cost of RFID related infrastructure including tags, 
readers, data storage etc. 
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Finance – Cost Sharing 
Sharing and/or allocation of costs between members 
of the RFID system. 
Infrastructure 
Infrastructure Infrastructure associated with the RFID network. 
Infrastructure – Design 
Covers the design of the RFID system infrastructure, 
placement of equipment and simplicity. 
Infrastructure – Environment 
Environment in which the RFID infrastructure is 
operating, includes humidity, presence of metals, 
location etc. 
Infrastructure – Health Concerns 
Health concerns associated with human exposure to 
RFID systems. 
Infrastructure – Standards 
Standards related specifically to RFID infrastructure 
tags, readers, transmission spectrum. Does not 
include data. 
Infrastructure - Tag 
Infrastructure comments related specifically to RFID 
tags. 
Organisational Knowledge 
Organisational Knowledge 
The amount of knowledge an organisation has related 
to RFID. 
Organisational Knowledge – 
Public Perception 
Perception the public has of RFID systems, and how 
organisations respond to that perception. Includes 
negative perceptions. 
Organisational Knowledge - 
Training 
Training provide to, or needed by, organisations in 
order to understand or use their RFID systems. 
Standards 
Standards - Compliance 
Why and how organisations comply or decide to 
comply with standards. 
Standards - Cost Cost of implementing standards specifically. 
Standards - Criticality 
The need for standards related to the criticality of the 
application. 
Standards - Hardware 
Standards, standards setting etc related to RFID 
systems hardware. 
Standards - International 
Standards at the international level, including 
international organisations. 
Standards - Proprietary 
Standards specific to a particular implementation, not 
designed or intended to be shared outside that 
system. 
Standards - Private Sector 
Standards related specifically to private sector 
attitudes, implementation and knowledge 
Standards - Public Sector 
Standards related specifically to public sector 
attitudes, implementation and knowledge 
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Standards - Setting 
Setting of standards, including those shared between 
public and private sectors. 
Intra-Organisational Mediators 
Data Sharing 
Data Sharing Data sharing associated with the RFID network. 
Data Sharing – Anonymisation 
Anonymisation of data could lead to increased data 
sharing. 
Data Sharing – Cross Sector Data sharing across sectors. 
Data Sharing – Privacy 
Privacy issues related specifically to the sharing of 
data and information. 
Data Sharing – Secure to Non 
Secure 
Sharing of data and information between secure and 
non secure environments. 
Data Sharing – Cross Jurisdiction Privacy Legislation, development and application. 
Privacy 
Privacy 
General discussion of privacy associated with the RFID 
network. 
Privacy – Access Access to information or data, in the privacy context. 
Privacy – Data Sharing 
Relates to the privacy issues surrounding the sharing 
of data and information between organisations or 
individuals. 
Privacy – International International privacy related issues. 
Privacy – Data Storage 
Privacy issues surrounding the storage of data, 
including jurisdiction. 
Privacy – Legislation Privacy Legislation, development and application. 
Privacy – Nature of Data 
The nature of data being collected or stored in RFID 
systems. Its origin and sensitivity. 
Privacy – Private Sector Privacy in the private sector context. 
Privacy – Public Sector Privacy in the public sector context. 
Privacy – Purpose of Collection 
The purpose for which data was collected, or about 
the relevance of purpose of collection. 
Privacy – Sector Differences 
Highlights the differences between sectors in their 
treatment of privacy related issues. 
Privacy – Self Regulation 
Self regulation of privacy matters, as opposed to 
legislated regulation. 
Privacy - Voluntariness 
Covers the voluntariness of interaction with the public 
sector . 
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Security 
Security Security of or associated with the RFID network. 
Security – Internet of Things 
Security related specifically to the RFID in the Internet 
of Things context. 
Security – Necessity The necessity of security in particular RFID systems. 
Security – Private Sector Security in the private sector context. 
Security – Public Sector Security in the public sector context. 
Trust 
Trust 
General discussion of trust associated with the RFID 
network. 
Trust – Between Sectors Trust between public and private sector entities. 
Trust – Building 
The building of trust between organisations and 
individuals. 
Trust – Internet of Things Trust in the context of the Internet of Things. 
Trust – Loss Loss of trust between organisations and individuals. 
Intra-Organisational Mediators 
Benefits 
Benefits 
Description of actual benefit derived from 
implementation of RFID system. 
Business Case 
Case written to support the implementation of RFID 
system. 
Benefits - Discovery/Realisation 
How the organisation found the benefits, or how 
benefits arose, as a result of RFID implementation. 
Data Management 
Data Management Data management associated with the RFID network. 
Data Management – Data 
Appropriateness 
How the nature of the data being gathered and its 
appropriateness to the task for which it is being used. 
Data Management – Negative 
Data 
How data that is perceived to be negative is received 
by the organisation. 
Data Management – Using Data The specifics of using data generated by RFID systems. 
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Organisational Management 
Organisational Management 
Organisational management associated with the RFID 
network. 
Organisational Management – 
Agreement 
Organisational management involved in getting 
agreement. 
Organisational Management – 
Change 
How organisations deal with the issues and 
complexities surrounding the changes required by 
RFID implementation. 
Organisational Management – 
Governance 
How governance affects RFID systems. 
Organisational Management – 
Management Support 
How support from various management layers affects 
RFID implementation and system. 
Organisational Management - 
Staff 
How the treatment and attitudes of staff affect RFID 
networks. 
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10 Appendix B – Deductive Coding Table 
Code Description 
Actor-Network Theory 
Black Box 
Where an actant, object, organisation is accepted as it 
stands and thought to be unchanging. 
Focal Actant 
The initial actant within a network, which organises 
and runs the translation. 
Inscription 
A program or action written into a technology or 
artefact. 
Intermediary A predictable element of the network. 
Mediator 
Something of which the input is not a good predictor 
of the output, can cause unexpected results. 
Multiplicity Indicates more than one aspect of an actant. 
Obligatory Passage Point 
A point through that must be passed in order for the 
translation to progress. 
Punctualisation 
Part of the network is simplified and assumed to act 
in the same way. 
Offer Response - Acceptance 
Where an actant accepts the offer of enrolment 
during translation. 
Offer Response - Disregard 
Where an actant disregards or ignores the offer of 
enrolment during translation. 
Offer Response - Dispute 
Where an actant disputes the offer of enrolment 
during translation. 
Translation – Problematisation 
The stage of translation where the focal actant 
describes the problem. 
Translation – Interessement 
The stage of translation where the focal actant 
attempts to interest others. 
Translation – Enrolment The stage of translation where roles are defined. 
Translation – Mobilisation 
The stage of translation where the focal actant works 
to ensure that others remain enrolled. 
Institutional Theory 
Coercion 
Pressure from formal or informal requirements, 
regulation. 
Mimetic Pressure to conform to what others are doing. 
Normative 
Pressure to follow the dictates of standards or 
professional bodies. 
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Pressure Response – 
Acquiescence 
Compliance with pressures for perceived good. 
Pressure  Response – 
Compromise 
Compliance with institutional pressures through 
compromise. 
Pressure Response – Avoidance 
Action taken to avoid complying with institutional 
pressures. 
Pressure Response – Defiance 
Defiance of, ignoring, or dismissing institutional 
pressures. 
Pressure  Response - 
Manipulation 
Attempting to deflect institutional pressures through 
attempting to control or manipulate. 
RFID Codes 
Bar Code 
Older form of identification technology based on a 
printed bar code. Identifies to product type. 
EPC 
Abbreviation for Electronic Product Code, a individual 
item level identification code. 
EPCIS 
Abbreviation for Electronic Product Code Information 
System, a middleware system carrying details 
associated with each EPC. 
Other Numbering Scheme 
Other numbering schemes used to individually 
identify RFID enabled items. 
Reader Device to read RFID tags. 
Tag RFID tag. 
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11 Appendix C – Contact Summary Sheet 
 
Summary 
Contact Type:  
Contact Date:    Today’s Date:  
Contact Name:    Contact Location:  
Contact Organisation:  
 
1. Main issues or themes in this contact: 
 
 
2. Summary of information gained (or not gained) in each target area: 
 
a. Demographics 
 
 
b. How the organisation became involved with RFID? 
 
 
c. How RFID is used? 
 
 
d. How RFID interacts with other organisations? 
 
 
e. How will it be used in the future? 
 
 
f. Other contacts 
 
 
3. Anything else salient, interesting, illuminating or important in this contact? 
 
 
4. Follow up required or new (or remaining) target questions in considering the next 
contact with this site? 
 
 
5. Thoughts generated by coding
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12 Appendix D – Consent to Participate 
 
Consent to Participation in Research 
 
 I have been given, and understood, an explanation of this research project.  
 I have had an opportunity to ask questions and I am satisfied with the answers I 
received. 
 I understand that I can withdraw myself (or any information I provide) from this 
project before 1st August 2012, by contacting the researcher. In this case all the 
information I provided will be excluded from the study. 
 I understand that this research is funded by, but independent of, GS1 New Zealand. 
 I understand that any information I provide will only be accessed by the researcher 
and her supervisors. 
 I am aware that the published results will not use my name; however my position title 
may be used unless otherwise requested. 
 I understand that the digital recording and transcriptions of interviews will be kept 
secure at all times, as will any documents I give to the researcher. 
 I understand that I may review the transcript of my interview and will be able to make 
clarifications and corrections if necessary.  
 I understand that the data I provide will not be used for any other purpose or released 
to others, including GS1 New Zealand.  
 I understand that I will receive a summary of findings on completion of the project. 
I consent to participate in this research project. 
 
Signed: ___________________________________________________ 
 
Date: _____________________________________________________ 
 
Name: ____________________________________________________
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13 Appendix E – Glossary 
Term19 Definition 
Actor-Network Theory (ANT) 
Theory developed primarily by Bruno Latour, John Law and 
Michael Callon, which believes everything (human and non-
human alike) has agency and can act in a social network. 
AIDC 
Abbreviation for Automatic Identification and Data Capture 
– technology used to automatically identify items, for 
example RFID technology. 
EPC 
Abbreviation for Electronic Product Code – the unique code 
by which items can be identified using RFID technology. 
ERP 
Abbreviation for Enterprise Resource Planning – the process 
by which organisations electronically manage their 
business. 
IFF 
Abbreviation for Identify Friend or Foe, a very early RFID 
type technology in which aircraft were identified as friendly 
or not during World War 2. 
Institutional Theory 
Theory that describes how various pressures act on 
institutions in order to modify their behaviours. 
Internet of Things 
The network of uniquely and automatically identified 
artefacts, joined together through the internet. 
Performativity 
The actions taken in order to establish (or perform) an 
identity or thing. 
RFID 
Abbreviation for Radio Frequency Identification, a 
technology for uniquely and automatically identifying 
artefacts or objects. 
Supply Chain 
The flow of products, materials and items from their raw 
components, through manufacture and sale. 
 
                                                     
19
 Note that ANT and Institutional Theory are defined in the Deductive Coding table in Appendix B 
